On Selfish Memes: culture as complex adaptive system

We present the formal definition of meme in the sense of the equivalence between memetics and the theory of cultural evolution. From the formal definition we find that culture can be seen analytically and persuade that memetic gives important role in the exploration of sociological theory, especially in the cultural studies. We show that we are not allowed to assume meme as smallest information unit in cultural evolution in general, but it is the smallest information we use on explaining cultural evolution. We construct a computational model and do simulation in advance presenting the selfish meme powerlaw distributed. The simulation result shows that the contagion of meme as well as cultural evolution is a complex adaptive system. Memetics is the system and art of importing genetics to social sciences

On Selfish Memes: culture as complex adaptive system

We present the formal definition of meme in the sense of the equivalence between memetics and the theory of cultural evolution. From the formal definition we find that culture can be seen analytically and persuade that memetic gives important role in the exploration of sociological theory, especially in the cultural studies. We show that we are not allowed to assume meme as smallest information unit in cultural evolution in general, but it is the smallest information we use on explaining cultural evolution. We construct a computational model and do simulation in advance presenting the selfish meme powerlaw distributed. The simulation result shows that the contagion of meme as well as cultural evolution is a complex adaptive system. Memetics is the system and art of importing genetics to social sciences.meme, memetics, memeplex, cultural evolution, cultural unit, complex system.

Too Interconnected To Fail: Financial Contagion and Systemic Risk in Network Model of CDS and Other Credit Enhancement Obligations of US Banks

Credit default swaps (CDS) which constitute up to 98% of credit derivatives have had a unique, endemic and pernicious role to play in the current financial crisis. However, there are few in depth empirical studies of the financial network interconnections among banks and between banks and nonbanks involved as CDS protection buyers and protection sellers. The ongoing problems related to technical insolvency of US commercial banks is not just confined to the so called legacy/toxic RMBS assets on balance sheets but also because of their credit risk exposures from SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles) and the CDS markets. The dominance of a few big players in the chains of insurance and reinsurance for CDS credit risk mitigation for banks� assets has led to the idea of �too interconnected to fail� resulting, as in the case of AIG, of having to maintain the fiction of non-failure in order to avert a credit event that can bring down the CDS pyramid and the financial system. This paper also includes a brief discussion of the complex system Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) approach to financial network modeling for systemic risk assessment. Quantitative analysis is confined to the empirical reconstruction of the US CDS network based on the FDIC Q4 2008 data in order to conduct a series of stress tests that investigate the consequences of the fact that top 5 US banks account for 92% of the US bank activity in the $34 tn global gross notional value of CDS for Q4 2008 (see, BIS and DTCC). The May-Wigner stability condition for networks is considered for the hub like dominance of a few financial entities in the US CDS structures to understand the lack of robustness. We provide a Systemic Risk Ratio and an implementation of concentration risk in CDS settlement for major US banks in terms of the loss of aggregate core capital. We also compare our stress test results with those provided by SCAP (Supervisory Capital Assessment Program). Finally, in the context of the Basel II credit risk transfer and synthetic securitization framework, there is little evidence that the CDS market predicated on a system of offsets to minimize final settlement can provide the credit risk mitigation sought by banks for reference assets in the case of a significant credit event. The large negative externalities that arise from a lack of robustness of the CDS financial network from the demise of a big CDS seller undermines the justification in Basel II that banks be permitted to reduce capital on assets that have CDS guarantees. We recommend that the Basel II provision for capital reduction on bank assets that have CDS cover should be discontinued.

Too Interconnected To Fail: Financial Contagion and Systemic Risk In Network Model of CDS and Other Credit Enhancement Obligations of US Banks

Credit default swaps (CDS) which constitute up to 98% of credit derivatives have had a unique, endemic and pernicious role to play in the current financial crisis. However, there are few in depth empirical studies of the financial network interconnections among banks and between banks and nonbanks involved as CDS protection buyers and protection sellers. The ongoing problems related to technical insolvency of US commercial banks is not just confined to the so called legacy/toxic RMBS assets on balance sheets but also because of their credit risk exposures from SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles) and the CDS markets. The dominance of a few big players in the chains of insurance and reinsurance for CDS credit risk mitigation for banks’ assets has led to the idea of “too interconnected to fail” resulting, as in the case of AIG, of having to maintain the fiction of non-failure in order to avert a credit event that can bring down the CDS pyramid and the financial system. This paper also includes a brief discussion of the complex system Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) approach to financial network modeling for systemic risk assessment. Quantitative analysis is confined to the empirical reconstruction of the US CDS network based on the FDIC Q4 2008 data in order to conduct a series of stress tests that investigate the consequences of the fact that top 5 US banks account for 92% of the US bank activity in the $34 tn global gross notional value of CDS for Q4 2008 (see, BIS and DTCC). The May-Wigner stability condition for networks is considered for the hub like dominance of a few financial entities in the US CDS structures to understand the lack of robustness. We provide a Systemic Risk Ratio and an implementation of concentration risk in CDS settlement for major US banks in terms of the loss of aggregate core capital. We also compare our stress test results with those provided by SCAP (Supervisory Capital Assessment Program). Finally, in the context of the Basel II credit risk transfer and synthetic securitization framework, there is little evidence that the CDS market predicated on a system of offsets to minimize final settlement can provide the credit risk mitigation sought by banks for reference assets in the case of a significant credit event. The large negative externalities that arise from a lack of robustness of the CDS financial network from the demise of a big CDS seller undermines the justification in Basel II that banks be permitted to reduce capital on assets that have CDS guarantees. We recommend that the Basel II provision for capital reduction on bank assets that have CDS cover should be discontinued.Credit Default Swaps; Financial Networks; Systemic Risk; Agent BasedCredit Default Swaps, Financial Networks, Systemic Risk, Agent Based Models, Complex Systems, Stress Testing

