23,905 research outputs found

    On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union

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    We study indirect democracy in which countries, states, or districts each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf. We show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each district's vote and then sticking with the status quo unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast for change. We analyze how the weights relate to the population size of a country and the correlation structure of agents' preferences, and then we compare the voting weights in the Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed Constitution

    Plural Voting for the Twenty-First Century

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    Recent political developments cast doubt on the wisdom of democratic decision-making. Brexit, the Colombian people's (initial) rejection of peace with the FARC, and the election of Donald Trump suggest that the time is right to explore alternatives to democracy. In this essay, I describe and defend the epistocratic system of government which is, given current theoretical and empirical knowledge, most likely to produce optimal political outcomes—or at least better outcomes than democracy produces. To wit, we should expand the suffrage as wide as possible and weight citizens’ votes in accordance with their competence. As it turns out, the optimal system is closely related to J. S. Mill's plural voting proposal. I also explain how voters’ competences can be precisely determined, without reference to an objective standard of correctness and without generating invidious comparisons between voters

    On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union

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    Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model, and compare them to the weights derived from poll data.Majority rule, Voting, Weighted voting, European Union

    Why one would accept Voting Theory for Democracy and reject the Penrose Square Root Weights

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    Various scientists under the label of “Scientists for a democratic Europe” (SDE) sent a joint “Letter to the governments of the EU member states” (2007) advising the use of the Penrose Square Root Weights (PSRW) for the EU Council of Ministers. When we compare the SDE letter with Colignatus (2001, 2007b) “Voting theory for democracy” (VTFD) then we find that SDE does not fit voting theory for democracy. Inspection of the material upon which the SDE letter is based also shows a moral choice while the rigorous empirical analysis by Gelman, Katz and Bafumi (2007) is actually misrepresented. So the SDE letter can also be rejected on its own grounds. The PSRW approach seems not valid for (indivisible) individuals but may be applicable for divisible shares in shareholder meetings.voting theory; voting systems; elections; public choice; political economy; Borda Fixed Point; democracy; European Union; Penrose square root weights;

    On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogenous Union

    Get PDF
    Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model.

    Direct Democracy, Political Delegation, and Responsibility Substitution

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    Can direct democracy provisions improve welfare over pure representative democracy? This paper studies how such provisions affect politicians’ incentives and selection. While direct democracy allows citizens to correct politicians’ mistakes, it also reduces the incentives of elected representatives to search for good policies. This responsibility substitution reduces citizens’ ability to screen competent politicians, when elections are the only means to address political agency problems. A lower cost of direct democracy induces a negative spiral on politicians incentives, which we characterize by a disincentive multiplier. As a consequence, introducing initiatives or lowering their cost can reduce voters’ expected utility. Moreover, when elections perform well in selecting politicians and provide incentives, this indirect welfare reducing effect is stronger.Direct Democracy, Initiative, Referendum, Political Agency, Delegation JEL Classification Numbers: D72, D78, P16

    The Birth, Adjustment and Death of States

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    The article proposes Erection, Adjustment, and Death mechanisms for governmental units, giving autonomy to each citizen as in a direct democracy. Rather than focusing on a narrow model with restrictive and specialized assumptions, and subsequent solutions, as has been common in the literature, the article takes citizens seriously acknowledging that they are best equipped to find their own solutions. The emphasis is on the practical approach of how citizens discover and implement their subjective preferences. Governmental units are subjected to some of the same market forces as ordinary firms, in the spirit of Coase (1988). This brings the interaction between governmental units closer to a market structure, and serves to eliminate or reduce many of the coercive elements of government.Territorial units, individual liberty, individual decision making, individual welfare, competitive markets, public choice, constitutional economics, political economy

    Economic Foundation of Dictatorship in Resource Exporting Economies

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    This paper explains the lack of democratization in resource exporting countries using a two period resource extraction model. There are two classes of agents: elite who own capital and natural resources and citizens who own labor. The elite announce, in the rst period, their plans for resource extraction and investment in the economy. Citizens, in the second period, decide whether to conduct a revolution against elite to capture their share of rents from un-extracted resources. Government policies are designed to ensure that the elite remain in power and that citizens do not have the incentive to revolt. These policies subsidize extraction and investment during the rst period. The extraction subsidy reduces the benet of revolution while the investment subsidy increases its cost. On the other hand, policies in the democracy case are not constrained by the revolution threat and represent the median voter preferences. The resource is over extracted in the non-democratic case compared to the democratic case. Also, investment in the non-resource sector is lower. The important nding of the model is that extraction path goes against price signals; rst period extraction increases with the increase of the resource price in the second period. Non-Democratic institution is the rational choice of the elite even with the costly policies to prevent a revolution.resource curse; political transition; institutions

    Inflation versus taxation: Representative democracy and party nominations

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    Public Finance;Taxation;Inflation
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