130 research outputs found
A New Method of Constructing a Lattice Basis and Its Applications to Cryptanalyse Short Exponent RSA
We provide a new method of constructing an optimal
lattice. Applying our method to the cryptanalysis of the short exponent
RSA, we obtain our results which extend Boneh and Durfee's work. Our
attack methods are based on a generalization to multivariate modular polynomial
equation. The results illustrate the fact that one should be careful
when using RSA key generation process with special parameters
On Deterministic Polynomial-time Equivalence of Computing the CRT-RSA Secret Keys and Factoring
Let N = pq be the product of two large primes. Consider Chinese remainder theorem-Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (CRT-RSA) with the public encryption exponent e and private decryption exponents dp, dq. It is well known that given any one of dp or dq (or both) one can factorise N in probabilistic poly(log N) time with success probability almost equal to 1. Though this serves all the practical purposes, from theoretical point of view, this is not a deterministic polynomial time algorithm. In this paper, we present a lattice-based deterministic poly(log N) time algorithm that uses both dp, dq (in addition to the public information e, N) to factorise N for certain ranges of dp, dq. We like to stress that proving the equivalence for all the values of dp, dq may be a nontrivial task.Defence Science Journal, 2012, 62(2), pp.122-126, DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.14429/dsj.62.171
A Unified Method for Private Exponent Attacks on RSA using Lattices
International audienceLet (n = pq, e = n^ÎČ) be an RSA public key with private exponent d = n^ÎŽ , where p and q are large primes of the same bit size. At Eurocrypt 96, Coppersmith presented a polynomial-time algorithm for finding small roots of univariate modular equations based on lattice reduction and then succussed to factorize the RSA modulus. Since then, a series of attacks on the key equation ed â kÏ(n) = 1 of RSA have been presented. In this paper, we show that many of such attacks can be unified in a single attack using a new notion called Coppersmith's interval. We determine a Coppersmith's interval for a given RSA public key (n, e). The interval is valid for any variant of RSA, such as Multi-Prime RSA, that uses the key equation. Then we show that RSA is insecure if ÎŽ < ÎČ + 1/3 α â 1/3 â (12αÎČ + 4α^2) provided that we have approximation p0 â„ â n of p with |p â p0| †1/2 n^α , α †1/2. The attack is an extension of Coppersmith's result
A polynomial time attack on RSA with private CRT-exponents smaller than
Wienerâs famous attack on RSA with d
Notes on Small Private Key Attacks on Common Prime RSA
We point out critical deficiencies in lattice-based cryptanalysis of common
prime RSA presented in ``Remarks on the cryptanalysis of common prime RSA for
IoT constrained low power devices'' [Information Sciences, 538 (2020) 54--68].
To rectify these flaws, we carefully scrutinize the relevant parameters
involved in the analysis during solving a specific trivariate integer
polynomial equation. Additionally, we offer a synthesized attack illustration
of small private key attacks on common prime RSA.Comment: 15 pages, 1 figur
Minkowski sum based lattice construction for multivariate simultaneous Coppersmith\u27s technique and applications to RSA
We investigate a lattice construction method for the Coppersmith technique
for finding small solutions of a modular equation.
We consider its variant for simultaneous equations
and propose a method to construct a lattice
by combining lattices for solving single equations.
As applications,
we consider
a new RSA cryptanalyses.
Our algorithm can factor an RSA modulus from pairs of RSA public exponents with the common modulus
corresponding to secret exponents smaller than ,
which improves on the previously best known result by Sarkar and Maitra.
For partial key exposure situation,
we also can factor the modulus if
,
where and are bit-lengths of the secret exponent and its exposed LSBs,
respectively
Improved Factoring Attacks on Multi-Prime RSA with Small Prime Difference
In this paper, we study the security of multi-prime RSA with small prime difference and propose two improved factoring attacks. The modulus involved in this variant is the product of r distinct prime factors of the same bit-size. Zhang and Takagi (ACISP 2013) showed a Fermat-like factoring attack on multi-prime RSA. In order to improve the previous result, we gather more information about the prime factors to derive r simultaneous modular equations. The first attack is to combine all the equations and solve one multivariate equation by generic lattice approaches. Since the equation form is similar to multi-prime Phi-hiding problem, we propose the second attack by applying the optimal linearization technique. We also show that our attacks can achieve better bounds in the experiments
Cryptanalysis of Server-Aided RSA Protocols with Private-Key Splitting
International audienceWe analyze the security and the efficiency of interactive protocols where a client wants to delegate the computation of an RSA signature given a public key, a public message and the secret signing exponent. We consider several protocols where the secret exponent is splitted using some algebraic decomposition. We first provide an exhaustive analysis of the delegation protocols in which the client outsources a single RSA exponentiation to the server. We then revisit the security of the protocols RSA-S1 and RSA-S2 that were proposed by Matsumoto, Kato and Imai in 1988. We present an improved lattice-based attack on RSA-S1 and we propose a simple variant of this protocol that provides better efficiency for the same security level. Eventually, we present the first attacks on the protocol RSA-S2 that employs the Chinese Remainder Theorem to speed up the client's computation. The efficiency of our (heuristic) attacks has been validated experimentally
Rounding and Chaining LLL: Finding Faster Small Roots of Univariate Polynomial Congruences
International audienceIn a seminal work at EUROCRYPT '96, Coppersmith showed how to find all small roots of a univariate polynomial congruence in polynomial time: this has found many applications in public-key cryptanalysis and in a few security proofs. However, the running time of the algorithm is a high-degree polynomial, which limits experiments: the bottleneck is an LLL reduction of a high-dimensional matrix with extra-large coefficients. We present in this paper the first significant speedups over Coppersmith's algorithm. The first speedup is based on a special property of the matrices used by Coppersmith's algorithm, which allows us to provably speed up the LLL reduction by rounding, and which can also be used to improve the complexity analysis of Coppersmith's original algorithm. The exact speedup depends on the LLL algorithm used: for instance, the speedup is asymptotically quadratic in the bit-size of the small-root bound if one uses the Nguyen-Stehlé L2 algorithm. The second speedup is heuristic and applies whenever one wants to enlarge the root size of Coppersmith's algorithm by exhaustive search. Instead of performing several LLL reductions independently, we exploit hidden relationships between these matrices so that the LLL reductions can be somewhat chained to decrease the global running time. When both speedups are combined, the new algorithm is in practice hundreds of times faster for typical parameters
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