Solving multiple-criteria R&D project selection problems with a data-driven evidential reasoning rule

In this paper, a likelihood based evidence acquisition approach is proposed to acquire evidence from experts'assessments as recorded in historical datasets. Then a data-driven evidential reasoning rule based model is introduced to R&D project selection process by combining multiple pieces of evidence with different weights and reliabilities. As a result, the total belief degrees and the overall performance can be generated for ranking and selecting projects. Finally, a case study on the R&D project selection for the National Science Foundation of China is conducted to show the effectiveness of the proposed model. The data-driven evidential reasoning rule based model for project evaluation and selection (1) utilizes experimental data to represent experts' assessments by using belief distributions over the set of final funding outcomes, and through this historic statistics it helps experts and applicants to understand the funding probability to a given assessment grade, (2) implies the mapping relationships between the evaluation grades and the final funding outcomes by using historical data, and (3) provides a way to make fair decisions by taking experts' reliabilities into account. In the data-driven evidential reasoning rule based model, experts play different roles in accordance with their reliabilities which are determined by their previous review track records, and the selection process is made interpretable and fairer. The newly proposed model reduces the time-consuming panel review work for both managers and experts, and significantly improves the efficiency and quality of project selection process. Although the model is demonstrated for project selection in the NSFC, it can be generalized to other funding agencies or industries.Comment: 20 pages, forthcoming in International Journal of Project Management (2019

Ethnographic Causality

This book explores the problem of causal inference when a sufficient number of comparative cases cannot be found, which would permit the application of frequency based models formulated in terms of explanatory causal generalizations

Target recognition for coastal surveillance based on radar images and generalised Bayesian inference

For coastal surveillance, this study proposes a novel approach to identify moving vessels from radar images with the use of a generalised Bayesian inference technique, namely the evidential reasoning (ER) rule. First of all, the likelihood information about radar blips is obtained in terms of the velocity, direction, and shape attributes of the verified samples. Then, it is transformed to be multiple pieces of evidence, which are formulated as generalised belief distributions representing the probabilistic relationships between the blip's states of authenticity and the values of its attributes. Subsequently, the ER rule is used to combine these pieces of evidence, taking into account their corresponding reliabilities and weights. Furthermore, based on different objectives and verified samples, weight coefficients can be trained with a non-linear optimisation model. Finally, two field tests of identifying moving vessels from radar images have been conducted to validate the effectiveness and flexibility of the proposed approach

Arithmetic, enumerative induction and size bias

Number theory abounds with conjectures asserting that every natural number has some arithmetic property. An example is Goldbach’s Conjecture, which states that every even number greater than 2 is the sum of two primes. Enumerative inductive evidence for such conjectures usually consists of small cases. In the absence of supporting reasons, mathematicians mistrust such evidence for arithmetical generalisations, more so than most other forms of non-deductive evidence. Some philosophers have also expressed scepticism about the value of enumerative inductive evidence in arithmetic. But why? Perhaps the best argument is that known instances of an arithmetical conjecture are almost always small: they appear at the start of the natural number sequence. Evidence of this kind consequently suffers from size bias. My essay shows that this sort of scepticism comes in many different flavours, raises some challenges for them all, and explores their respective responses

Confirmation, Decision, and Evidential Probability

Henry Kyburg’s theory of Evidential Probability offers a neglected tool for approaching problems in confirmation theory and decision theory. I use Evidential Probability to examine some persistent problems within these areas of the philosophy of science. Formal tools in general and probability theory in particular have great promise for conceptual analysis in confirmation theory and decision theory, but they face many challenges. In each chapter, I apply Evidential Probability to a specific issue in confirmation theory or decision theory. In Chapter 1, I challenge the notion that Bayesian probability offers the best basis for a probabilistic theory of evidence. In Chapter 2, I criticise the conventional measures of quantities of evidence that use the degree of imprecision of imprecise probabilities. In Chapter 3, I develop an alternative to orthodox utility-maximizing decision theory using Kyburg’s system. In Chapter 4, I confront the orthodox notion that Nelson Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction makes purely formal theories of induction untenable. Finally, in Chapter 5, I defend probabilistic theories of inductive reasoning against John D. Norton’s recent collection of criticisms. My aim is the development of fresh perspectives on classic problems and contemporary debates. I both defend and exemplify a formal approach to the philosophy of science. I argue that Evidential Probability has great potential for clarifying our concepts of evidence and rationality

What else justification could be

According to a captivating picture, epistemic justification is essentially a matter of epistemic or evidential likelihood. While certain problems for this view are well known, it is motivated by a very natural thought—if justification can fall short of epistemic certainty, then what else could it possibly be? In this paper I shall develop an alternative way of thinking about epistemic justification. On this conception, the difference between justification and likelihood turns out to be akin to the more widely recognised difference between ceteris paribus laws and brute statistical generalisations. I go on to discuss, in light of this suggestion, issues such as classical and lottery-driven scepticism as well as the lottery and preface paradoxes