40,957 research outputs found

    Overview and classification of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains

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    Among coordination mechanisms, contracts are valuable tools used in both theory and practice to coordinate various supply chains. The focus of this paper is to present an overview of contracts and a classification of coordination contracts and contracting literature in the form of classification schemes. The two criteria used for contract classification, as resulted from contracting literature, are transfer payment contractual incentives and inventory risk sharing. The overview classification of the existing literature has as criteria the level of detail used in designing the coordination models with applicability on the forward and reverse supply chains.Coordination contracts; forward supply chain; reverse supply chain

    Choosing a transport contract over multiple periods

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    We offer a shipper and a carrier the choice among three contracts in which to frame their relationship. Both can also take recourse in the transport spot market. Demand and price on the spot market are dependent exogenous stochastic processes. We model the outcome of this endogenous choice of contract. The results, given in closed form, are different from those presented in the literature. Using numeric instances, we show how a choice is made and which contract would be preferred. Comparison on the variance of the economic returns are offered. The conclusions are applicable when the carrier is not capacity constrained.

    The impact of coordination and information on transport procurement

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    Transport cost is second in importance after production cost in industry. It is the purpose of the present paper to study the impact of information sharing and contractual instruments between a supply chain and its transport suppliers. After reviewing the literature, we propose a model to measure the benefits in terms of transport cost and standard deviation of transport cost. We evaluate three scenarios over one period reiterated for a shipper carrier two-echelon model with a mix of long- term and short-term procurement strategies: perfect information, asymmetric information and private information at one level of the supply chain. We evaluate the transfer in rent between carrier and shipper according to the information known and give some insights on optimal contract parameters.Supply chain management, coordination, contracts, information sharing, game theory, mechanisms

    Decision support for build-to-order supply chain management through multiobjective optimization

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    This is the post-print version of the final paper published in International Journal of Production Economics. The published article is available from the link below. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. Copyright @ 2010 Elsevier B.V.This paper aims to identify the gaps in decision-making support based on multiobjective optimization (MOO) for build-to-order supply chain management (BTO-SCM). To this end, it reviews the literature available on modelling build-to-order supply chains (BTO-SC) with the focus on adopting MOO techniques as a decision support tool. The literature has been classified based on the nature of the decisions in different part of the supply chain, and the key decision areas across a typical BTO-SC are discussed in detail. Available software packages suitable for supporting decision making in BTO supply chains are also identified and their related solutions are outlined. The gap between the modelling and optimization techniques developed in the literature and the decision support needed in practice are highlighted. Future research directions to better exploit the decision support capabilities of MOO are proposed. These include: reformulation of the extant optimization models with a MOO perspective, development of decision supports for interfaces not involving manufacturers, development of scenarios around service-based objectives, development of efficient solution tools, considering the interests of each supply chain party as a separate objective to account for fair treatment of their requirements, and applying the existing methodologies on real-life data sets.Brunel Research Initiative and Enterprise Fund (BRIEF

    Setup Cost Reduction and Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information

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    Screening contracts are a common approach to solve supply chain coordination problems under asymmetric information. Previous research in this area shows that asymmetric information leads to supply chain coordination deficits. We extend the standard framework of lotsizing decisions under asymmetric information by allowing investments in setup cost reduction. We find that asymmetric information leads to an overinvestment in setup cost reduction. Yet, the overall effect on supply chain performance is ambiguous. We show that these results holds for a wide variety of investment functions.

    Coordination of Decentralized Supply Chains: A Literature Review

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    Due to the fact that the double margin exists in the decentralized supply chain, many papers focus on the coordination of decentralized supply chain. In this paper, we classify these papers into three parts according to the structure of supply chain. The first kind of supply chain consists of one upstream supplier and one downstream retailer. The second one consists of multiple suppliers and a single retailer. The last one refers to the supply chain with multiple suppliers and a single retailer. This paper can enable readers to get the knowledge of existing research on supply chain coordination. We also give some interesting future research concerning this topic

    Improving the coordination in the humanitarian supply chain: exploring the role of options contract

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    The uncertainty associated with the location, severity and timing of disaster makes it difficult for the humanitarian organization (HO) to predict demand for the aid material and thereby making the relief material procurement even more challenging. This research explores whether options contract can be used as a mechanism to aid the HO in making procurement of relief material less challenging by addressing two main issues: inventory risk for buyers and over-production risk for suppliers. Furthermore, a contracting mechanism is designed to achieve coordination between the HO and aid material suppliers in the humanitarian supply chain through optimal pricing. The options contract is modelled as a stylized version of the newsvendor problem that allows the HO to adjust their order quantity after placing the initial order at the beginning of the planning horizon. This flexibility helps to mitigate the risk of both overstocking and understocking for the HO as well as the risk of overproduction for the supplier. Our results indicate that the optimal values for decision parameters are not “point estimates” but a range of prices, which can facilitate negotiation between the two parties for appropriate selection of contract parameters under an options contract. The results imply that options contract can aid in the decentralized approach of fixing the prices between the HO and the supplier, which in turn would help in achieving systemic coordination
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