78,821 research outputs found
A Characterization Theorem for a Modal Description Logic
Modal description logics feature modalities that capture dependence of
knowledge on parameters such as time, place, or the information state of
agents. E.g., the logic S5-ALC combines the standard description logic ALC with
an S5-modality that can be understood as an epistemic operator or as
representing (undirected) change. This logic embeds into a corresponding modal
first-order logic S5-FOL. We prove a modal characterization theorem for this
embedding, in analogy to results by van Benthem and Rosen relating ALC to
standard first-order logic: We show that S5-ALC with only local roles is, both
over finite and over unrestricted models, precisely the bisimulation invariant
fragment of S5-FOL, thus giving an exact description of the expressive power of
S5-ALC with only local roles
Belief change in branching time: AGM-consistency and iterated revision
We study belief change branching-time structures. First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent to AGM-consistency, which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full belief revision function that satisfies the AGM postulates. Second, we provide a set of modal axioms that characterize the class of AGM-consistent frames within the modal logic introduced in [Bonanno, Axiomatic characterization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic, Artificial Intelligence, 2007]. Third, we introduce a generalization of AGM belief revision functions that allows a clear statement of principles of iterated belief revision and discuss iterated revision both semantically and syntactically.iterated belief revision, branching time, information, belief, modal logic, AGM belief revision
Trust-based belief change
International audienceWe propose a modal logic that supports reasoning about trust-based belief change. The term trust-based belief change refers to belief change that depends on the degree of trust the receiver has in the source of information
Bilattice logic of epistemic actions and knowledge
International audienceBaltag, Moss, and Solecki proposed an expansion of classical modal logic, called logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (EAK), in which one can reason about knowledge and change of knowledge. Kurz and Palmigiano showed how duality theory provides a flexible framework for modeling such epistemic changes, allowing one to develop dynamic epistemic logics on a weaker propositional basis than classical logic (for example an intuitionistic basis). In this paper we show how the techniques of Kurz and Palmigiano can be further extended to define and axiomatize a bilattice logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (BEAK). Our propositional basis is a modal expansion of the well-known four-valued logic of Belnap and Dunn, which is a system designed for handling inconsistent as well as potentially conflicting information. These features, we believe, make our framework particularly promising from a computer science perspective
Indicative Conditionals and Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Recent ideas about epistemic modals and indicative conditionals in formal
semantics have significant overlap with ideas in modal logic and dynamic
epistemic logic. The purpose of this paper is to show how greater interaction
between formal semantics and dynamic epistemic logic in this area can be of
mutual benefit. In one direction, we show how concepts and tools from modal
logic and dynamic epistemic logic can be used to give a simple, complete
axiomatization of Yalcin's [16] semantic consequence relation for a language
with epistemic modals and indicative conditionals. In the other direction, the
formal semantics for indicative conditionals due to Kolodny and MacFarlane [9]
gives rise to a new dynamic operator that is very natural from the point of
view of dynamic epistemic logic, allowing succinct expression of dependence (as
in dependence logic) or supervenience statements. We prove decidability for the
logic with epistemic modals and Kolodny and MacFarlane's indicative conditional
via a full and faithful computable translation from their logic to the modal
logic K45.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825
Positive Logic with Adjoint Modalities: Proof Theory, Semantics and Reasoning about Information
We consider a simple modal logic whose non-modal part has conjunction and
disjunction as connectives and whose modalities come in adjoint pairs, but are
not in general closure operators. Despite absence of negation and implication,
and of axioms corresponding to the characteristic axioms of (e.g.) T, S4 and
S5, such logics are useful, as shown in previous work by Baltag, Coecke and the
first author, for encoding and reasoning about information and misinformation
in multi-agent systems. For such a logic we present an algebraic semantics,
using lattices with agent-indexed families of adjoint pairs of operators, and a
cut-free sequent calculus. The calculus exploits operators on sequents, in the
style of "nested" or "tree-sequent" calculi; cut-admissibility is shown by
constructive syntactic methods. The applicability of the logic is illustrated
by reasoning about the muddy children puzzle, for which the calculus is
augmented with extra rules to express the facts of the muddy children scenario.Comment: This paper is the full version of the article that is to appear in
the ENTCS proceedings of the 25th conference on the Mathematical Foundations
of Programming Semantics (MFPS), April 2009, University of Oxfor
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