Channel structure and pricing strategy for volume software distribution business in Hong Kong.

by Leung Ka Ho.Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 62-63).DISCLAIMER --- p.IACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.IIABSTRACT --- p.IIITABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.IVChapter CHAPTER I --- FOUNDATIONS --- p.1Company Background --- p.1The Software Industry and Automate --- p.2Automate's 、Business Model - The Virtual Corporation --- p.4Distribution Channel Development History in Hong Kong --- p.6Chapter CHAPTER II --- INDUSTRIAL ANALYSIS --- p.9Software Market in General --- p.9Internal Rivalry --- p.10Entry --- p.11Substitutes --- p.12Buyer Power --- p.13Supplier Power --- p.14Automate --- p.15Competition and new entrant --- p.16Threat of Substitutes --- p.16Buyer Power --- p.17Supplier Power --- p.18Channel - Distributors --- p.18Competition and new entrantThreat of Substitutes --- p.19Buyer Power --- p.20Supplier Power --- p.20Channel Dealers and Resellers --- p.21Competition and new entrant --- p.22Threat of Substitutes --- p.23Buyer Power --- p.23Suppl ier Power --- p.23Chapter CHAPTER III --- CHANNEL STRUCTURE --- p.25The Product Line - A Economic Perspective --- p.25Market Structure and Competition --- p.28Before 1988 --- p.291988 -1993 --- p.291993-1996 --- p.301996onwards --- p.34Chapter CHAPTER IV --- GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES --- p.37Growth Projections --- p.37New Market Challenges --- p.39Product Line Extension --- p.40Chapter CHAPTER V --- CHANNEL RESTRUCTURING --- p.42Economic Models --- p.42Determination of Service Level --- p.45Free Riding --- p.47Channel Structure --- p.48Retail Price Maintenance --- p.49Vertical Integration --- p.50Distributor's Role --- p.51The Problem Child --- p.52Cournot Competition Among Distributors --- p.52Pricing --- p.54Push Pricing Strategy --- p.56Pull Pricing Strategy --- p.57"""Push"" or "" Pull""" --- p.58CONCLUSION --- p.61REFERENCES --- p.62Books --- p.62Periodicals --- p.6

Understanding business strategies of networked value constellations using goal- and value modeling

In goal-oriented requirements engineering (GORE), one usually proceeds from a goal analysis to a requirements specification, usually of IT systems. In contrast, we consider the use of GORE for the design of IT-enabled value constellations, which are collections of enterprises that jointly satisfy a consumer need using information technology. The requirements analysis needed to do such a crossorganizational design not only consists of a goal analysis, in which the relevant strategic goals of the participating companies are aligned, but also of a value analysis, in which the commercial sustainability of the constellation is explored. In this paper we investigate the relation between strategic goal- and value modeling. We use theories about business strategy such as those by Porter to identify strategic goals of a value constellation, and operationalize these goals using value models. We show how value modeling allows us to find more detailed goals, and to analyze conflicts among goals

Ecosystem Competition and the Antitrust Laws

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