The completeness of quantum theory for predicting measurement outcomes

The predictions that quantum theory makes about the outcomes of measurements are generally probabilistic. This has raised the question whether quantum theory can be considered complete, or whether there could exist alternative theories that provide improved predictions. Here we review recent work that considers arbitrary alternative theories, constrained only by the requirement that they are compatible with a notion of "free choice" (defined with respect to a natural causal order). It is shown that quantum theory is "maximally informative", i.e., there is no other compatible theory that gives improved predictions. Furthermore, any alternative maximally informative theory is necessarily equivalent to quantum theory. This means that the state a system has in such a theory is in one-to-one correspondence with its quantum-mechanical state (the wave function). In this sense, quantum theory is complete.Comment: 15 pages, 4 figures. This is an expanded and more pedagogical version of arXiv:1005.5173 and arXiv:1111.6597 that discusses in detail the relation to other result

Objective Bayesian analysis of neutrino masses and hierarchy

Given the precision of current neutrino data, priors still impact noticeably the constraints on neutrino masses and their hierarchy. To avoid our understanding of neutrinos being driven by prior assumptions, we construct a prior that is mathematically minimally informative. Using the constructed uninformative prior, we find that the normal hierarchy is favoured but with inconclusive posterior odds of 5.1:1. Better data is hence needed before the neutrino masses and their hierarchy can be well constrained. We find that the next decade of cosmological data should provide conclusive evidence if the normal hierarchy with negligible minimum mass is correct, and if the uncertainty in the sum of neutrino masses drops below 0.025 eV. On the other hand, if neutrinos obey the inverted hierarchy, achieving strong evidence will be difficult with the same uncertainties. Our uninformative prior was constructed from principles of the Objective Bayesian approach. The prior is called a reference prior and is minimally informative in the specific sense that the information gain after collection of data is maximised. The prior is computed for the combination of neutrino oscillation data and cosmological data and still applies if the data improve.Comment: 15 pages. Minor changes to match accepted version in JCA

Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information

We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. We show that it is not possible for all legislators to communicate informatively. In particular, the legislator who is ideologically more distant from the proposer cannot communicate informatively, but the closer legislator may communicate whether he would \compromise "or flight" on ideology. Surprisingly, the proposer may be worse off when bargaining with two legislators (under majority rule) than with one (who has veto power), because competition between the legislators may result in less information conveyed in equilibrium. Despite separable preferences, the proposer is always better off making proposals for the two dimensions together

Restricted Value Iteration: Theory and Algorithms

Value iteration is a popular algorithm for finding near optimal policies for POMDPs. It is inefficient due to the need to account for the entire belief space, which necessitates the solution of large numbers of linear programs. In this paper, we study value iteration restricted to belief subsets. We show that, together with properly chosen belief subsets, restricted value iteration yields near-optimal policies and we give a condition for determining whether a given belief subset would bring about savings in space and time. We also apply restricted value iteration to two interesting classes of POMDPs, namely informative POMDPs and near-discernible POMDPs

Experimental effects and causal representations

In experimental settings, scientists often “make” new things, in which case the aim is to intervene in order to produce experimental objects and processes—characterized as ‘effects’. In this discussion, I illuminate an important performative function in measurement and experimentation in general: intervention-based experimental production (IEP). I argue that even though the goal of IEP is the production of new effects, it can be informative for causal details in scientific representations. Specifically, IEP can be informative about causal relations in: regularities under study; ‘intervention systems’, which are measurement/experimental systems; and new technological systems

Outline of a Theory of Strongly Semantic Information

Peer reviewe

Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria

This paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions. The main contributions of this study are the extension of Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk formulation to multi-dimensional sources and to noisy channel setups. We consider both (simultaneous) Nash equilibria and (sequential) Stackelberg equilibria. We show that for arbitrary scalar sources, in the presence of misalignment, the quantized nature of all equilibrium policies holds for Nash equilibria in the sense that all Nash equilibria are equivalent to those achieved by quantized encoder policies. On the other hand, all Stackelberg equilibria policies are fully informative. For multi-dimensional setups, unlike the scalar case, Nash equilibrium policies may be of non-quantized nature, and even linear. In the noisy setup, a Gaussian source is to be transmitted over an additive Gaussian channel. The goals of the encoder and the decoder are misaligned by a bias term and encoder's cost also includes a penalty term on signal power. Conditions for the existence of affine Nash equilibria as well as general informative equilibria are presented. For the noisy setup, the only Stackelberg equilibrium is the linear equilibrium when the variables are scalar. Our findings provide further conditions on when affine policies may be optimal in decentralized multi-criteria control problems and lead to conditions for the presence of active information transmission in strategic environments.Comment: 15 pages, 4 figure

Bayesian inference in a cointegrating panel data model

This paper develops methods of Bayesian inference in a cointegrating panel data model. This model involves each cross-sectional unit having a vector error correction representation. It is flexible in the sense that different cross-sectional units can have different cointegration ranks and cointegration spaces. Furthermore, the parameters which characterize short-run dynamics and deterministic components are allowed to vary over cross-sectional units. In addition to a noninformative prior, we introduce an informative prior which allows for information about the likely location of the cointegration space and about the degree of similarity in coefficients in different cross-sectional units. A collapsed Gibbs sampling algorithm is developed which allows for efficient posterior inference. Our methods are illustrated using real and artificial data

Retrospective model-based inference guides model-free credit assignment

An extensive reinforcement learning literature shows that organisms assign credit efficiently, even under conditions of state uncertainty. However, little is known about credit-assignment when state uncertainty is subsequently resolved. Here, we address this problem within the framework of an interaction between model-free (MF) and model-based (MB) control systems. We present and support experimentally a theory of MB retrospective-inference. Within this framework, a MB system resolves uncertainty that prevailed when actions were taken thus guiding an MF credit-assignment. Using a task in which there was initial uncertainty about the lotteries that were chosen, we found that when participants’ momentary uncertainty about which lottery had generated an outcome was resolved by provision of subsequent information, participants preferentially assigned credit within a MF system to the lottery they retrospectively inferred was responsible for this outcome. These findings extend our knowledge about the range of MB functions and the scope of system interactions