Rich preference-based argumentation frameworks

International audienceAn argumentation framework is seen as a directed graph whose nodes are arguments and arcs are attacks between the arguments. Acceptable sets of arguments, called extensions, are computed using a semantics. Existing semantics are solely based on the attacks and do not take into account other important criteria like the intrinsic strengths of arguments. The contribution of this paper is three fold. First, we study how preferences issued from differences in strengths of arguments can help in argumentation frameworks. We show that they play two distinct and complementary roles: (i) to repair the attack relation between arguments, (ii) to refine the evaluation of arguments. Despite the importance of both roles, only the first one is tackled in existing literature. In a second part of this paper, we start by showing that existing models that repair the attack relation with preferences do not perform well in certain situations and may return counter-intuitive results. We then propose a new abstract and general framework which treats properly both roles of preferences. The third part of this work is devoted to defining a bridge between the argumentation-based and the coherence-based approaches for handling inconsistency in knowledge bases, in particular when priorities between formulae are available. We focus on two well-known models, namely the preferred sub-theories introduced by Brewka and the demo-preferred sets defined by Cayrol, Royer and Saurel. For each of these models, we provide an instantiation of our abstract framework which is in full correspondence with it

Properties of ABA+ for Non-Monotonic Reasoning

We investigate properties of ABA+, a formalism that extends the well studied structured argumentation formalism Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) with a preference handling mechanism. In particular, we establish desirable properties that ABA+ semantics exhibit. These pave way to the satisfaction by ABA+ of some (arguably) desirable principles of preference handling in argumentation and nonmonotonic reasoning, as well as non-monotonic inference properties of ABA+ under various semantics.Comment: This is a revised version of the paper presented at the worksho

Pareto Optimality and Strategy Proofness in Group Argument Evaluation (Extended Version)

An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set of arguments should be evaluated. It is crucial not only to ensure that the outcome is logically consistent, but also satisfies measures of social optimality and immunity to strategic manipulation. This is because agents have their individual preferences about what the outcome ought to be. In the current paper, we analyze three previously introduced argument-based aggregation operators with respect to Pareto optimality and strategy proofness under different general classes of agent preferences. We highlight fundamental trade-offs between strategic manipulability and social optimality on one hand, and classical logical criteria on the other. Our results motivate further investigation into the relationship between social choice and argumentation theory. The results are also relevant for choosing an appropriate aggregation operator given the criteria that are considered more important, as well as the nature of agents' preferences