The Law of Deception: A Research Agenda

The law of deception is the body of laws that address acts and omissions that wrongfully cause others to hold false beliefs. So defined, the law of deception cuts across traditional doctrinal boundaries. It encompasses the torts of deceit and defamation, false advertising laws, labeling requirements, securities fraud and disclosure regulations, criminal fraud, perjury statutes, and a host of other generic and more targeted laws. This essay suggests that the law of deception constitutes a coherent body of law, and identifies four salient questions about it. The questions are these: First, within the law of deception one finds several different approaches to interpreting potentially deceptive communications. These include highly contextualist approaches (e.g., the tort of deceit), more restrictive literal-meaning rules (federal perjury law), and occasionally default legal meanings (the FTC’s reasonable basis rule). One set of questions concerns when and why which interpretive approach is appropriate. A second set of questions concerns legally salient harms. Laws of deception can be designed to protect those who might be deceived (e.g., negligent misrepresentation), those about whom a lie is told (defamation), honest competitors (false advertising laws), and credible communication more generally (as the Stolen Valor Act attempted). A theory of the law of deception should disaggregate these distinct purposes and evaluate the justifications for and design implications of each. A third set of questions concerns the relationship between deception and consent. Although deception sometimes vitiates consent (in the torts of battery and trespass, in contract law, in fourth amendment searches, and in rape law), it does not always do so. And the line between vitiating and non-vitiating deception shifts across different laws. This too demands explanation. Finally, sometimes the law permits parties to contract out of liability for deception (e.g., “big boy” letters), effectively consenting to what would otherwise be deceptive behavior. A theory of the law of deception should also provide an account when, why and how parties are able to contract out of laws of deception. These are not the only interesting questions one might ask about the law of deception. Nor does this essay attempt to answer them. The goal is to make the case for thinking about the law of deception as a whole, and to suggest some directions for further research

Towards a theory of deception

This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent�s strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of the simplest theories compatible with the available knowledge. The approach can be viewed as formalizing into a game theoretic setting a well documented bias in social psychology, the Fundamental Attribution Er- ror. It is applied to a bargaining problem, thereby revealing a deceptive tactic that is hard to explain in the full rationality paradigm

Pro-social motive promotes early understanding of false belief

Ever since Premack & Woodruff's classic article^1^, which introduced the term "theory of mind", researchers have claimed that strategic deception is the most natural behavioural consequence of understanding false belief. Here we challenge that claim, and provide evidence for the first time that the earliest manifestation of false belief understanding in human development is found in young children's emerging pro-social behaviours. In a modified false belief task, children were asked either to choose one protagonist they should help to find the object (the pro-social context), or to choose one they need to deceive so that none of the protagonists can find the object (the competitive context). The results show that the pro-social motive, but not the competitive motive, boosts early false belief understanding. This is most clearly contrasted with findings that apes, our closest living relatives, are capable of intentionally manipulating others by concealing information only under competitive motives, not under cooperative alternatives. Thus, the current findings are the strongest to date that sophisticated understanding of others' belief in humans has its unique origin, separate from the primate origin at some point in recent evolution, when cooperative and communicative motives played an essential role for their survival

Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 2 year olds

Two-year-olds engage in many behaviors that ostensibly require the attribution of mental states to other individuals. Yet the overwhelming consensus has been that children of this age are unable to attribute false beliefs. In the current study, we used an eyetracker to record infants' looking behavior while they watched actions on a computer monitor. Our data demonstrate that 25-month-old infants correctly anticipate an actor's actions when these actions can be predicted only by attributing a false belief to the actor

Exploring the performance reserve: Effect of different magnitudes of power output deception on 4,000 m cycling time-trial performance

Purpose The aim of the present study was to investigate whether a magnitude of deception of 5% in power output would lead to a greater reduction in the amount of time taken for participants to complete a 4000 m cycling TT than a magnitude of deception of 2% in power output, which we have previously shown can lead to a small change in 4000 m cycling TT performance. Methods Ten trained male cyclists completed four, 4000 m cycling TTs. The first served as a habituation and the second as a baseline for future trials. During trials three and four participants raced against a pacer which was set, in a randomized order, at a mean power output equal to 2% (+2% TT) or 5% (+5% TT) higher than their baseline performance. However participants were misled into believing that the power output of the pacer was an accurate representation of their baseline performance on both occasions. Cardiorespiratory responses were recorded throughout each TT, and used to estimate energy contribution from aerobic and anaerobic metabolism. Results Participants were able to finish the +2% TT in a significantly shorter duration than at baseline (p = 0.01), with the difference in performance likely attributable to a greater anaerobic contribution to total power output (p = 0.06). There was no difference in performance between the +5% TT and +2% TT or baseline trials. Conclusions Results suggest that a performance reserve is conserved, involving anaerobic energy contribution, which can be utilised given a belief that the exercise will be sustainable however there is an upper limit to how much deception can be tolerated. These findings have implications for performance enhancement in athletes and for our understanding of the nature of fatigue during high-intensity exercise

Towards a theory of deception

This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to deception where deception is defined to be the process by which actions are chosen to induce erroneous inferences so as to take advantage of them. Specifically, we introduce a framework with boundedly rational players in which agents make inferences based on a coarse information about others' behaviors: Agents are assumed to know only the average reaction function of other agents over groups of situations. Equilibrium requires that the coarse information available to agents is correct, and that inferences and optimizations are made based on the simplest theories compatible with the available information. We illustrate the phenomenon of deception and how reputation concerns may arise even in zero-sum games in which there is no value to commitment. We further illustrate how the possibility of deception affects standard economic insights through a number of stylized applications including a monitoring game and two simple bargaining games. The approach can be viewed as formalizing into a game theoretic setting a well documented bias in social psychology, the Fundamental Attribution Error.deception ; game theory ; fundamental attribution error