A History Students Manual to European History

This document is a legacy syllabus published by the Department of History at Howard University. The document was developed by Dr. Charles H. Wesley during his tenure as an Assistant Professor at the university

Perception of Early Croatian History in the Contemporary British Historiography

Rad analizira članke povijesnih leksikona, rječnika, kronologija i drugih općih pregleda povijesti objavljenih u Britaniji u drugoj polovici 20. stoljeća te pronalazi sadržaje koji se tiču hrvatske proπlosti. Prateći percepciju povijesnih procesa na hrvatskom području od ranog srednjeg vijeka do sredine 19. stoljeća, rad vrednuje kvalitetu sadržaja, upozorava na nedovoljnu informativnost te upozorava na perifernu ulogu koja je pridana Hrvatskoj u spomenutom tipu literature.Current British encyclopaedic and other similar editions that give general historical information give only piecemeal and incomplete data about the earliest period of Croatian history. Information about Croatian mediaeval history (creation of the Hungarian-Croat kingdom, Croatian acceptance of the Habsburg rule, period of Ottoman Turks occupation of Croatian areas) is also limited and incomplete. Much more information is given on Croatian 19th century history but Croatian history is still observed only as an element in the history of more important political entities which ruled Croatian territories during that period. Historical events and developments in Croatia are mentioned only if they also had an influence on developments outside Croatia (Military border, Zrinski magnate family, Uskoks of Senj, Illyrian provinces, 1848-1849 revolution). Obviously Croatian history is still largely unknown to British historians and public. Much information is missing and the existing information can lead to wrong conclusions about Croatian history. Without new and more comprehensive articles on Croatia in the future British historical editions it is highly unlikely that British reader will get an objective picture of Croatian history

Tundale’s Vision: Socialization in 12th Century Ireland

The purpose of this project is to explore the historical image of Hell in Medieval Europe as an agent of socialization for illiterate Christian communities. The project focuses on a literary work, Tundale’s Vision, written in 1149 C.E in Cashel, Ireland. Tundale’s Vision came from a genre of vision literature derived from popular oracular folk tradition surrounding the image of Hell that served the purpose of socializing Christian communities to certain social norms and stigmas presented by the author. Vision literature would be used by preachers in vernacular sermons throughout the Medieval period in order to reinforce moral and social messages presented in to their congregations, and it drew much of its themes and imagery from folk traditions in order to be more relatable to local communities. This research provides a historical context from which this genre of literature emerged including a discourse on how it gained power as an agent of socialization in Medieval Europe. Time is devoted to the historical state of what are generally considered primary agents of socialization in human societies throughout Medieval Europe, and research reveals that much of these agents, aside from religion, were inaccessible to the majority of Medieval Europeans, especially those of the lower class. Additionally, this project provides information on the rise in popularity of the artistic image of Hell in the Medieval period. The analysis of Tundale’s Vision, a work that emerged from this environment saturated with artistic depictions of Hell, reconstructs potential social norms and stigmas of 12th century Ireland relating to a contemporary reform movement within the Irish Christian church. This analysis provides the historical origin of many images commonly associated with the popular Medieval conception of Hell as it appears in Tundale’s Vision, and it analyzes the use of the fear of a painful afterlife in order spread and reinforce ideals presented by the Christian Church. Much of this project draws from the scholarly works of Gwenfair Adams and John Seymour who produced research concerning Tundale’s Vision, other works of vision literature, and their impact on Medieval Christian communities. The power of religious artwork in the process of socialization in Medieval Ireland should become apparent throughout this work

