Quantum Probabilities as Behavioral Probabilities

We demonstrate that behavioral probabilities of human decision makers share many common features with quantum probabilities. This does not imply that humans are some quantum objects, but just shows that the mathematics of quantum theory is applicable to the description of human decision making. The applicability of quantum rules for describing decision making is connected with the nontrivial process of making decisions in the case of composite prospects under uncertainty. Such a process involves deliberations of a decision maker when making a choice. In addition to the evaluation of the utilities of considered prospects, real decision makers also appreciate their respective attractiveness. Therefore, human choice is not based solely on the utility of prospects, but includes the necessity of resolving the utility-attraction duality. In order to justify that human consciousness really functions similarly to the rules of quantum theory, we develop an approach defining human behavioral probabilities as the probabilities determined by quantum rules. We show that quantum behavioral probabilities of humans not merely explain qualitatively how human decisions are made, but they predict quantitative values of the behavioral probabilities. Analyzing a large set of empirical data, we find good quantitative agreement between theoretical predictions and observed experimental data.Comment: Latex file, 32 page

Evidence for surprise minimization over value maximization in choice behavior

Classical economic models are predicated on the idea that the ultimate aim of choice is to maximize utility or reward. In contrast, an alternative perspective highlights the fact that adaptive behavior requires agents' to model their environment and minimize surprise about the states they frequent. We propose that choice behavior can be more accurately accounted for by surprise minimization compared to reward or utility maximization alone. Minimizing surprise makes a prediction at variance with expected utility models; namely, that in addition to attaining valuable states, agents attempt to maximize the entropy over outcomes and thus 'keep their options open'. We tested this prediction using a simple binary choice paradigm and show that human decision-making is better explained by surprise minimization compared to utility maximization. Furthermore, we replicated this entropy-seeking behavior in a control task with no explicit utilities. These findings highlight a limitation of purely economic motivations in explaining choice behavior and instead emphasize the importance of belief-based motivations

Fuzziness and Funds Allocation in Portfolio Optimization

Each individual investor is different, with different financial goals, different levels of risk tolerance and different personal preferences. From the point of view of investment management, these characteristics are often defined as objectives and constraints. Objectives can be the type of return being sought, while constraints include factors such as time horizon, how liquid the investor is, any personal tax situation and how risk is handled. It's really a balancing act between risk and return with each investor having unique requirements, as well as a unique financial outlook - essentially a constrained utility maximization objective. To analyze how well a customer fits into a particular investor class, one investment house has even designed a structured questionnaire with about two-dozen questions that each has to be answered with values from 1 to 5. The questions range from personal background (age, marital state, number of children, job type, education type, etc.) to what the customer expects from an investment (capital protection, tax shelter, liquid assets, etc.). A fuzzy logic system has been designed for the evaluation of the answers to the above questions. We have investigated the notion of fuzziness with respect to funds allocation.Comment: 21 page

Fairness Behind a Veil of Ignorance: A Welfare Analysis for Automated Decision Making

We draw attention to an important, yet largely overlooked aspect of evaluating fairness for automated decision making systems---namely risk and welfare considerations. Our proposed family of measures corresponds to the long-established formulations of cardinal social welfare in economics, and is justified by the Rawlsian conception of fairness behind a veil of ignorance. The convex formulation of our welfare-based measures of fairness allows us to integrate them as a constraint into any convex loss minimization pipeline. Our empirical analysis reveals interesting trade-offs between our proposal and (a) prediction accuracy, (b) group discrimination, and (c) Dwork et al.'s notion of individual fairness. Furthermore and perhaps most importantly, our work provides both heuristic justification and empirical evidence suggesting that a lower-bound on our measures often leads to bounded inequality in algorithmic outcomes; hence presenting the first computationally feasible mechanism for bounding individual-level inequality.Comment: Conference: Thirty-second Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2018

GME versus OLS - Which is the best to estimate utility functions?

This paper estimates von Neumann andMorgenstern utility functions comparing the generalized maximum entropy (GME) with OLS, using data obtained by utility elicitation methods. Thus, it provides a comparison of the performance of the two estimators in a real data small sample setup. The results confirm the ones obtained for small samples through Monte Carlo simulations. The difference between the two estimators is small and it decreases as the width of the parameter support vector increases. Moreover the GME estimator is more precise than the OLS one. Overall the results suggest that GME is an interesting alternative to OLS in the estimation of utility functions when data is generated by utility elicitation methods.Generalized maximum entropy; Maximum entropy principle; von Neumann and Morgenstern utility; Utility elicitation.