About the proof-theoretic ordinals of weak fixed point theories

This paper presents several proof-theoretic results concerning weak fixed point theories over second order number theory with arithmetic comprehension and full or restricted induction on the natural numbers. It is also shown that there are natural second order theories which are proof-theoretically equivalent but have different proof-theoretic ordinal

Computational reverse mathematics and foundational analysis

Reverse mathematics studies which subsystems of second order arithmetic are equivalent to key theorems of ordinary, non-set-theoretic mathematics. The main philosophical application of reverse mathematics proposed thus far is foundational analysis, which explores the limits of different foundations for mathematics in a formally precise manner. This paper gives a detailed account of the motivations and methodology of foundational analysis, which have heretofore been largely left implicit in the practice. It then shows how this account can be fruitfully applied in the evaluation of major foundational approaches by a careful examination of two case studies: a partial realization of Hilbert's program due to Simpson [1988], and predicativism in the extended form due to Feferman and Sch\"{u}tte. Shore [2010, 2013] proposes that equivalences in reverse mathematics be proved in the same way as inequivalences, namely by considering only $\omega$-models of the systems in question. Shore refers to this approach as computational reverse mathematics. This paper shows that despite some attractive features, computational reverse mathematics is inappropriate for foundational analysis, for two major reasons. Firstly, the computable entailment relation employed in computational reverse mathematics does not preserve justification for the foundational programs above. Secondly, computable entailment is a $\Pi^1_1$ complete relation, and hence employing it commits one to theoretical resources which outstrip those available within any foundational approach that is proof-theoretically weaker than $\Pi^1_1\text{-}\mathsf{CA}_0$.Comment: Submitted. 41 page

The modal logic of set-theoretic potentialism and the potentialist maximality principles

We analyze the precise modal commitments of several natural varieties of set-theoretic potentialism, using tools we develop for a general model-theoretic account of potentialism, building on those of Hamkins, Leibman and L\"owe, including the use of buttons, switches, dials and ratchets. Among the potentialist conceptions we consider are: rank potentialism (true in all larger $V_\beta$); Grothendieck-Zermelo potentialism (true in all larger $V_\kappa$ for inaccessible cardinals $\kappa$); transitive-set potentialism (true in all larger transitive sets); forcing potentialism (true in all forcing extensions); countable-transitive-model potentialism (true in all larger countable transitive models of ZFC); countable-model potentialism (true in all larger countable models of ZFC); and others. In each case, we identify lower bounds for the modal validities, which are generally either S4.2 or S4.3, and an upper bound of S5, proving in each case that these bounds are optimal. The validity of S5 in a world is a potentialist maximality principle, an interesting set-theoretic principle of its own. The results can be viewed as providing an analysis of the modal commitments of the various set-theoretic multiverse conceptions corresponding to each potentialist account.Comment: 36 pages. Commentary can be made about this article at http://jdh.hamkins.org/set-theoretic-potentialism. Minor revisions in v2; further minor revisions in v

Iterated reflection principles over full disquotational truth

Iterated reflection principles have been employed extensively to unfold epistemic commitments that are incurred by accepting a mathematical theory. Recently this has been applied to theories of truth. The idea is to start with a collection of Tarski-biconditionals and arrive by finitely iterated reflection at strong compositional truth theories. In the context of classical logic it is incoherent to adopt an initial truth theory in which A and 'A is true' are inter-derivable. In this article we show how in the context of a weaker logic, which we call Basic De Morgan Logic, we can coherently start with such a fully disquotational truth theory and arrive at a strong compositional truth theory by applying a natural uniform reflection principle a finite number of times

Model Theoretic Complexity of Automatic Structures

We study the complexity of automatic structures via well-established concepts from both logic and model theory, including ordinal heights (of well-founded relations), Scott ranks of structures, and Cantor-Bendixson ranks (of trees). We prove the following results: 1) The ordinal height of any automatic well- founded partial order is bounded by \omega^\omega ; 2) The ordinal heights of automatic well-founded relations are unbounded below the first non-computable ordinal; 3) For any computable ordinal there is an automatic structure of Scott rank at least that ordinal. Moreover, there are automatic structures of Scott rank the first non-computable ordinal and its successor; 4) For any computable ordinal, there is an automatic successor tree of Cantor-Bendixson rank that ordinal.Comment: 23 pages. Extended abstract appeared in Proceedings of TAMC '08, LNCS 4978 pp 514-52

A predicative variant of a realizability tripos for the Minimalist Foundation.

open2noHere we present a predicative variant of a realizability tripos validating the intensional level of the Minimalist Foundation extended with Formal Church thesis.the file attached contains the whole number of the journal including the mentioned pubblicationopenMaietti, Maria Emilia; Maschio, SamueleMaietti, MARIA EMILIA; Maschio, Samuel

Hyperations, Veblen progressions and transfinite iterations of ordinal functions

In this paper we introduce hyperations and cohyperations, which are forms of transfinite iteration of ordinal functions. Hyperations are iterations of normal functions. Unlike iteration by pointwise convergence, hyperation preserves normality. The hyperation of a normal function f is a sequence of normal functions so that f^0= id, f^1 = f and for all ordinals \alpha, \beta we have that f^(\alpha + \beta) = f^\alpha f^\beta. These conditions do not determine f^\alpha uniquely; in addition, we require that the functions be minimal in an appropriate sense. We study hyperations systematically and show that they are a natural refinement of Veblen progressions. Next, we define cohyperations, very similar to hyperations except that they are left-additive: given \alpha, \beta, f^(\alpha + \beta)= f^\beta f^\alpha. Cohyperations iterate initial functions which are functions that map initial segments to initial segments. We systematically study cohyperations and see how they can be employed to define left inverses to hyperations. Hyperations provide an alternative presentation of Veblen progressions and can be useful where a more fine-grained analysis of such sequences is called for. They are very amenable to algebraic manipulation and hence are convenient to work with. Cohyperations, meanwhile, give a novel way to describe slowly increasing functions as often appear, for example, in proof theory