3,356 research outputs found

    A Survey on Password Guessing

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    Text password has served as the most popular method for user authentication so far, and is not likely to be totally replaced in foreseeable future. Password authentication offers several desirable properties (e.g., low-cost, highly available, easy-to-implement, reusable). However, it suffers from a critical security issue mainly caused by the inability to memorize complicated strings of humans. Users tend to choose easy-to-remember passwords which are not uniformly distributed in the key space. Thus, user-selected passwords are susceptible to guessing attacks. In order to encourage and support users to use strong passwords, it is necessary to simulate automated password guessing methods to determine the passwords' strength and identify weak passwords. A large number of password guessing models have been proposed in the literature. However, little attention was paid to the task of providing a systematic survey which is necessary to review the state-of-the-art approaches, identify gaps, and avoid duplicate studies. Motivated by that, we conduct a comprehensive survey on all password guessing studies presented in the literature from 1979 to 2022. We propose a generic methodology map to present an overview of existing methods. Then, we explain each representative approach in detail. The experimental procedures and available datasets used to evaluate password guessing models are summarized, and the reported performances of representative studies are compared. Finally, the current limitations and the open problems as future research directions are discussed. We believe that this survey is helpful to both experts and newcomers who are interested in password securityComment: 35 pages, 5 figures, 5 table

    Improving the Eco-system of Passwords

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    Password-based authentication is perhaps the most widely used method for user authentication. Passwords are both easy to understand and use, and easy to implement. With these advantages, password-based authentication is likely to stay as an important part of security in the foreseeable future. One major weakness of password-based authentication is that many users tend to choose weak passwords that are easy to guess. In this dissertation, we address the challenge and improve the eco-system of passwords in multiple aspects. Firstly, we provide methodologies that help password research. To be more specific, we propose Probability Threshold Graphs, which is superior to Guess Number Graphs when comparing password models and password datasets. We also introduce rich literature of statistical language modeling into password modeling and show that if used correctly, whole-string Markov models outperform Probabilistic Context Free Grammar models. Secondly, we improve password policies and practice used by websites by studying how to best check weak passwords. We model different password strength checking methods as Password Ranking Algorithms (PRAs), and introduce two methods for comparing different PRAs: the β-Residual Strength Graph and the Normalized β-Residual Strength Graph. Finally, we examine the security and usability of commonly suggested password generation strategies. We find that for mnemonic sentence-based strategies, differences in the exact instructions have a tremendous impact on the security level of the resulting passwords. For word-based strategies, security of the resulting passwords mainly depends on the number of words required, and requiring at least 3 words is likely to result in passwords stronger than the general passwords chosen by typical users

    Quantifying the Security of Recognition Passwords: Gestures and Signatures

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    Gesture and signature passwords are two-dimensional figures created by drawing on the surface of a touchscreen with one or more fingers. Prior results about their security have used resilience to either shoulder surfing, a human observation attack, or dictionary attacks. These evaluations restrict generalizability since the results are: non-comparable to other password systems (e.g. PINs), harder to reproduce, and attacker-dependent. Strong statements about the security of a password system use an analysis of the statistical distribution of the password space, which models a best-case attacker who guesses passwords in order of most likely to least likely. Estimating the distribution of recognition passwords is challenging because many different trials need to map to one password. In this paper, we solve this difficult problem by: (1) representing a recognition password of continuous data as a discrete alphabet set, and (2) estimating the password distribution through modeling the unseen passwords. We use Symbolic Aggregate approXimation (SAX) to represent time series data as symbols and develop Markov chains to model recognition passwords. We use a partial guessing metric, which demonstrates how many guesses an attacker needs to crack a percentage of the entire space, to compare the security of the distributions for gestures, signatures, and Android unlock patterns. We found the lower bounds of the partial guessing metric of gestures and signatures are much higher than the upper bound of the partial guessing metric of Android unlock patterns

    Introducing a Machine Learning Password Metric Based on EFKM Clustering Algorithm

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    we introduce a password strength metric using Enhanced Fuzzy K-Means clustering algorithm (EFKM henceforth). The EFKM is trained on the OWASP list of 10002 weak passwords. After that, the optimized centroids are maximized to develop a password strength metric. The resulting meter was validated by contrasting with three entropy-based metrics using two datasets: the training dataset (OWASP) and a dataset that we collected from github website that contains 5189451 leaked passwords. Our metric is able to recognize all the passwords from the OWASP as weak passwords only. Regarding the leaked passwords, the metric recognizes almost the entire set as weak passwords. We found that the results of the EFKM-based metric and the entropy-based meters are consistent. Hence the EFKM metric demonstrates its validity as an efficient password strength checker

    Using Context-Based Password Strength Meter to Nudge Users' Password Generating Behavior: A Randomized Experiment

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    Encouraging users to create stronger passwords is one of the key issues in password-based authentication. It is particularly important as prior works have highlighted that most passwords are weak. Yet, passwords are still the most commonly used authentication method. This paper seeks to mitigate the issue of weak passwords by proposing a context-based password strength meter. We conduct a randomized experiment on Amazon MTurk and observe the change in users’ behavior. The results show that our proposed method is significantly effective. Users exposed to our password strength meter are more likely to change their passwords after seeing the warning message, and those new passwords are stronger. Furthermore, users are willing to invest their time to learn about creating a stronger password, even in a traditional password strength meter setting. Our findings suggest that simply incorporating contextual information to password strength meters could be an effective method in promoting more secure behaviors among end users

    Using Context-Based Password Strength Meter to Nudge Users\u27 Password Generating Behavior: A Randomized Experiment

    Get PDF
    Encouraging users to create stronger passwords is one of the key issues in password-based authentication. It is particularly important as prior works have highlighted that most passwords are weak. Yet, passwords are still the most commonly used authentication method. This paper seeks to mitigate the issue of weak passwords by proposing a context-based password strength meter. We conduct a randomized experiment on Amazon MTurk and observe the change in users’ behavior. The results show that our proposed method is significantly effective. Users exposed to our password strength meter are more likely to change their passwords after seeing the warning message, and those new passwords are stronger. Furthermore, users are willing to invest their time to learn about creating a stronger password, even in a traditional password strength meter setting. Our findings suggest that simply incorporating contextual information to password strength meters could be an effective method in promoting more secure behaviors among end users
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