Formal methods in the design of cryptographic protocols (state of the art)

This paper is a state of the art review of the use of formal methods in the design of cryptographic protocols

RFID ownership transfer with positive secrecy capacity channels

RFID ownership transfer protocols (OTPs) transfer tag ownership rights. Recently, there has been considerable interest in such protocols, however, guaranteeing privacy for symmetric-key settings without trusted third parties (TTPs) is a challenge still unresolved. In this paper, we address this issue and show that it can be solved by using channels with positive secrecy capacity. We implement these channels with noisy tags and provide practical values, thus proving that perfect secrecy is theoretically possible. We then define a communication model that captures spatiotemporal events and describe a first example of symmetric-key based OTP that: (i) is formally secure in the proposed communication model and (ii) achieves privacy with a noisy tag wiretap channel without TTPs

Analysis of cryptographic protocols using logics of belief: an overview, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2002, nr 4

When designing a cryptographic protocol or explaining it, one often uses arguments such as “since this message was signed by machine B, machine A can be sure it came from B” in informal proofs justifying how the protocol works. Since it is, in such informal proofs, often easy to overlook an essential assumption, such as a trust relation or the belief that a message is not a replay from a previous session, it seems desirable to write such proofs in a formal system. While such logics do not replace the recent techniques of automatic proofs of safety properties, they help in pointing the weaknesses of the system. In this paper, we present briefly the BAN (Burrows-Abadi-Needham) formal system [10, 11] as well as some derivative. We show how to prove some properties of a simple protocol, as well as detecting undesirable assumptions. We then explain how the manual search for proofs can be made automatic. Finally, we explain how the lack of proper semantics can be a bit worrying

Defining an approximation to formally verify cryptographic protocols

Electronic forms of communication are abundant in todays world, and much emphasis is placed on these methods of communication in every day life. In order to guarantee the secrecy and authenticity of information exchanged, it is vital to formally verify the cryptographic protocols used in these forms of communications. This verification does, however, present many challenges. The systems to verify are infinite, with an infinite number of sessions and of p articipants. As if this was not enough, there is also a reactive element to deal with: th e intruder. The intruder will attack the protocol to achieve his goal: usurping identity, stealing confidential information, etc. His behavior is unpredictable! This thesis describes a method of verification based 011 the verification of systems by approximation. Starting from an initial configuration of the network, an overapproximation of the set of messages exchanged is automatically computed. Secrecy and authentication properties can then be checked on the approximated system. Starting from an existing semi-automatic proof method developed by Genet and Klay, an automatic solution is developed. Starting from an existing semi-automatic proof method developed by Genet and Klay, an automatic solution is developed. This thesis defines a particular approximation function that can be generated automatically and that guarantees that the computation of the approximated system terminates. Th e verification by approximation only tells if properties are verified. When the verification fails no conclusion can be drawn on the property. Thus, this thesis also shows how the approximation technique can easily be combined with another verification technique to combine the strengths of both approaches. Finally, the tool developed to validate these developments and the results of cryptographic protocol verifications carried out in the course of this research are included

Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2002, nr 4

kwartalni

Secure Distribution of Protected Content in Information-Centric Networking

The benefits of the ubiquitous caching in ICN are profound, such features make ICN promising for content distribution, but it also introduces a challenge to content protection against the unauthorized access. The protection of a content against unauthorized access requires consumer authentication and involves the conventional end-to-end encryption. However, in information-centric networking (ICN), such end-to-end encryption makes the content caching ineffective since encrypted contents stored in a cache are useless for any consumers except those who know the encryption key. For effective caching of encrypted contents in ICN, we propose a secure distribution of protected content (SDPC) scheme, which ensures that only authenticated consumers can access the content. SDPC is lightweight and allows consumers to verify the originality of the published content by using a symmetric key encryption. Moreover, SDPC naming scheme provides protection against privacy leakage. The security of SDPC was proved with the BAN logic and Scyther tool verification, and simulation results show that SDPC can reduce the content download delay.Comment: 15 pages, 8 figures, This article is an enhancement version of journal article published in IEEE Systems Journal, DOI: 10.1109/JSYST.2019.2931813. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1808.0328