The Contribution of Social Simulation in the Advancement of Marketing Issues and Challenges

For some years now, marketers have been praising for a more holistic approach of a company’s marketing efforts across all areas. However, traditional models show serious limitations to address the complexities of managing all of a company’s touch points with a customer. Agent-based modeling (ABM) has opened the door to explore the unfolding behaviors and outputs of an increasingly connected and interactive marketplace. The contribution of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it provides researchers with a state-of-the-art repository for this strand of research. This facilitates the identification of relevant gaps in the literature and future research avenues. Second, it contributes to assess the way ABM has improved our understanding of the dynamics of markets and its participants when marketing strategies are implemented. Both goals aim at showing the various ways that social simulation has expanded our understanding of marketing and the future research opportunities for both, marketing and computer scientists

Agent-based modeling of social conflict, civil violence and revolution: State-of-the-art-review and further prospects

In this paper, we present a state-of-the-art review of Agent-based models (ABM) for simulation of social conflict phenomena, such as peaceful or violent street protests, civil violence and revolution. First, a simplified characterization of social conflict phenomena as emergent properties of a complex system is presented, together with a description of their macro and micro levels and the scales of the emergent properties. Then, existing ABM for simulation of crowd dynamics, civil violence and revolution are analyzed and compared, using a framework that considers their purpose/scope, environment representation, agent types and their architecture, the scales of the emergent properties, the qualitative and quantitative understanding of the phenomena provided by the results obtained from the models. We discuss the strengths and limitations of the existing models, as well as the promising lines of research for filling the gaps between the state-of-the-art models and real phenomena. This review is part of a work in progress on the assembling and dynamics of protests and civil violence, involving both simulation of the assembling process and the protest dynamics, as well as data collection in real protest events, and provides hints and guidelines for future developments.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

SOPHIA

The Iraqi Insurgency (2003–2011) has commonly been characterized as demonstrating the tendency for violence to cluster and diffuse at the local level. Recent research has demonstrated that insurgent attacks in Iraq cluster in time and space in a manner similar to that observed for the spread of a disease. The current study employs a variety of approaches common to the scientific study of criminal activities to advance our understanding of the correlates of observed patterns of the incidence and contagion of insurgent attacks. We hypothesize that the precise patterns will vary from one place to another, but that more attacks will occur in areas that are heavily populated, where coalition forces are active, and along road networks. To test these hypotheses, we use a fishnet to build a geographical model of Baghdad that disaggregates the city into more than 3000 grid cell locations. A number of logistic regression models with spatial and temporal lags are employed to explore patterns of local escalation and diffusion. These models demonstrate the validity of arguments under each of three models but suggest, overall, that risk heterogeneity arguments provide the most compelling and consistent account of the location of insurgency. In particular, the results demonstrate that violence is most likely at locations with greater population levels, higher density of roads, and military garrisons

Epidemic models for U.S. financial subprime mortgage crisis in 2008 influencing on Korean corporations

Department of Management EngineeringA financial crisis can spread like a contagious disease to both domestic sectors including demand market and foreign markets which are linked to one country with various aspects. This work mainly focuses on contagious phenomenon which is observed in Korean corporations enlisted in KOSPI & KOSDAQ index right after U.S financial shock in 2008. To set up the model, we use SIR epidemic model to detect epidemic dynamics in Korean corporations after shock. In addition, EDF model is also applied to analyze the degree of contagion within individual business. Using corporate fundamental data from KRX and FSS, including stock price, total market value, and current liabilities from Jun. 2008 to Jun. 2010, we observe contagious features resulted from U.S. financial crisis - EDFs are rising or show sustained level within infected corporations. We also presume parameters including contact rate and recovery rate to identify epidemic model of U.S. financial crisis which especially affected business sector in Korea. Further research is needed to identify the individual movement of certain sector or individual corporations from a view of agent-based model.ope