Online Steiner Tree with Deletions

In the online Steiner tree problem, the input is a set of vertices that appear one-by-one, and we have to maintain a Steiner tree on the current set of vertices. The cost of the tree is the total length of edges in the tree, and we want this cost to be close to the cost of the optimal Steiner tree at all points in time. If we are allowed to only add edges, a tight bound of $\Theta(\log n)$ on the competitiveness is known. Recently it was shown that if we can add one new edge and make one edge swap upon every vertex arrival, we can maintain a constant-competitive tree online. But what if the set of vertices sees both additions and deletions? Again, we would like to obtain a low-cost Steiner tree with as few edge changes as possible. The original paper of Imase and Waxman had also considered this model, and it gave a greedy algorithm that maintained a constant-competitive tree online, and made at most $O(n^{3/2})$ edge changes for the first $n$ requests. In this paper give the following two results. Our first result is an online algorithm that maintains a Steiner tree only under deletions: we start off with a set of vertices, and at each time one of the vertices is removed from this set: our Steiner tree no longer has to span this vertex. We give an algorithm that changes only a constant number of edges upon each request, and maintains a constant-competitive tree at all times. Our algorithm uses the primal-dual framework and a global charging argument to carefully make these constant number of changes. We then study the natural greedy algorithm proposed by Imase and Waxman that maintains a constant-competitive Steiner tree in the fully-dynamic model (where each request either adds or deletes a vertex). Our second result shows that this algorithm makes only a constant number of changes per request in an amortized sense.Comment: An extended abstract appears in the SODA 2014 conferenc

Greedy Algorithms for Steiner Forest

In the Steiner Forest problem, we are given terminal pairs $\{s_i, t_i\}$, and need to find the cheapest subgraph which connects each of the terminal pairs together. In 1991, Agrawal, Klein, and Ravi, and Goemans and Williamson gave primal-dual constant-factor approximation algorithms for this problem; until now, the only constant-factor approximations we know are via linear programming relaxations. We consider the following greedy algorithm: Given terminal pairs in a metric space, call a terminal "active" if its distance to its partner is non-zero. Pick the two closest active terminals (say $s_i, t_j$), set the distance between them to zero, and buy a path connecting them. Recompute the metric, and repeat. Our main result is that this algorithm is a constant-factor approximation. We also use this algorithm to give new, simpler constructions of cost-sharing schemes for Steiner forest. In particular, the first "group-strict" cost-shares for this problem implies a very simple combinatorial sampling-based algorithm for stochastic Steiner forest

Distance Transformation for Network Design Problems

International audienceWe propose a new generic way to construct extended formulations for a large class of network design problems with given connectivity requirements. The approach is based on a graph transformation that maps any graph into a layered graph according to a given distance function. The original connectivity requirements are in turn transformed into equivalent connectivity requirements in the layered graph. The mapping is extended to the graphs induced by fractional vectors through an extended linear integer programming formulation. While graphs induced by binary vectors are mapped to isomorphic layered graphs, those induced by fractional vectors are mapped to a set of graphs having worse connectivity properties. Hence, the connectivity requirements in the layered graph may cut off fractional vectors that were feasible for the problem formulated in the original graph. Experiments over instances of the Steiner Forest and Hop-constrained Survivable Network Design problems show that significant gap reductions over the state-of-the art formulations can be obtained

Online Directed Spanners and Steiner Forests

We present online algorithms for directed spanners and Steiner forests. These problems fall under the unifying framework of online covering linear programming formulations, developed by Buchbinder and Naor (MOR, 34, 2009), based on primal-dual techniques. Our results include the following: For the pairwise spanner problem, in which the pairs of vertices to be spanned arrive online, we present an efficient randomized $\tilde{O}(n^{4/5})$-competitive algorithm for graphs with general lengths, where $n$ is the number of vertices. With uniform lengths, we give an efficient randomized $\tilde{O}(n^{2/3+\epsilon})$-competitive algorithm, and an efficient deterministic $\tilde{O}(k^{1/2+\epsilon})$-competitive algorithm, where $k$ is the number of terminal pairs. These are the first online algorithms for directed spanners. In the offline setting, the current best approximation ratio with uniform lengths is $\tilde{O}(n^{3/5 + \epsilon})$, due to Chlamtac, Dinitz, Kortsarz, and Laekhanukit (TALG 2020). For the directed Steiner forest problem with uniform costs, in which the pairs of vertices to be connected arrive online, we present an efficient randomized $\tilde{O}(n^{2/3 + \epsilon})$-competitive algorithm. The state-of-the-art online algorithm for general costs is due to Chakrabarty, Ene, Krishnaswamy, and Panigrahi (SICOMP 2018) and is $\tilde{O}(k^{1/2 + \epsilon})$-competitive. In the offline version, the current best approximation ratio with uniform costs is $\tilde{O}(n^{26/45 + \epsilon})$, due to Abboud and Bodwin (SODA 2018). A small modification of the online covering framework by Buchbinder and Naor implies a polynomial-time primal-dual approach with separation oracles, which a priori might perform exponentially many calls. We convert the online spanner problem and the online Steiner forest problem into online covering problems and round in a problem-specific fashion

