Two case studies on electronic distribution of government securities: the U.S. Treasury Direct System and the Philippine Expanded Small Investors Program

The case study on the U.S. Treasury Direct examines the evolution of the electronic distribution systems for marketable and nonmarketable government securities, the main objectives, and the basic legal infrastructure and the preconditions enabling the system. The U.S. experience highlights that the enabling environment and infrastructure (for example, in terms of information databases such as Pay.Gov) make a large difference in terms of both the security and convenience that customers can expect in the use of the system. The system also achieved important cost savings for the Bureau of the Public Debt. The case study on the Small Investors Program of the Philippines looks at a program that the Philippine government has been experimenting with to sell its securities directly to retail investors over the Internet. The recently revised version of the program-called the Expanded Small Investors Program-aims to increase access to government securities and distribute them more widely, develop better savings products, and enhance competition in the primary markets for these securities. The authors analyze whether the program's main goals can be achieved while mitigating the risks. Their analysis suggests thatthere are good reasons to believe that the new program will succeed. Still, regular and responsive assessments and adjustments will be required as the program moves forward.International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Environmental Economics&Policies,Fiscal&Monetary Policy,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Financial Intermediation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Intermediation,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Banks&Banking Reform

SIZE AND HETEROGENEITY MATTER. A MICROSTRUCTURE-BASED ANALYSIS OF REGULATION OF SECONDARY MARKETS FOR GOVERNMENT BONDS.

This paper deals with the economics of secondary markets for government bonds. Ultimately, the analysis is shaped by a public policy goal: assessing the elements of a regulatory framework for these markets. In that regard, the decisive role of market structure leads to a critical review of microstructure conclusions relevant specifically for government debt markets. It is argued that the nature of information asymmetries and matching costs in government debt markets determines a bias towards a fragmented microstructure at odds both with exchange-like arrangements and with ordinary regulatory approaches. Hence, a generic conclusion highlights the risks of blindly transposing regulatory principles from the equity markets area without due regard to the specifics of the bond market. As a specific application of this idea, the paper critically reviews electronic trading platforms that emulate exchange-like order execution solutions. More specifically, the paper opposes the hybrid microstructure (pure limit order book plus affirmative quoting obligation) faced by European primary dealers and the arbitrage-based approach to market-making found in US inter-dealer markets. The Citigroup disruptive trade in August 2004 is analyzed from this perspective. Government bond regulation is argued to necessarily depart from ordinary approaches also because it captures the diverse interests of various governmental agencies. As an application of this principle, the paper discusses repo and short-selling regulation in government bond markets. The atypical market structure and the multi- agency endeavour around government bond markets raise the chances of regulatory failures. Nevertheless, it is argued that a reliance on competition, integrative infrastructure and basic systemic protections as over-arching principles for regulation is consistent with recommendations from relevant economic theory. Finally, political economy issues arising in implementation of transparency, disclosure or retail investor protection will be addressed in the context of selected country cases.government bonds, microstructure, regulation

Russia: The Long Road to Ratification. Internal Institution and Pressure Groups in the Kyoto Protocol’s Adoption Process

The Russian Federation played a crucial role in the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed, after the US decision not to comply with the treaty, its ratification turned out to be indispensable for the Protocol to become legally binding. In early 2002, the Russian government decided to initiate the ratification process. However, notwithstanding this initial commitment, the country long hesitated to fulfil its promises, and for the last two years it sent numerous contradictory signals with respect to its position on climate policy. As a consequence, the factors that shape Russia’s behaviour in the context of climate negotiations received increasing attention. The main focus has been on the economic and international aspects motivating the Russian strategy. This paper attempts to complete this analysis by concentrating on a further feature that significantly contributed to Russia’s final decision, namely domestic forces. These factors have often been overlooked in the discussion of the Russian strategy. In order to fill this gap, this paper reconstructs the Russian ratification process, trying to identify the main domestic players and their role. Our findings provide various indications on the reasons of the recent developments in Russia, confirming the key role of the Russian President.Agreements, Climate, Incentives, Negotiations, Policy

Auctioning of CO2 Emission Allowances in Phase 3 of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

