Logic Programming Applications: What Are the Abstractions and Implementations?

This article presents an overview of applications of logic programming, classifying them based on the abstractions and implementations of logic languages that support the applications. The three key abstractions are join, recursion, and constraint. Their essential implementations are for-loops, fixed points, and backtracking, respectively. The corresponding kinds of applications are database queries, inductive analysis, and combinatorial search, respectively. We also discuss language extensions and programming paradigms, summarize example application problems by application areas, and touch on example systems that support variants of the abstractions with different implementations

bdbms -- A Database Management System for Biological Data

Biologists are increasingly using databases for storing and managing their data. Biological databases typically consist of a mixture of raw data, metadata, sequences, annotations, and related data obtained from various sources. Current database technology lacks several functionalities that are needed by biological databases. In this paper, we introduce bdbms, an extensible prototype database management system for supporting biological data. bdbms extends the functionalities of current DBMSs to include: (1) Annotation and provenance management including storage, indexing, manipulation, and querying of annotation and provenance as first class objects in bdbms, (2) Local dependency tracking to track the dependencies and derivations among data items, (3) Update authorization to support data curation via content-based authorization, in contrast to identity-based authorization, and (4) New access methods and their supporting operators that support pattern matching on various types of compressed biological data types. This paper presents the design of bdbms along with the techniques proposed to support these functionalities including an extension to SQL. We also outline some open issues in building bdbms.Comment: This article is published under a Creative Commons License Agreement (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/.) You may copy, distribute, display, and perform the work, make derivative works and make commercial use of the work, but, you must attribute the work to the author and CIDR 2007. 3rd Biennial Conference on Innovative Data Systems Research (CIDR) January 710, 2007, Asilomar, California, US

Ensuring Cyber-Security in Smart Railway Surveillance with SHIELD

Modern railways feature increasingly complex embedded computing systems for surveillance, that are moving towards fully wireless smart-sensors. Those systems are aimed at monitoring system status from a physical-security viewpoint, in order to detect intrusions and other environmental anomalies. However, the same systems used for physical-security surveillance are vulnerable to cyber-security threats, since they feature distributed hardware and software architectures often interconnected by ‘open networks’, like wireless channels and the Internet. In this paper, we show how the integrated approach to Security, Privacy and Dependability (SPD) in embedded systems provided by the SHIELD framework (developed within the EU funded pSHIELD and nSHIELD research projects) can be applied to railway surveillance systems in order to measure and improve their SPD level. SHIELD implements a layered architecture (node, network, middleware and overlay) and orchestrates SPD mechanisms based on ontology models, appropriate metrics and composability. The results of prototypical application to a real-world demonstrator show the effectiveness of SHIELD and justify its practical applicability in industrial settings

Composing Aspects at Shared Join Points

Aspect-oriented languages provide means to superimpose aspectual behavior on a given set of join points. It is possible that not just a single, but several units of aspectual behavior need to be superimposed on the same join point. Aspects that specify the superimposition of these units are said to "share" the same join point. Such shared join points may give rise to issues such as\ud determining the exact execution order and the dependencies among the aspects. In this paper, we present a detailed analysis of the problem, and identify a set of requirements upon mechanisms for composing aspects at shared join points. To address the identified issues, we propose a general and declarative model for defining constraints upon the possible compositions of aspects at a shared join point. Finally, by using an extended notion of join points, we show how concrete aspectoriented programming languages, particularly AspectJ and Compose*, can adopt the proposed model

Service Level Agreement-based GDPR Compliance and Security assurance in (multi)Cloud-based systems

Compliance with the new European General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) and security assurance are currently two major challenges of Cloud-based systems. GDPR compliance implies both privacy and security mechanisms definition, enforcement and control, including evidence collection. This paper presents a novel DevOps framework aimed at supporting Cloud consumers in designing, deploying and operating (multi)Cloud systems that include the necessary privacy and security controls for ensuring transparency to end-users, third parties in service provision (if any) and law enforcement authorities. The framework relies on the risk-driven specification at design time of privacy and security level objectives in the system Service Level Agreement (SLA) and in their continuous monitoring and enforcement at runtime.The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 644429 and No 780351, MUSA project and ENACT project, respectively. We would also like to acknowledge all the members of the MUSA Consortium and ENACT Consortium for their valuable help

Securing Databases from Probabilistic Inference

Databases can leak confidential information when users combine query results with probabilistic data dependencies and prior knowledge. Current research offers mechanisms that either handle a limited class of dependencies or lack tractable enforcement algorithms. We propose a foundation for Database Inference Control based on ProbLog, a probabilistic logic programming language. We leverage this foundation to develop Angerona, a provably secure enforcement mechanism that prevents information leakage in the presence of probabilistic dependencies. We then provide a tractable inference algorithm for a practically relevant fragment of ProbLog. We empirically evaluate Angerona's performance showing that it scales to relevant security-critical problems.Comment: A short version of this paper has been accepted at the 30th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 2017