A Design of MAC Model Based on the Separation of Duties and Data Coloring: DSDC-MAC

Among the access control methods for database security, there is Mandatory Access Control (MAC) model in which the security level is set to both the subject and the object to enhance the security control. Legacy MAC models have focused only on one thing, either confidentiality or integrity. Thus, it can cause collisions between security policies in supporting confidentiality and integrity simultaneously. In addition, they do not provide a granular security class policy of subjects and objects in terms of subjects\u27 roles or tasks. In this paper, we present the security policy of Bell_LaPadula Model (BLP) model and Biba model as one complemented policy. In addition, Duties Separation and Data Coloring (DSDC)-MAC model applying new data coloring security method is proposed to enable granular access control from the viewpoint of Segregation of Duty (SoD). The case study demonstrated that the proposed modeling work maintains the practicality through the design of Human Resources management System. The proposed model in this study is suitable for organizations like military forces or intelligence agencies where confidential information should be carefully handled. Furthermore, this model is expected to protect systems against malicious insiders and improve the confidentiality and integrity of data

An Analysis of and Perspective on the Information Security Maturity Model: a case study of a Public and a Private Sector Company

Information Security (IS) is a concept that is related to protecting a set of data in order to preserve the value it has for an individual or an organization. A review of the literature shows there are four main aspects related to IS: confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation. Based on these four aspects, a new framework is put forward for analyzing the information security maturity model (ISMM) in an organization, assuming that each organization has a minimum level of information security policies in each aspect, taking into consideration the percentage of policies that this organization has from all those cited in our model. At the end, a case study was conducted in order to analyze the ISMM of a public and private sector company

Managerial Control Effects on Information Security Policy Compliance Intentions: Considerations of Formal and Informal Modes of Control

With the continued advancement in computer and digital technologies, companies, institutions, and organizations worldwide have leveraged new information technology to increase efficiency and effectiveness for all aspects of their business functions. Oftentimes, the information processed and stored on information systems poses an information security risk to the organization, employees, and clients alike. Therefore, a comprehensive and effective information security management program is essential to protecting data from accidental or intentional exposure to actors who wish to gain access to data to make a profit by selling the information to the highest bidder, utilize the stolen data for their own internal research and development, or use the data to damage a targeted institution for nefarious motives. Employees’ compliance with corporate information security policies is a necessary component to the success of the corporate information security management program. In this study, I adopted the control theory and developed a research model to explain how formal and informal organizational controls affect employees’ intentions to comply with information security policies. To test the model, I collected data from 303 respondents about their perceptions of their organizations’ formal and informal control modes along with their respective intentions to comply with information security policies. SEM-PLS analysis provided results that were only partially in consonance with previous studies and showed some additive effects when control modes were combined into a single model. I found clan control (informal) to have a significant and positive effect. I also found that adding the informal control modes into the model resulted in a different effect by rendering input control (formal) and self-control (informal) insignificant and changing the direction of the relationship of outcome control (formal) and behavior control (formal). In turn, these findings can help organizations set up proper controls to protect themselves from cyber threats and establish the most effective methods of control based on organizational context and control theory to ensure employees’ compliance with the established information security policies of their organizations

A Cloud-Oriented Cross-Domain Security Architecture

The Monterey Security Architecture addresses the need to share high-value data across multiple domains of different classification levels while enforcing information flow policies. The architecture allows users with different security authorizations to securely collaborate and exchange information using commodity computers and familiar commercial client software that generally lack the prerequisite assurance and functional security protections. MYSEA seeks to meet two compelling requirements, often assumed to be at odds: enforcing critical, mandatory security policies, and allowing access and collaboration in a familiar work environment. Recent additions to the MYSEA design expand the architecture to support a cloud of cross-domain services, hosted within a federation of multilevel secure (MLS) MYSEA servers. The MYSEA cloud supports single-sign on, service replication, and network-layer quality of security service. This new cross domain, distributed architecture follows the consumption and delivery model for cloud services, while maintaining the federated control model necessary to support and protect cross domain collaboration within the enterprise. The resulting architecture shows the feasibility of high-assurance, cross-domain services hosted within a community cloud suitable for interagency, or joint, collaboration. This paper summarizes the MYSEA architecture and discusses MYSEA's approach to provide an MLS-constrained cloud computing environment.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Nontransitive Policies Transpiled

Nontransitive Noninterference (NTNI) and Nontransitive Types (NTT) are a new security condition and enforcement for policies which, in contrast to Denning\u27s classical lattice model, assume no transitivity of the underlying flow relation. Nontransitive security policies are a natural fit for coarse-grained information-flow control where labels are specified at module rather than variable level of granularity.While the nontransitive and transitive policies pursue different goals and have different intuitions, this paper demonstrates that nontransitive noninterference can in fact be reduced to classical transitive noninterference. We develop a lattice encoding that establishes a precise relation between NTNI and classical noninterference. Our results make it possible to clearly position the new NTNI characterization with respect to the large body of work on noninterference. Further, we devise a lightweight program transformation that leverages standard flow-sensitive information-flow analyses to enforce nontransitive policies. We demonstrate several immediate benefits of our approach, both theoretical and practical. First, we improve the permissiveness over (while retaining the soundness of) the nonstandard NTT enforcement. Second, our results naturally generalize to a language with intermediate inputs and outputs. Finally, we demonstrate the practical benefits by utilizing state-of-the-art flow-sensitive tool JOANA to enforce nontransitive policies for Java programs

