The signaling role of fiscal austerity

I build a model where creditworthy countries may use fiscal austerity to communicate their ability to repay sovereign debt and show that the signaling channel is active only for high levels of asymmetric information. The model generates a negative association between the amount of public information, provided by the rating agencies, and fiscal tightness. Informed by the model predictions, I build a model where creditworthy countries may use fiscal austerity to communicate their ability to repay sovereign debt and show that the signaling channel is active only for high levels of asymmetric information. The model generates a negative association between the amount of public information, provided by the rating agencies, and fiscal tightness. Informed by the model predictions, I perform an empirical investigation based on a panel of 58 OECD and emerging market economies since 1980 and find evidence of this signaling channel

Discounted stochastic games with no stationary Nash equilibrium: two examples

We present two examples of discounted stochastic games, each with a continuum of states, finitely many players, and actions, that possess no stationary equilibria. The first example has deterministic transitions—an assumption undertaken in most of the early applications of dynamics games in economics—and perfect information, and does not possess even stationary approximate equilibria or Markovian equilibria. The second example satisfies, in addition to stronger regularity assumptions, that all transitions are absolutely continuous with respect to a fixed measure—an assumption that has been widely used in more recent economic applications. This assumption has been undertaken in several positive results on the existence of stationary equilibria in special cases, and in particular, guarantees the existence of stationary approximate equilibria

Measurable selection for purely atomic games

A general selection theorem is presented constructing a measurable mapping from a state space to a parameter space under the assumption that the state space can be decomposed as a collection of countable equivalence classes under a smooth equivalence relation. It is then shown how this selection theorem can be used as a general purpose tool for proving the existence of measurable equilibria in broad classes of several branches of games when an appropriate smoothness condition holds, including Bayesian games with atomic knowledge spaces, stochastic games with countable orbits, and graphical games of countable degree—examples of a subclass of games with uncountable state spaces that we term purely atomic games. Applications to repeated games with symmetric incomplete information and acceptable bets are also presented

Unraveling Coordination Problems

The interplay between strategic beliefs and policy complicates policy design in coordination games. To untangle this relationship, we study policy design in the context of equilibrium selection. We characterize the unique subsidy scheme that selects a targeted strategy vector as the unique equilibrium of a coordination game. These subsidies are continuous in model parameters and do not make the targeted strategies strictly dominant. While discrimination is optimal in games with multiple equilibria (Segal, 2003; Winter, 2004), we construct a non-discriminatory subsidy scheme the cost of which converges to that of a least-cost discriminatory policy when agents are symmetric

The Epistemology of Simulation, Computation and Dynamics in Economics Ennobling Synergies, Enfeebling 'Perfection'

Lehtinen and Kuorikoski ([73]) question, provocatively, whether, in the context of Computing the Perfect Model, economists avoid - even positively abhor - reliance on simulation. We disagree with the mildly qualified affirmative answer given by them, whilst agreeing with some of the issues they raise. However there are many economic theoretic, mathematical (primarily recursion theoretic and constructive) - and even some philosophical and epistemological - infelicities in their descriptions, definitions and analysis. These are pointed out, and corrected; for, if not, the issues they raise may be submerged and subverted by emphasis just on the unfortunate, but essential, errors and misrepresentationsSimulation, Computation, Computable, Analysis, Dynamics, Proof, Algorithm

Corporate financing choices after the 2007-2008 financial crisis

We study the factors that, arguably, affect the probability of a new borrower choosing between structured finance (SF), either project finance (PF) loans or asset securitization (AS) bonds, and straight debt finance (SDF) – corporate bonds (CB) – transactions using a large cross section of 24,435 Western European loans and bonds issued between January 1st, 2000 and December 31st, 2011. Borrowers chose an SF transaction when they seek long-term financing and when they operate in a country with lower sovereign rating. Findings suggest that industrials, utilities, transportation, and governmental borrowers exhibit a higher likelihood of an SF transaction, more specifically, a PF transaction. Several macroeconomic factors, like market interest rate levels and volatility, and the slope of the Euro swap curve, positively influence the probability of observing an SF over an SDF transaction. The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis decrease the probability of observing an AS transaction. During the crisis, macroeconomic factors seem to significantly influence the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF. We also find that credit spreads and loan to value ratios have a significant negative relationship for AS bonds. Overall, findings are in line with security design literature. SF transactions or instruments, based on extensively contractual and security design, allow the reduction of the net costs associated with asymmetric information and agency conflicts.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Climate change and human migration: managing the cascade effects initiated by natural disasters

The potential links between climate change, human migration and conflict have been receiving an increasing amount of attention since the turn of the century. Up-to-date reports that address the most recent understanding of climate change and environmental hazards indicate that humans have undeniably contributed to the rising global temperature and will continue to do so if lower pollution thresholds are not maintained. While this enacts a multitude of physical, biological, chemical, and societal changes, it is imperative to analyze and address the impact of climate change on human migration trends. Human migrants face several types of problems ranging from environmental issues related to climate change (sea-level rise, more frequent and intense storms and floods, drought, wildfires, etc.), to conflicts from physical migration into neighboring towns, cities, regions, or countries. These types of physical migration that are climate change driven, which can be referred to as “adaptation migration” can be capable of snowballing from a human-to-environment issue into a human-to-human conflict; usually involving some type of violence or political discrimination/persecution. The aim of this study is to analyze how climate change is impacting human migration trends, the possible percolating effects that can result from human migration, and how these factors have influenced and will continue to influence governments and governance in the coastal area. The information in this report will be able to provide a greater understanding of adaptation migration through the use of differential equations, how these trends can be modeled, and how Game Theory can be used as a strategic tool for policymakers moving forward.I would like to thank the WACOMA program and all of its coordinators, past and present, as they have all played an essential role in helping not only myself, but all of the students develop into the people we are today. Thank you all for everything you have done throughout this entire process

Glosarium Matematika

273 p.; 24 cm