A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation

We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games.Comment: 21 pages. To appear in International Game Theory Review (IGTR

Physical Layer Security: Coalitional Games for Distributed Cooperation

Cooperation between wireless network nodes is a promising technique for improving the physical layer security of wireless transmission, in terms of secrecy capacity, in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. While existing physical layer security literature answered the question "what are the link-level secrecy capacity gains from cooperation?", this paper attempts to answer the question of "how to achieve those gains in a practical decentralized wireless network and in the presence of a secrecy capacity cost for information exchange?". For this purpose, we model the physical layer security cooperation problem as a coalitional game with non-transferable utility and propose a distributed algorithm for coalition formation. Through the proposed algorithm, the wireless users can autonomously cooperate and self-organize into disjoint independent coalitions, while maximizing their secrecy capacity taking into account the security costs during information exchange. We analyze the resulting coalitional structures, discuss their properties, and study how the users can self-adapt the network topology to environmental changes such as mobility. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm allows the users to cooperate and self-organize while improving the average secrecy capacity per user up to 25.32% relative to the non-cooperative case.Comment: Best paper Award at Wiopt 200

Coalitional Games for Distributed Collaborative Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Networks

Collaborative spectrum sensing among secondary users (SUs) in cognitive networks is shown to yield a significant performance improvement. However, there exists an inherent trade off between the gains in terms of probability of detection of the primary user (PU) and the costs in terms of false alarm probability. In this paper, we study the impact of this trade off on the topology and the dynamics of a network of SUs seeking to reduce the interference on the PU through collaborative sensing. Moreover, while existing literature mainly focused on centralized solutions for collaborative sensing, we propose distributed collaboration strategies through game theory. We model the problem as a non-transferable coalitional game, and propose a distributed algorithm for coalition formation through simple merge and split rules. Through the proposed algorithm, SUs can autonomously collaborate and self-organize into disjoint independent coalitions, while maximizing their detection probability taking into account the cooperation costs (in terms of false alarm). We study the stability of the resulting network structure, and show that a maximum number of SUs per formed coalition exists for the proposed utility model. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm allows a reduction of up to 86.6% of the average missing probability per SU (probability of missing the detection of the PU) relative to the non-cooperative case, while maintaining a certain false alarm level. In addition, through simulations, we compare the performance of the proposed distributed solution with respect to an optimal centralized solution that minimizes the average missing probability per SU. Finally, the results also show how the proposed algorithm autonomously adapts the network topology to environmental changes such as mobility.Comment: in proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM 200

Coalition Formation Games for Distributed Cooperation Among Roadside Units in Vehicular Networks

Vehicle-to-roadside (V2R) communications enable vehicular networks to support a wide range of applications for enhancing the efficiency of road transportation. While existing work focused on non-cooperative techniques for V2R communications between vehicles and roadside units (RSUs), this paper investigates novel cooperative strategies among the RSUs in a vehicular network. We propose a scheme whereby, through cooperation, the RSUs in a vehicular network can coordinate the classes of data being transmitted through V2R communications links to the vehicles. This scheme improves the diversity of the information circulating in the network while exploiting the underlying content-sharing vehicle-to-vehicle communication network. We model the problem as a coalition formation game with transferable utility and we propose an algorithm for forming coalitions among the RSUs. For coalition formation, each RSU can take an individual decision to join or leave a coalition, depending on its utility which accounts for the generated revenues and the costs for coalition coordination. We show that the RSUs can self-organize into a Nash-stable partition and adapt this partition to environmental changes. Simulation results show that, depending on different scenarios, coalition formation presents a performance improvement, in terms of the average payoff per RSU, ranging between 20.5% and 33.2%, relative to the non-cooperative case.Comment: accepted and to appear in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC), Special issue on Vehicular Communications and Network

Socially Trusted Collaborative Edge Computing in Ultra Dense Networks

Small cell base stations (SBSs) endowed with cloud-like computing capabilities are considered as a key enabler of edge computing (EC), which provides ultra-low latency and location-awareness for a variety of emerging mobile applications and the Internet of Things. However, due to the limited computation resources of an individual SBS, providing computation services of high quality to its users faces significant challenges when it is overloaded with an excessive amount of computation workload. In this paper, we propose collaborative edge computing among SBSs by forming SBS coalitions to share computation resources with each other, thereby accommodating more computation workload in the edge system and reducing reliance on the remote cloud. A novel SBS coalition formation algorithm is developed based on the coalitional game theory to cope with various new challenges in small-cell-based edge systems, including the co-provisioning of radio access and computing services, cooperation incentives, and potential security risks. To address these challenges, the proposed method (1) allows collaboration at both the user-SBS association stage and the SBS peer offloading stage by exploiting the ultra dense deployment of SBSs, (2) develops a payment-based incentive mechanism that implements proportionally fair utility division to form stable SBS coalitions, and (3) builds a social trust network for managing security risks among SBSs due to collaboration. Systematic simulations in practical scenarios are carried out to evaluate the efficacy and performance of the proposed method, which shows that tremendous edge computing performance improvement can be achieved.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1010.4501 by other author

Canonical Coalitional Games vs. Coalition Formation Games for Power Exchange Management of Networked Microgrids

The concept of networked microgrids, which refers to a cluster of microgrids connected with each other, has emerged in the literature as a consequence of the increasing development of renewable energy. Energy management systems have been developed for planning, monitoring and controlling the power exchange into networked microgrids. Their main components are optimization algorithms for power exchange management. Several optimization algorithms based on coalition formation games were proposed to minimize distribution and transformation power loss of networked microgrids. Unlike these approaches, this paper proposes a non-lineal model based on canonical coalitional game for power exchange management of networked microgrids. To show the performance of the proposed model, results of the model and results of an algorithm based on coalition formation games recently reported in the literature are com-pared with. The main conclusion of this work is, when the objective is to minimize total power losses, the problem of power exchange management of networked microgrids should be modelled as a canonical coalition games and not as coalition formation games.Sociedad Argentina de Informática e Investigación Operativ

Canonical Coalitional Games vs. Coalition Formation Games for Power Exchange Management of Networked Microgrids

The concept of networked microgrids, which refers to a cluster of microgrids connected with each other, has emerged in the literature as a consequence of the increasing development of renewable energy. Energy management systems have been developed for planning, monitoring and controlling the power exchange into networked microgrids. Their main components are optimization algorithms for power exchange management. Several optimization algorithms based on coalition formation games were proposed to minimize distribution and transformation power loss of networked microgrids. Unlike these approaches, this paper proposes a non-lineal model based on canonical coalitional game for power exchange management of networked microgrids. To show the performance of the proposed model, results of the model and results of an algorithm based on coalition formation games recently reported in the literature are com-pared with. The main conclusion of this work is, when the objective is to minimize total power losses, the problem of power exchange management of networked microgrids should be modelled as a canonical coalition games and not as coalition formation games.Sociedad Argentina de Informática e Investigación Operativ