Human reasoning and cognitive science

In the late summer of 1998, the authors, a cognitive scientist and a logician, started talking about the relevance of modern mathematical logic to the study of human reasoning, and we have been talking ever since. This book is an interim report of that conversation. It argues that results such as those on the Wason selection task, purportedly showing the irrelevance of formal logic to actual human reasoning, have been widely misinterpreted, mainly because the picture of logic current in psychology and cognitive science is completely mistaken. We aim to give the reader a more accurate picture of mathematical logic and, in doing so, hope to show that logic, properly conceived, is still a very helpful tool in cognitive science. The main thrust of the book is therefore constructive. We give a number of examples in which logical theorizing helps in understanding and modeling observed behavior in reasoning tasks, deviations of that behavior in a psychiatric disorder (autism), and even the roots of that behavior in the evolution of the brain

Reasoning about Action: An Argumentation - Theoretic Approach

We present a uniform non-monotonic solution to the problems of reasoning about action on the basis of an argumentation-theoretic approach. Our theory is provably correct relative to a sensible minimisation policy introduced on top of a temporal propositional logic. Sophisticated problem domains can be formalised in our framework. As much attention of researchers in the field has been paid to the traditional and basic problems in reasoning about actions such as the frame, the qualification and the ramification problems, approaches to these problems within our formalisation lie at heart of the expositions presented in this paper

Inheritance Reasoning: Psychological Plausibility, Proof Theory and Semantics

Institute for Communicating and Collaborative SystemsDefault inheritance reasoning is a propositional approach to non monotonic reasoning designed to model reasoning with natural language generics. Inheritance reasoners model sets of natural language generics as directed acyclicgraphs,and inference corresponds to the specification of paths through those networks. A proliferation of inheritance proof theories exist in the literature along with extensive debate about the most reasonable way to construct inferences, based on intuitions about interpretations of particular inheritance networks. There has not been an accepted semantics for inheritance which unifies the set of possible proof theories, which would help identify truly ill motivated proof theories. This thesis attempts to clarify the inheritance literature in the three ways indicated in the title: psychological plausibility, proof theory and semantics

Pseudo-contractions as Gentle Repairs

Updating a knowledge base to remove an unwanted consequence is a challenging task. Some of the original sentences must be either deleted or weakened in such a way that the sentence to be removed is no longer entailed by the resulting set. On the other hand, it is desirable that the existing knowledge be preserved as much as possible, minimising the loss of information. Several approaches to this problem can be found in the literature. In particular, when the knowledge is represented by an ontology, two different families of frameworks have been developed in the literature in the past decades with numerous ideas in common but with little interaction between the communities: applications of AGM-like Belief Change and justification-based Ontology Repair. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between pseudo-contraction operations and gentle repairs. Both aim to avoid the complete deletion of sentences when replacing them with weaker versions is enough to prevent the entailment of the unwanted formula. We show the correspondence between concepts on both sides and investigate under which conditions they are equivalent. Furthermore, we propose a unified notation for the two approaches, which might contribute to the integration of the two areas

Dynamic epistemic logics for abstract argumentation

AbstractThis paper introduces a multi-agent dynamic epistemic logic for abstract argumentation. Its main motivation is to build a general framework for modelling the dynamics of a debate, which entails reasoning about goals, beliefs, as well as policies of communication and information update by the participants. After locating our proposal and introducing the relevant tools from abstract argumentation, we proceed to build a three-tiered logical approach. At the first level, we use the language of propositional logic to encode states of a multi-agent debate. This language allows to specify which arguments any agent is aware of, as well as their subjective justification status. We then extend our language and semantics to that of epistemic logic, in order to model individuals' beliefs about the state of the debate, which includes uncertainty about the information available to others. As a third step, we introduce a framework of dynamic epistemic logic and its semantics, which is essentially based on so-called event models with factual change. We provide completeness results for a number of systems and show how existing formalisms for argumentation dynamics and unquantified uncertainty can be reduced to their semantics. The resulting framework allows reasoning about subtle epistemic and argumentative updates—such as the effects of different levels of trust in a source—and more in general about the epistemic dimensions of strategic communication

Using Extended Logic Programs to Formalize Commonsense Reasoning

In this dissertation, we investigate how commonsense reasoning can be formalized by using extended logic programs. In this investigation, we first use extended logic programs to formalize inheritance hierarchies with exceptions by adopting McCarthy's simple abnormality formalism to express uncertain knowledge. In our representation, not only credulous reasoning can be performed but also the ambiguity-blocking inheritance and the ambiguity-propagating inheritance in skeptical reasoning are simulated. In response to the anomalous extension problem, we explore and discover that the intuition underlying commonsense reasoning is a kind of forward reasoning. The unidirectional nature of this reasoning is applied by many reformulations of the Yale shooting problem to exclude the undesired conclusion. We then identify defeasible conclusions in our representation based on the syntax of extended logic programs. A similar idea is also applied to other formalizations of commonsense reasoning to achieve such a purpose

Logics for AI and Law: Joint Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Logics for New-Generation Artificial Intelligence and the International Workshop on Logic, AI and Law, September 8-9 and 11-12, 2023, Hangzhou

This comprehensive volume features the proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Logics for New-Generation Artificial Intelligence and the International Workshop on Logic, AI and Law, held in Hangzhou, China on September 8-9 and 11-12, 2023. The collection offers a diverse range of papers that explore the intersection of logic, artificial intelligence, and law. With contributions from some of the leading experts in the field, this volume provides insights into the latest research and developments in the applications of logic in these areas. It is an essential resource for researchers, practitioners, and students interested in the latest advancements in logic and its applications to artificial intelligence and law