Depersonalization disorder as a systematic downregulation of interoceptive signals

Depersonalisation disorder (DPD) is a psychopathological condition characterised by a feeling of detachment from one's own body and surrounding, and it is understood as emerging from the downregulation of interoceptive afferents. However, the precise mechanisms that drive this 'interoceptive silencing' are yet to be clarified. Here we present a computational and neurobiologically plausible model of DPD within the active inference framework. Specifically, we describe DPD as arising from disrupted interoceptive processing at higher levels of the cortical hierarchy where the interoceptive and exteroceptive streams are integrated. We simulated the behaviour of an agent subjected to a situation of high interoceptive activation despite the absence of a perceivable threat in the external environment. The simulation showed how a similar condition, if perceived as inescapable, would result in a downregulation of interoceptive signals, whilst leaving the exteroceptive ones unaffected. Such interoceptive silencing would force the agent to over-rely on exteroceptive information and would ultimately lead to the DPD phenomenology. Finally, our simulation shows that repeated exposure to similar situations over time will lead the agent to increasingly disengage from bodily responses even in the face of a less triggering situation, explaining how a single episode of depersonalization can lead to chronic DPD

The Problem of Mental Action

In mental action there is no motor output to be controlled and no sensory input vector that could be manipulated by bodily movement. It is therefore unclear whether this specific target phenomenon can be accommodated under the predictive processing framework at all, or if the concept of “active inference” can be adapted to this highly relevant explanatory domain. This contribution puts the phenomenon of mental action into explicit focus by introducing a set of novel conceptual instruments and developing a first positive model, concentrating on epistemic mental actions and epistemic self-control. Action initiation is a functionally adequate form of self-deception; mental actions are a specific form of predictive control of effective connectivity, accompanied and possibly even functionally mediated by a conscious “epistemic agent model”. The overall process is aimed at increasing the epistemic value of pre-existing states in the conscious self-model, without causally looping through sensory sheets or using the non-neural body as an instrument for active inference

Learning to Dream, Dreaming to Learn

The importance of sleep for healthy brain function is widely acknowledged. However, it remains mysterious how the sleeping brain, disconnected from the outside world and plunged into the fantastic experiences of dreams, is actively learning. A main feature of dreams is the generation of new realistic sensory experiences in absence of external input, from the combination of diverse memory elements. How do cortical networks host the generation of these sensory experiences during sleep? What function could these generated experiences serve? In this thesis, we attempt to answer these questions using an original, computational approach inspired by modern artificial intelligence. In light of existing cognitive theories and experimental data, we suggest that cortical networks implement a generative model of the sensorium that is systematically optimized during wakefulness and sleep states. By performing network simulations on datasets of natural images, our results not only propose potential mechanisms for dream generation during sleep states, but suggest that dreaming is an essential feature for learning semantic representations throughout mammalian development

From Biological to Synthetic Neurorobotics Approaches to Understanding the Structure Essential to Consciousness (Part 3)

This third paper locates the synthetic neurorobotics research reviewed in the second paper in terms of themes introduced in the first paper. It begins with biological non-reductionism as understood by Searle. It emphasizes the role of synthetic neurorobotics studies in accessing the dynamic structure essential to consciousness with a focus on system criticality and self, develops a distinction between simulated and formal consciousness based on this emphasis, reviews Tani and colleagues' work in light of this distinction, and ends by forecasting the increasing importance of synthetic neurorobotics studies for cognitive science and philosophy of mind going forward, finally in regards to most- and myth-consciousness

The Role of Consciousness in Memory

Conscious events interact with memory systems in learning, rehearsal and retrieval (Ebbinghaus 1885/1964; Tulving 1985). Here we present hypotheses that arise from the IDA computional model (Franklin, Kelemen and McCauley 1998; Franklin 2001b) of global workspace theory (Baars 1988, 2002). Our primary tool for this exploration is a flexible cognitive cycle employed by the IDA computational model and hypothesized to be a basic element of human cognitive processing. Since cognitive cycles are hypothesized to occur five to ten times a second and include interaction between conscious contents and several of the memory systems, they provide the means for an exceptionally fine-grained analysis of various cognitive tasks. We apply this tool to the small effect size of subliminal learning compared to supraliminal learning, to process dissociation, to implicit learning, to recognition vs. recall, and to the availability heuristic in recall. The IDA model elucidates the role of consciousness in the updating of perceptual memory, transient episodic memory, and procedural memory. In most cases, memory is hypothesized to interact with conscious events for its normal functioning. The methodology of the paper is unusual in that the hypotheses and explanations presented are derived from an empirically based, but broad and qualitative computational model of human cognition

Prospection in cognition: the case for joint episodic-procedural memory in cognitive robotics

Prospection lies at the core of cognition: it is the means by which an agent \u2013 a person or a cognitive robot \u2013 shifts its perspective from immediate sensory experience to anticipate future events, be they the actions of other agents or the outcome of its own actions. Prospection, accomplished by internal simulation, requires mechanisms for both perceptual imagery and motor imagery. While it is known that these two forms of imagery are tightly entwined in the mirror neuron system, we do not yet have an effective model of the mentalizing network which would provide a framework to integrate declarative episodic and procedural memory systems and to combine experiential knowledge with skillful know-how. Such a framework would be founded on joint perceptuo-motor representations. In this paper, we examine the case for this form of representation, contrasting sensory-motor theory with ideo-motor theory, and we discuss how such a framework could be realized by joint episodic-procedural memory. We argue that such a representation framework has several advantages for cognitive robots. Since episodic memory operates by recombining imperfectly recalled past experience, this allows it to simulate new or unexpected events. Furthermore, by virtue of its associative nature, joint episodic-procedural memory allows the internal simulation to be conditioned by current context, semantic memory, and the agent\u2019s value system. Context and semantics constrain the combinatorial explosion of potential perception-action associations and allow effective action selection in the pursuit of goals, while the value system provides the motives that underpin the agent\u2019s autonomy and cognitive development. This joint episodic-procedural memory framework is neutral regarding the final implementation of these episodic and procedural memories, which can be configured sub-symbolically as associative networks or symbolically as content-addressable image databases and databases of motor-control scripts