The development of IT and Telnet and its Impact in Business Security (non Security)

During the years, the people are more hungry for faster doing processes and works. There always is high possibility for loss business and markets by different attacks in different layers. In this paper is presented which are the challenges faced with information security on businesses during the rapid development IT and Telnet. This challenge requires stable technology, the standard platform and especially policies and rules for implementation security steps through those rapid changes in technology. In the paper are presented some of statistical review about the causes of information damage, which are advantages and weaknesses using new information technology. At the end is presented a model with seven attributes which has impact in information system security for every kind of the business.The paper has descriptive-narrative, statistical and inductive nature

Mitigating Information security risks during the Transition to Integrated Operations: Models & Data

This research studies the change of information security risks during the transition toIntegrated Operations (an operation extensively utilize advanced information communicationtechnology to connect offshore facilities and onshore control centers and even vendors.) inNorsk Hydro, a Norwegian oil and gas company. The specific case for this study is a pilotplatform in transition to Integrated Operations, Brage: twenty traditional work processes areto be replaced by new work processes. The operators on the Brage platform have to build uprelevant new knowledge to work effectively with new work processes. The new workprocesses, new knowledge and their interrelationship all affect information security risks.The management of Norsk Hydro is concerned with the problem of the increasinginformation security risks, which might cause incidents with severe consequences. We lookfor policies that support a successful (smooth and fast) operation transition.System dynamics is adopted in this research to model the causal structure (mechanism) ofthe operation transition. We chose system dynamics because operation transition is a processrich in feedback, delays, nonlinearity and tradeoffs. All these features are captured by systemdynamics models. Moreover, system dynamics models can be used to simulate variousscenarios. The analyses of these scenarios can lead to insights on policy rules. Wespecifically investigate policies concerning transition speed, resource allocation during thetransition to Integrated Operations and investment rules in incident response capability.Since historical time series data about incidents and information security risks are scarce, weuse following model-based interventions to elicit structural information from our client andexperts:May 2005 First group model-building workshop Problem articulationSep 2005 Second group model-building workshop Model conceptualizationDec 2005 Model-based interview Model formulationYear 2006 Series of model-based meetings Model refinementNov 2008 Model-based interview Model validationThe Brage model was developed and validated through these model-based interventions. Theanalyses of various simulation results lead to the following policy insights: 1. Transition speed. The operation transition should be designed with a speed that allowsthe operators not only to get familiar with new work processes, but also to build up thedetailed knowledge supporting these work processes. The relevance of such knowledge,which is mostly tacit, is sometimes underrated. If the operators only know what to do,but not how to do it effectively, the benefit of the new technology (embedded in the newwork processes) will not be fully realized, and the platform will be more vulnerable toinformation security threats.2. Resource allocation. Resources (operators’ time) are needed to learn new work processesand to acquire related knowledge. Generally, the operators will first put their time intoachieving the production target. Investment on learning activities will not be prioritizedif these activities hinder reaching the production target, even if the operators know thisshort-term performance drop is the cost for obtaining long-term higher performance.Nevertheless strategic decision should never be influenced by operative goals and highlevel managements should be responsible to make decisions on whether focusing onlong-term profits and accept short-term performance drop as a trade-off.3. Investment in incident response capability. The management in Norsk Hydro is aware ofthe increasing information security risks changing from unconnected platforms tointegrated ones. However, investment in incident response capability to handleincreasing incidents is not made proactively. Only if the frequency of incidents hasincreased or severe incidents has occurred or the incident cost have been proved high,will the management decide to invest more on incident response capability. The Bragemodel simulations illustrate that these reactive decision rules will trap the managementinto ignoring the early signs of increasing information security risks, and causeunderinvestment, which results in inadequate incident response capability, andsubsequently leads to severe consequence. Proactive decision rules work effectively inreducing severity of incidents.This work helps our client in two ways. First, the model-based communication helps themanagement in Norsk Hydro clarify the problem it is facing and understand the underlyingmechanism causing the problem. There is an increased insight into the relevance of newknowledge acquisition. Second, the Brage model offers the management a tool to investigatethe long-term operation results under different policies, thus, helping improve themanagement decision process. This work contributes to the information security literature in three ways. First, previousresearch in information security is mostly on risk assessment methodology and informationsecurity management checklist. The dynamics of information security risks during theoperation transition period has not been well studied before. In this fast changing society,this aspect of changing information security risks is of importance. Second, we introduce adynamic view with the long-term perspective of information security. Although incidentshappen in random manner, the underlying mechanism that leads to such incidents oftenexists for a period. Understanding such mechanism is the key to prevent incidents. Last, butnot least, we demonstrate how formal modeling and simulation can facilitate the building oftheories on information security management. Information security management involvesnot only “hard” aspects, such as work processes and technology, but also “soft” aspects, suchas people’s awareness, people’s perception, and the cultural environment, - and all of whichchange over time. These soft aspects are sometimes the major factors affecting informationsecurity.This work also contributes to the system dynamics literature by adding examples of howmodel-based interventions are used to identify problems, conceptualize and validate models.The activities of group model-building workshops and model validation interviews arecarefully documented and reflected. It is an important step towards the accumulation ofknowledge in model-based intervention

