22 research outputs found
Vehicle Communication using Secrecy Capacity
We address secure vehicle communication using secrecy capacity. In
particular, we research the relationship between secrecy capacity and various
types of parameters that determine secrecy capacity in the vehicular wireless
network. For example, we examine the relationship between vehicle speed and
secrecy capacity, the relationship between the response time and secrecy
capacity of an autonomous vehicle, and the relationship between transmission
power and secrecy capacity. In particular, the autonomous vehicle has set the
system modeling on the assumption that the speed of the vehicle is related to
the safety distance. We propose new vehicle communication to maintain a certain
level of secrecy capacity according to various parameters. As a result, we can
expect safer communication security of autonomous vehicles in 5G
communications.Comment: 17 Pages, 12 Figure
Evaluating On-demand Pseudonym Acquisition Policies in Vehicular Communication Systems
Standardization and harmonization efforts have reached a consensus towards
using a special-purpose Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI) in upcoming
Vehicular Communication (VC) systems. However, there are still several
technical challenges with no conclusive answers; one such an important yet open
challenge is the acquisition of shortterm credentials, pseudonym: how should
each vehicle interact with the VPKI, e.g., how frequently and for how long?
Should each vehicle itself determine the pseudonym lifetime? Answering these
questions is far from trivial. Each choice can affect both the user privacy and
the system performance and possibly, as a result, its security. In this paper,
we make a novel systematic effort to address this multifaceted question. We
craft three generally applicable policies and experimentally evaluate the VPKI
system performance, leveraging two large-scale mobility datasets. We consider
the most promising, in terms of efficiency, pseudonym acquisition policies; we
find that within this class of policies, the most promising policy in terms of
privacy protection can be supported with moderate overhead. Moreover, in all
cases, this work is the first to provide tangible evidence that the
state-of-the-art VPKI can serve sizable areas or domain with modest computing
resources.Comment: 6 pages, 7 figures, IoV-VoI'1
Analyzing Attacks on Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC)
Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) is one of the driving applications
of vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) and promises to bring more efficient and
faster transportation through cooperative behavior between vehicles. In CACC,
vehicles exchange information, which is relied on to partially automate
driving; however, this reliance on cooperation requires resilience against
attacks and other forms of misbehavior. In this paper, we propose a rigorous
attacker model and an evaluation framework for this resilience by quantifying
the attack impact, providing the necessary tools to compare controller
resilience and attack effectiveness simultaneously. Although there are
significant differences between the resilience of the three analyzed
controllers, we show that each can be attacked effectively and easily through
either jamming or data injection. Our results suggest a combination of
misbehavior detection and resilient control algorithms with graceful
degradation are necessary ingredients for secure and safe platoons.Comment: 8 pages (author version), 5 Figures, Accepted at 2017 IEEE Vehicular
Networking Conference (VNC
Etude de Faisabilité des Mécanismes de Détection de Mauvais Comportement dans les systèmes de transport intelligents coopératifs (C-ITS)
International audience—Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C–ITS) is an emerging technology that aims at improving road safety, traffic efficiency and drivers experience. To this end, vehicles cooperate with each others and the infrastructure by exchanging Vehicle–to–X communication (V2X) messages. In such communicating systems message authentication and privacy are of paramount importance. The commonly adopted solution to cope with these issues relies on the use of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that provides digital certificates to entities of the system. Even if the use of pseudonym certificates mitigate the privacy issues, the PKI cannot address all cyber threats. That is why we need a mechanism that enable each entity of the system to detect and report misbehaving neighbors. In this paper, we provide a state-of-the-art of misbehavior detection methods. We then discuss their feasibility with respect to current standards and law compliance as well as hardware/software requirements
Generation of realistic signal strength measurements for a 5G Rogue Base Station attack scenario
The detection and prevention of cyber-attacks is one of the main challenges in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) autonomous platooning scenarios. A key tool in this activity is the measurement report that is generated by User Equipment (UE), containing received signal strength and location information. Such data is effective in techniques to detect Rogue Base Stations (RBS) or Subscription Permanent Identifier SUPI/5G-GUTI catchers. An undetected RBS could result in unwanted consequences such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and subscriber privacy attacks on the network and UE. Motivated by this, this paper presents the novel simulation of a 5G cellular system to generate a realistic dataset of signal strength measurements that can later be used in the development of techniques to identify and prevent RBS interventions. The results show that the tool can create a large dataset of realistic measurement reports which can be used to develop and validate RBS detection techniques
SECMACE: Scalable and Robust Identity and Credential Management Infrastructure in Vehicular Communication Systems
Several years of academic and industrial research efforts have converged to a
common understanding on fundamental security building blocks for the upcoming
Vehicular Communication (VC) systems. There is a growing consensus towards
deploying a special-purpose identity and credential management infrastructure,
i.e., a Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI), enabling pseudonymous
authentication, with standardization efforts towards that direction. In spite
of the progress made by standardization bodies (IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI) and
harmonization efforts (Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC)), significant
questions remain unanswered towards deploying a VPKI. Deep understanding of the
VPKI, a central building block of secure and privacy-preserving VC systems, is
still lacking. This paper contributes to the closing of this gap. We present
SECMACE, a VPKI system, which is compatible with the IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI
standards specifications. We provide a detailed description of our
state-of-the-art VPKI that improves upon existing proposals in terms of
security and privacy protection, and efficiency. SECMACE facilitates
multi-domain operations in the VC systems and enhances user privacy, notably
preventing linking pseudonyms based on timing information and offering
increased protection even against honest-but-curious VPKI entities. We propose
multiple policies for the vehicle-VPKI interactions, based on which and two
large-scale mobility trace datasets, we evaluate the full-blown implementation
of SECMACE. With very little attention on the VPKI performance thus far, our
results reveal that modest computing resources can support a large area of
vehicles with very low delays and the most promising policy in terms of privacy
protection can be supported with moderate overhead.Comment: 14 pages, 9 figures, 10 tables, IEEE Transactions on Intelligent
Transportation System