A Finite-Model-Theoretic View on Propositional Proof Complexity

We establish new, and surprisingly tight, connections between propositional proof complexity and finite model theory. Specifically, we show that the power of several propositional proof systems, such as Horn resolution, bounded-width resolution, and the polynomial calculus of bounded degree, can be characterised in a precise sense by variants of fixed-point logics that are of fundamental importance in descriptive complexity theory. Our main results are that Horn resolution has the same expressive power as least fixed-point logic, that bounded-width resolution captures existential least fixed-point logic, and that the polynomial calculus with bounded degree over the rationals solves precisely the problems definable in fixed-point logic with counting. By exploring these connections further, we establish finite-model-theoretic tools for proving lower bounds for the polynomial calculus over the rationals and over finite fields

The modal logic of set-theoretic potentialism and the potentialist maximality principles

We analyze the precise modal commitments of several natural varieties of set-theoretic potentialism, using tools we develop for a general model-theoretic account of potentialism, building on those of Hamkins, Leibman and L\"owe, including the use of buttons, switches, dials and ratchets. Among the potentialist conceptions we consider are: rank potentialism (true in all larger $V_\beta$); Grothendieck-Zermelo potentialism (true in all larger $V_\kappa$ for inaccessible cardinals $\kappa$); transitive-set potentialism (true in all larger transitive sets); forcing potentialism (true in all forcing extensions); countable-transitive-model potentialism (true in all larger countable transitive models of ZFC); countable-model potentialism (true in all larger countable models of ZFC); and others. In each case, we identify lower bounds for the modal validities, which are generally either S4.2 or S4.3, and an upper bound of S5, proving in each case that these bounds are optimal. The validity of S5 in a world is a potentialist maximality principle, an interesting set-theoretic principle of its own. The results can be viewed as providing an analysis of the modal commitments of the various set-theoretic multiverse conceptions corresponding to each potentialist account.Comment: 36 pages. Commentary can be made about this article at http://jdh.hamkins.org/set-theoretic-potentialism. Minor revisions in v2; further minor revisions in v

The modal logic of arithmetic potentialism and the universal algorithm

I investigate the modal commitments of various conceptions of the philosophy of arithmetic potentialism. Specifically, I consider the natural potentialist systems arising from the models of arithmetic under their natural extension concepts, such as end-extensions, arbitrary extensions, conservative extensions and more. In these potentialist systems, I show, the propositional modal assertions that are valid with respect to all arithmetic assertions with parameters are exactly the assertions of S4. With respect to sentences, however, the validities of a model lie between S4 and S5, and these bounds are sharp in that there are models realizing both endpoints. For a model of arithmetic to validate S5 is precisely to fulfill the arithmetic maximality principle, which asserts that every possibly necessary statement is already true, and these models are equivalently characterized as those satisfying a maximal $\Sigma_1$ theory. The main S4 analysis makes fundamental use of the universal algorithm, of which this article provides a simplified, self-contained account. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the philosophical differences of several fundamentally different potentialist attitudes---linear inevitability, convergent potentialism and radical branching possibility---are expressed by their corresponding potentialist modal validities.Comment: 38 pages. Inquiries and commentary can be made at http://jdh.hamkins.org/arithmetic-potentialism-and-the-universal-algorithm. Version v3 has further minor revisions, including additional reference

The prospects for mathematical logic in the twenty-first century

The four authors present their speculations about the future developments of mathematical logic in the twenty-first century. The areas of recursion theory, proof theory and logic for computer science, model theory, and set theory are discussed independently.Comment: Association for Symbolic Logi

PSPACE Bounds for Rank-1 Modal Logics

For lack of general algorithmic methods that apply to wide classes of logics, establishing a complexity bound for a given modal logic is often a laborious task. The present work is a step towards a general theory of the complexity of modal logics. Our main result is that all rank-1 logics enjoy a shallow model property and thus are, under mild assumptions on the format of their axiomatisation, in PSPACE. This leads to a unified derivation of tight PSPACE-bounds for a number of logics including K, KD, coalition logic, graded modal logic, majority logic, and probabilistic modal logic. Our generic algorithm moreover finds tableau proofs that witness pleasant proof-theoretic properties including a weak subformula property. This generality is made possible by a coalgebraic semantics, which conveniently abstracts from the details of a given model class and thus allows covering a broad range of logics in a uniform way

Model-theoretic characterization of intuitionistic propositional formulas

Notions of k-asimulation and asimulation are introduced as asymmetric counterparts to k-bisimulation and bisimulation, respectively. It is proved that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to k-asimulations for some k, and then that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to asimulations. Finally, it is proved that a first-order formula is intuitionistically equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to asimulations between intuitionistic models.Comment: 16 pages, 0 figures. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1202.119

Logic in the Tractatus

I present a reconstruction of the logical system of the Tractatus, which differs from classical logic in two ways. It includes an account of Wittgenstein’s “form-series” device, which suffices to express some effectively generated countably infinite disjunctions. And its attendant notion of structure is relativized to the fixed underlying universe of what is named. There follow three results. First, the class of concepts definable in the system is closed under finitary induction. Second, if the universe of objects is countably infinite, then the property of being a tautology is \Pi^1_1-complete. But third, it is only granted the assumption of countability that the class of tautologies is \Sigma_1-definable in set theory. Wittgenstein famously urges that logical relationships must show themselves in the structure of signs. He also urges that the size of the universe cannot be prejudged. The results of this paper indicate that there is no single way in which logical relationships could be held to make themselves manifest in signs, which does not prejudge the number of objects