The Climate action and renewable energy package proposed by the European Commission in the beginning of 2008 suggests auctioning as basic principle for allocation for the upcoming third trading phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme that runs from 2013 to 2020. Overall, it is estimated that at least two third of the total quantity of allowances will be auctioned in 2013, to be increased to 100 % by 2020. In this paper, we emphasize the importance of a properly chosen auction design as the significantly higher auction share, compared to the past and current trading phase, is expected to yield a thin secondary market for CO2 allowances. We elaborate main criteria that a viable auction design is supposed to fulfil and propose a specific auction design for the third trading phase. The auction we recommend is a simultaneous dynamic uniform double auction. -- Die Europäische Kommission hat in ihrem Klima- und Energiepaket vom Januar 2008 eine Weichenstellung für den europäischen Emissionshandel vorgeschlagen. Bislang wurden die Zertifikate an die betroffenen Unternehmen aus den energieintensiven Sektoren kostenfrei vergeben. Nach den Plänen der Kommission sollen Stromproduzenten ab 2013 alle benötigten Zertifikate ersteigern müssen. Unternehmen aus anderen energieintensiven Branchen sollen zunächst nur 20 % ersteigern, in 2020 dann 100 %. Da insgesamt mindestens zwei Drittel aller Zertifikate versteigert werden, ist zu erwarten, dass der freie Markt für Zertifikate ab 2013 deutlich dünner sein wird als dies bisher der Fall ist. Aus diesem Grund gewinnt das Design der Auktion an Bedeutung, denn vom Auktionspreis, der die Knappheit an Zertifikaten signalisieren soll, werden wichtige Investitionsentscheidungen in CO2-arme Technologien abhängen. Eventuelle Fehler im Auktionsdesign können, wenn die Zertifikate überwiegend versteigert werden, nicht mehr durch einen liquiden freien Markt geheilt werden.climate policy,emissions trading,auction design

Overview of Polkadot and its Design Considerations

In this paper we describe the design components of the heterogenous multi-chain protocol Polkadot and explain how these components help Polkadot address some of the existing shortcomings of blockchain technologies. At present, a vast number of blockchain projects have been introduced and employed with various features that are not necessarily designed to work with each other. This makes it difficult for users to utilise a large number of applications on different blockchain projects. Moreover, with the increase in number of projects the security that each one is providing individually becomes weaker. Polkadot aims to provide a scalable and interoperable framework for multiple chains with pooled security that is achieved by the collection of components described in this paper

From Tether to Terra: The Current Stablecoin Ecosystem and the Failure of Regulators

The Tether controversy and Terra crash have placed stablecoins in the regulatory spotlight. Stablecoins are often portrayed as posing systemic risks to financial markets, with some pundits labelling them “the villain of the finance world.” Global regulatory bodies, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank of International Settlement (BIS), and political leaders, including the Biden Administration, have all called for stablecoin regulation. These officials allege that stablecoins’ structure, combined with their exponential growth, pose a unique risk to global markets. Before the May 2022 Terra crash, government reports superficially treated stablecoins by exclusively focusing on asset-backed coins. Post hoc, regulatory reports treated Terra’s collapse as inevitable, using the failure as an opportunity to push for a central bank digital currency (“CBDC”) in the United States. Whether stablecoins should be regulated is not up for debate. Their regulation is imminent. Yet, how stablecoins should be regulated and if CBDCs can be an adequate replacement is another matter. In the words of the Commodities Future Trading Commission’s (CFTC) Dawn Stump: “As financial markets evolve and adapt to new demands, market regulators must not stifle beneficial innovations by clinging rigidly to regulatory approaches of the past that may no longer be fit for purpose.

Secure Computing, Economy, and Trust: A Generic Solution for Secure Auctions with Real-World Applications

In this paper we consider the problem of constructing secure auctions based on techniques from modern cryptography. We combine knowledge from economics, cryptography and security engineering and develop and implement secure auctions for practical real-world problems. In essence this paper is an overview of the research project SCET--Secure Computing, Economy, and Trust-- which attempts to build auctions for real applications using secure multiparty computation. The main contributions of this project are: A generic setup for secure evaluation of integer arithmetic including comparisons; general double auctions expressed by such operations; a real world double auction tailored to the complexity and performance of the basic primitives '+' and