Parameterized Complexity Dichotomy for Steiner Multicut

The Steiner Multicut problem asks, given an undirected graph G, terminals sets T1,...,Tt $\subseteq$ V(G) of size at most p, and an integer k, whether there is a set S of at most k edges or nodes s.t. of each set Ti at least one pair of terminals is in different connected components of G \ S. This problem generalizes several graph cut problems, in particular the Multicut problem (the case p = 2), which is fixed-parameter tractable for the parameter k [Marx and Razgon, Bousquet et al., STOC 2011]. We provide a dichotomy of the parameterized complexity of Steiner Multicut. That is, for any combination of k, t, p, and the treewidth tw(G) as constant, parameter, or unbounded, and for all versions of the problem (edge deletion and node deletion with and without deletable terminals), we prove either that the problem is fixed-parameter tractable or that the problem is hard (W[1]-hard or even (para-)NP-complete). We highlight that: - The edge deletion version of Steiner Multicut is fixed-parameter tractable for the parameter k+t on general graphs (but has no polynomial kernel, even on trees). We present two proofs: one using the randomized contractions technique of Chitnis et al, and one relying on new structural lemmas that decompose the Steiner cut into important separators and minimal s-t cuts. - In contrast, both node deletion versions of Steiner Multicut are W[1]-hard for the parameter k+t on general graphs. - All versions of Steiner Multicut are W[1]-hard for the parameter k, even when p=3 and the graph is a tree plus one node. Hence, the results of Marx and Razgon, and Bousquet et al. do not generalize to Steiner Multicut. Since we allow k, t, p, and tw(G) to be any constants, our characterization includes a dichotomy for Steiner Multicut on trees (for tw(G) = 1), and a polynomial time versus NP-hardness dichotomy (by restricting k,t,p,tw(G) to constant or unbounded).Comment: As submitted to journal. This version also adds a proof of fixed-parameter tractability for parameter k+t using the technique of randomized contraction

A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares

In a seminal paper, Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant studied cost sharing protocols for network design with the objective to implement a low-cost Steiner forest as a Nash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing open problems to date is to understand the power of budget-balanced and separable cost sharing protocols in order to induce low-cost Steiner forests. In this work, we focus on undirected networks and analyze topological properties of the underlying graph so that an optimal Steiner forest can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium (by some separable cost sharing protocol) independent of the edge costs. We term a graph efficient if the above stated property holds. As our main result, we give a complete characterization of efficient undirected graphs for two-player network design games: an undirected graph is efficient if and only if it does not contain (at least) one out of few forbidden subgraphs. Our characterization implies that several graph classes are efficient: generalized series-parallel graphs, fan and wheel graphs and graphs with small cycles.Comment: 60 pages, 69 figures, OR 2017 Berlin, WINE 2017 Bangalor

Bounds on the Cost of Stabilizing a Cooperative Game

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the AI Access Foundation via the DOI in this record.A key issue in cooperative game theory is coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core—the set of outcomes that are resistant to group deviations. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. We investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using subsidies. We consider scenarios where an external party that is interested in having the players work together offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition, or, more generally, a particular coalition structure. This payment is conditional on players not deviating from this coalition structure, and may be divided among the players in any way they wish. We define the cost of stability as the minimum external payment that stabilizes the game. We provide tight bounds on the cost of stability, both for games where the coalitional values are nonnegative (profit-sharing games) and for games where the coalitional values are nonpositive (cost-sharing games), under natural assumptions on the characteristic function, such as superadditivity, anonymity, or both. We also investigate the relationship between the cost of stability and several variants of the least core. Finally, we study the computational complexity of problems related to the cost of stability, with a focus on weighted voting games.DFGEuropean Science FoundationNRF (Singapore)European Research CouncilHorizon 2020 European Research Infrastructure projectIsrael Science FoundationIsrael Ministry of Science and TechnologyGoogle Inter-University Center for Electronic Markets and AuctionsEuropean Social Fund (European Commission)Calabria Regio