Phenomenology, Colonialism, and the Administrative State

In A Realistic Theory of Law, Brian Tamanaha rejects the claim that universal legal principles exist, and its variant that essential features of law applicable to all societies can be identified. He argues that we should define law in accordance with our society’s ordinary usage of the term and analyze law in other societies on the basis of the practices they follow on subjects that fall within the boundaries of that usage. Tamanaha then observes that the effort to identify universal principles or essential features of law has interfered with our understanding of the way that law, as we define it, has evolved over the course of human history. Even more importantly, this effort has occluded our understanding of our own legal system, which is largely organization-based and managerial, and carries out a wide variety of functions beyond the traditional one of regulating relations between private persons. There are at least two major arguments against the positions that Tamanaha advances. The argument against rejecting any universal legal standards is that this rejection is a form of cultural relativism and thus precludes our ability to make moral judgments about other nations or other societies. Are we truly willing to say that slavery or human sacrifice is not wrong, but merely reflect a different cultural perspective; are we willing to say that there are no universal principles by which we can condemn someone like Hitler? The argument against allowing all the organizational and managerial practices of our society to count as law is that it validates governmental action that violates important legal or moral principles. Are we truly willing to say that discretionary, opaque, and result-oriented behavior of modern administrative agencies does not raise concerns about their lawfulness? These may seem like separate objections, stated at different levels of generality, but I will maintain that they suffer from a common defect and thus are best answered with a single argument. That argument is that the principles by which we formulate our moral judgments are the product of our own society, the very same society that has generated our modern form of government. The idea that we can articulate and apply universal moral principles is simply a rhetorical device, characteristic of own society, and one that cannot withstand sustained examination. This does not preclude us from advancing moral arguments; rather, it means that the best moral arguments we can advance— the ones that will be most meaningful to us—are derived from our own conceptual framework, that is, the framework generated by our own society. It also means that the concepts of law and government that will be most meaningful to us are our own concepts of those institutions. We can criticize those institutions, but global condemnations of them based on different concepts, concepts that are not our own, are also little more than rhetorical devices designed to grant an illusory validity to particular criticisms being voiced within the context of our own society’s debates. The underlying theory of this argument goes beyond the boundaries of the discussion in Tamanaha’s book. The book is designed to refute certain widespread positions in Anglo-American analytic jurisprudence and does so within the framework of that jurisprudence. The basic approach of analytic jurisprudence, like analytic philosophy in general, is to interrogate our own beliefs, to demand that we reflect on the values that we hold and the consequences they imply. Tamanaha’s reliance on this approach is not a defect, because the positions against which the book is directed are probably critiqued most effectively on their own terms. In my view, there is a more philosophically and psychologically convincing way to address general questions about law and legal systems. This is Husserl’s phenomenology, an approach less common in Anglo-American jurisprudence but dominant on the European continent. I argue that phenomenology leads to a different and more effective answer to the two objections that might be raised against Tamanaha’s position, and thereby offers a different perspective on that position. Thus, it is not a critique of Tamanaha’s argument, but rather an alternative route to the same conclusions that he reaches. This article applies a phenomenological approach to the subject matter of Tamanaha’s book, and the potential criticisms against it, in four sections. Section A shows why there are no universal principles of law and why any claim to such principles is incoherent. Section B then argues that the effort to find universal principles that apply to all legal systems is an inadequate and indeed defective way to understand legal systems other than our own. Section C argues that this effort is also an inadequate and defective way to understand our own legal system. The final section then applies these arguments to the modern administrative state and shows that global critiques of it, even at the most sophisticated level, tend to be based upon such asserted universal principles. The administrative state is our society’s mode of governance; its specific features can of course be criticized, but its basic existence is the product of the same conceptual processes that generate the basis for any criticisms that we might advance

UWOMJ Volume 39, Number 4, June 1969

Schulich School of Medicine & Dentistryhttps://ir.lib.uwo.ca/uwomj/1205/thumbnail.jp

Swimming with the current: The role of the credit rating agencies in contemporary global governance

As the international system grows in complexity and inter-connectedness, contemporary global governance is increasingly shaped by the credit rating agencies. The well documented retreat of the state continues apace as technological and financial developments swamp the capacity of traditionally dominant actors to influence human affairs on a global scale. The credit rating agencies have leveraged the importance of credit provisioning and the increased reliance on knowledge to position themselves in a powerful position to influence decision making. Their ratings are being supplemented by an array of judgements about variables that are difficult to define, such as the intentions or willingness of elected officials to pursue certain courses of action in the future. These assessments determine the creditworthiness of government and non-government actors across the globe. This thesis seeks to explore the role of credit rating agencies in contemporary global governance by documenting the growth of credit as the lifeblood of contemporary global governance and the critical role of knowledge in the financial markets. Two case studies are used to illustrate how credit rating agencies interact with and influence state actors and the subordinate role states now play in contemporary global governance