2,739 research outputs found
Defeating jamming with the power of silence: a game-theoretic analysis
The timing channel is a logical communication channel in which information is
encoded in the timing between events. Recently, the use of the timing channel
has been proposed as a countermeasure to reactive jamming attacks performed by
an energy-constrained malicious node. In fact, whilst a jammer is able to
disrupt the information contained in the attacked packets, timing information
cannot be jammed and, therefore, timing channels can be exploited to deliver
information to the receiver even on a jammed channel.
Since the nodes under attack and the jammer have conflicting interests, their
interactions can be modeled by means of game theory. Accordingly, in this paper
a game-theoretic model of the interactions between nodes exploiting the timing
channel to achieve resilience to jamming attacks and a jammer is derived and
analyzed. More specifically, the Nash equilibrium is studied in the terms of
existence, uniqueness, and convergence under best response dynamics.
Furthermore, the case in which the communication nodes set their strategy and
the jammer reacts accordingly is modeled and analyzed as a Stackelberg game, by
considering both perfect and imperfect knowledge of the jammer's utility
function. Extensive numerical results are presented, showing the impact of
network parameters on the system performance.Comment: Anti-jamming, Timing Channel, Game-Theoretic Models, Nash Equilibriu
A Game of One/Two Strategic Friendly Jammers Versus a Malicious Strategic Node
We present a game-theoretic analysis of the interaction between a malicious node, attempting to perform unauthorized radio transmission, and friendly jammers trying to disrupt the malicious communications. We investigate the strategic behavior of the jammers against a rational malicious node and highlight counterintuitive results for this conflict. We also analyze the impact of multiple friendly jammers sharing the same goal but acting without coordination; we find out that this scenario offers a better payoff for the jammers, which has some strong implications on how to implement friendly jamming
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