7,365 research outputs found
Marginal contributions and externalities in the value
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the concepts of intrinsic marginal contributions and externalities. If one requires efficiency for the grand coalition, we provide several results concerning extensions of the Shapley value. Using the axioms of efficiency, anonymity, marginality and monotonicity, we provide upper and lower bounds to players' payoffs when affected by external effects, and a characterization of an ''externality-free'' value. If the grand coalition does not form, we characterize a payoff configuration on the basis of the principle of balanced contributions. We also analyze a game of coalition formation that yields sharp prediction
MARGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXTERNALITIES IN THE VALUE
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the concepts of intrinsic marginal contributions and externalities. If one requires efficiency for the grand coalition, we provide several results concerning extensions of the Shapley value. Using the axioms of efficiency, anonymity, marginality and monotonicity, we provide upper and lower bounds to players' payoffs when affected by external effects, and a characterization of an ``externality-free'' value. If the grand coalition does not form, we characterize a payoff configuration on the basis of the principle of balanced contributions. We also analyze a game of coalition formation that yields sharp predictions
Marginal contributions and externalities in the value.
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the concepts of intrinsic marginal contributions and externalities. If one requires efficiency for the grand coalition, we provide several results concerning extensions of the Shapley value. Using the axioms of efficiency, anonymity, marginality and monotonicity, we provide upper and lower bounds to players' payoffs when affected by external effects, and a characterization of an ''externality-free'' value. If the grand coalition does not form, we characterize a payoff configuration on the basis of the principle of balanced contributions. We also analyze a game of coalition formation that yields sharp predictions
A Logic-Based Representation for Coalitional Games with Externalities
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems that exhibit externalities from coalition formation, i.e., systems in which the gain from forming a coalition may be affected by the formation of other co-existing coalitions. Although externalities play a key role in many real-life situations, very little attention has been given to this issue in the multi-agent system literature, especially with regard to the computational aspects involved. To this end, we propose a new representation which, in the spirit of Ieong and Shoham [9], is based on Boolean expressions. The idea behind our representation is to construct much richer expressions that allow for capturing externalities induced upon coalitions. We show that the new representation is fully expressive, at least as concise as the conventional partition function game representation and, for many games, exponentially more concise. We evaluate the efficiency of our new representation by considering the problem of computing the Extended and Generalized Shapley value, a powerful extension of the conventional Shapley value to games with externalities. We show that by using our new representation, the Extended and Generalized Shapley value, which has not been studied in the computer science literature to date, can be computed in time linear in the size of the input
Spectrum Leasing as an Incentive towards Uplink Macrocell and Femtocell Cooperation
The concept of femtocell access points underlaying existing communication
infrastructure has recently emerged as a key technology that can significantly
improve the coverage and performance of next-generation wireless networks. In
this paper, we propose a framework for macrocell-femtocell cooperation under a
closed access policy, in which a femtocell user may act as a relay for
macrocell users. In return, each cooperative macrocell user grants the
femtocell user a fraction of its superframe. We formulate a coalitional game
with macrocell and femtocell users being the players, which can take individual
and distributed decisions on whether to cooperate or not, while maximizing a
utility function that captures the cooperative gains, in terms of throughput
and delay.We show that the network can selforganize into a partition composed
of disjoint coalitions which constitutes the recursive core of the game
representing a key solution concept for coalition formation games in partition
form. Simulation results show that the proposed coalition formation algorithm
yields significant gains in terms of average rate per macrocell user, reaching
up to 239%, relative to the non-cooperative case. Moreover, the proposed
approach shows an improvement in terms of femtocell users' rate of up to 21%
when compared to the traditional closed access policy.Comment: 29 pages, 11 figures, accepted at the IEEE JSAC on Femtocell Network
Physical Layer Security: Coalitional Games for Distributed Cooperation
Cooperation between wireless network nodes is a promising technique for
improving the physical layer security of wireless transmission, in terms of
secrecy capacity, in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. While existing
physical layer security literature answered the question "what are the
link-level secrecy capacity gains from cooperation?", this paper attempts to
answer the question of "how to achieve those gains in a practical decentralized
wireless network and in the presence of a secrecy capacity cost for information
exchange?". For this purpose, we model the physical layer security cooperation
problem as a coalitional game with non-transferable utility and propose a
distributed algorithm for coalition formation. Through the proposed algorithm,
the wireless users can autonomously cooperate and self-organize into disjoint
independent coalitions, while maximizing their secrecy capacity taking into
account the security costs during information exchange. We analyze the
resulting coalitional structures, discuss their properties, and study how the
users can self-adapt the network topology to environmental changes such as
mobility. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm allows the users
to cooperate and self-organize while improving the average secrecy capacity per
user up to 25.32% relative to the non-cooperative case.Comment: Best paper Award at Wiopt 200
Study of a Dynamic Cooperative Trading Queue Routing Control Scheme for Freeways and Facilities with Parallel Queues
This article explores the coalitional stability of a new cooperative control
policy for freeways and parallel queuing facilities with multiple servers.
Based on predicted future delays per queue or lane, a VOT-heterogeneous
population of agents can agree to switch lanes or queues and transfer payments
to each other in order to minimize the total cost of the incoming platoon. The
strategic interaction is captured by an n-level Stackelberg model with
coalitions, while the cooperative structure is formulated as a partition
function game (PFG). The stability concept explored is the strong-core for PFGs
which we found appropiate given the nature of the problem. This concept ensures
that the efficient allocation is individually rational and coalitionally
stable. We analyze this control mechanism for two settings: a static vertical
queue and a dynamic horizontal queue. For the former, we first characterize the
properties of the underlying cooperative game. Our simulation results suggest
that the setting is always strong-core stable. For the latter, we propose a new
relaxation program for the strong-core concept. Our simulation results on a
freeway bottleneck with constant outflow using Newell's car-following model
show the imputations to be generally strong-core stable and the coalitional
instabilities to remain small with regard to users' costs.Comment: 3 figures. Presented at Annual Meeting Transportation Research Board
2018, Washington DC. Proof of conjecture 1 pendin
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