Latest Trends and Future Directions of Cyber Security Information Systems

The significance of the information system security is critical issue for the organizations since it leads to big financial losses. The understanding of cyber security threats is not only an innovative requirement but also it is a conservative task. The rapid changes in technologies and services are major driving and leading concerns to the cyber security, requiring reassessment and renewal of standardized policies for counter measures to the resistant vulnerabilities. The main aim of this paper is to improve the understanding and perception of latest security threats, security counter measures, and the future trends of cyberspace security. Therefore, we look forward proposing a new classification model of security threats in order to generalize the impact of threats into classes rather than the impact of every individual threat. The importance of this study comes from the neediness to forecast the future trends of information system cyber security on the long basis, as well as the identification of future security measures that would be reliable. Cyber security models need to improve according to the situational awareness over all situations and at all levels in order to avoid conflicting interests and priorities. Keywords: security, cyber security, cyber-attacks, information system security

Retirement and Wealth

This paper estimates reduced form retirement and wealth equations, and analyzes the relationship between them. Data are from the first four waves of the longitudinal Health and Retirement Study, individuals born from 1931 to 1941. Single equation retirement models relate the probability of retiring to forward looking measures of changes in the values of social security and pension benefits when retirement is postponed. Such simple models suggest that if the social security early retirement age were to be raised or abolished, more people would retire earlier rather than later. Our work analyzes the reasons for such counter intuitive predictions, and discusses the need to analyze these policies in the context of a structural model of retirement and wealth. To improve retirement analysis, we develop the premium value, a measure of the future value of pensions and social security that better reflects the accrual of benefits under defined contribution plans. We also introduce a new definition of retirement to blend information on objective hours worked with subjective self reports of retirement status. Our findings also explore the effects of social security incentives on partial retirement, and consider the importance of partial retirement in any study relating social security to retirement behavior.

Secure collaboration in onboarding

The process of onboarding a company is characterized by inter-enterprise collaboration between the acquiring and the acquired companies. Multiple cross-functional teams are formed to assimilate and integrate the processes, products, data, customers, and partners of the company under acquisition. Dynamic access control management in such inter-enterprise collaboration is the subject of this thesis. A problem in inter-enterprise collaboration in onboarding is that information assets shared by collaborating teams are not adequately protected. As a result, there is potential for accidental or malicious leakage of sensitive business information like the intellectual property, product roadmaps and strategy, customer lists etc. Also, the statically defined access control policies are not sufficient to address access control requirements of dynamic collaboration where there is a constant change in people, processes, and information assets in collaboration repository. This research proposes a new approach and model to integrate security in onboarding collaboration process. Research methods such as, literature review, field studies including direct experiential projects in onboarding and interviews with experts in Mergers and Acquisitions, and detailed data collection and analysis through surveys are used to identify the issues that need to be addressed in the onboarding process. Literature review enabled the identification of access control requirements from the perspective of statically defined policies and the need to determine access dynamically. From the field studies, it was deciphered that there is a need for a well-defined onboarding collaboration process. The data analysis and interpretation from the survey results provided insights into the needs for integrating security in all phases of onboarding collaboration. All these research methods essentially enabled identification of two key issues that this research addresses: 1) well-defined onboarding collaboration process and 2) building security in all phases of onboarding collaboration. A new approach and model called SCODA is developed to integrate security in all phases of onboarding collaboration. Onboarding collaboration process consists of four phases: create, operate, dissolve, and archive. These phases provide the basis for systematically addressing security and access control when the collaboration team is formed, while it is operating, when the team is dissolved after completing its tasks, and when shared information assets are archived. The research adapts role based access control (RBAC) and formally defines the enterprise, functional, and collaboration roles for making access control management decisions. New ideas are developed in trustbased access control management in dynamic collaboration. The change management aspects are also discussed. The SCODA model is validated and the refinements incorporated accordingly. This research contributed to both theory and practice of information security in general and access control in particular in the context of dynamic collaboration. It proposed a new approach of building security in, i.e. to integrate security in all phases of collaboration. In order to build security in, a new onboarding collaboration process is developed that is adaptable and customizable. It has also developed a new approach for trust based dynamic access control based on the new concepts of strong and weak trust relationships. These trust relationships are also adaptable and customizable. Finally, this research has potential for future research work in the design and implementation of multi-paradigm based enterprise security frameworks and interenterprise collaboration