Proving Grounds of Urbicide: Civil and Urban Perspectives on the Bombing of Capital Cities

In the bombing of urban settlements, the main impacts have been on resident civilians, living space and non-military functions. This is shown in the bombing of London, Berlin and Tokyo in the Second World War, arguably the first and only serious tests of strategic air power and urbicide to determine war outcomes. The history and scope of raiding of these capital cities differed in many ways, but the civilian experience and urban implications were very similar. The bombings attacked the most vulnerable areas, where resident populations found themselves poorly protected at best. The intentions, as well as results, of the raiding are examples of urbicide, planned to kill indiscriminately and destroy all elements of urban existence. Yet, a disarticulation emerges between the political, industrial and war-controlling functions of the capitals, which the bombing was supposed to disable but could not, and the plight of their citizens. The bombing was encouraged as ‘spectacular violence’, even though militarily inconclusive and, in seeking to avoid combat while terrorising non-combatants, it experimented with an approach to armed violence that would prevail after 1945. Despite enormous changes since 1945, the plight of bombed civilians has changed little

Destroying Hitler’s Berghof: The Bomber Command Raid of 25 April 1945

This paper examines the Royal Air Force raid on Adolf Hitler’s Berghof on the Obersalzberg in April 1945. Arthur Harris, the head of Bomber Command, wanted to emphasize the air power’s decisive role in the defeat of Nazism. However, Winston Churchill and Bernard Montgomery, among others, questioned the usefulness of destroying Berchtesgaden so late in the war. Unlike traditional explanations that focus on post–Dresden guilt, this article contends that British politicians grew increasingly concerned with the economic state of postwar Germany and the potential costs of the upcoming occupation. The continuation of area bombing at this late stage of the war reinforced the fears and consequences of “overkill.” Harris’s disconnect with postwar civil–military concerns negatively influenced the postwar image of Bomber Command

The Balance Sheet: The Costs and the Gains of the Bombing Campaign

Critics of the bomber offensive frequently argue that the material and human cost of the campaign far overshadowed the gains, and that the resources dedicated to it could have been more effectively utilized elsewhere. They have argued that the combat manpower could have been better used in the other fighting services, especially the army, and industry could have been used to produce more weapons for these fighting services. However, proponents of this line of thought assume that the weight of effort expended on the bombing campaign was inordinately high. Richard Overy maintains that it was actually rather modest. “Measured against the totals for the entire war effort (production and fighting), bombing absorbed 7 percent, rising to 12 percent in 1944–45. Since at least a proportion of bomber production went to other theatres of war, the aggregate figures for the direct bombing of Germany were certainly smaller than this. Seven percent of Britain’s war effort can hardly be regarded as an unreasonable allocation of resources.” Further, although some significant infantry shortages were experienced in 1944, they never reached an extremely critical overall level and were eventually rectified. With respect to materiel, none of the services was conspicuously wanting for anything by 1943, and the British effort was thereafter bolstered by substantial North American war production

The Historiography of the Allied Bombing Campaign of Germany.

This thesis is a historiographical study concerning the strategic bombing campaign of Germany during World War II. The study questions how effective the campaign was in comparing the prewar theories to wartime practices. Secondly, it questions the morality of the bombings and how and why bombing techniques changed throughout the course of the war. Lastly, the study looks at a recent topic in the historic community, which is the question of remembrance and Germans as victims of the war. This study concludes that the strategic bombing campaign of Germany was a success but not in the sense that prewar planners had anticipated. The moral implications of the bombings were horrific, but given the severity of the war they were fighting, were a necessity. The question of Germans as victims will be open to debate for some time, especially because Germans and Americans have opposing viewpoints on the matter

What did we do to Germany during the Second World War? A British perspective on the Allied strategic bombing campaign 1940-45

The Allied strategic bombing of Germany during World War II was a significant event in the history of Europe. Social representations of this event were investigated at the level of individual knowledge. To establish an index of British collective memory for this event, 169 adults (aged 18–87 years), divided into three generational groups, completed a questionnaire. The findings showed a disparity between subjective knowledge and historical actuality across all three age groups. A decline in understanding across time also suggests that a large degree of social, cultural and institutional forgetting has taken place since 1945 leading to misapprehension and widespread inability to comprehend the scale, intensity and destructiveness of the campaign. Social representations of the Allied bombing of Germany continue to endorse a British narrative that is unable to articulate with any accuracy the effects of the campaign on German civilians or British airmen. Representations of this historical event appear to be shifting in ways that may eventually lead to an unintended state of denial in the future, i.e. that the human consequences of the campaign were rather limited

The HSS/SNiC : a conceptual framework for collapsing security down to the physical layer

This work details the concept of a novel network security model called the Super NIC (SNIC) and a Hybrid Super Switch (HSS). The design will ultimately incorporate deep packet inspection (DPI), intrusion detection and prevention (IDS/IPS) functions, as well as network access control technologies therefore making all end-point network devices inherently secure. The SNIC and HSS functions are modelled using a transparent GNU/Linux Bridge with the Netfilter framework

Bombs, brains, and science : the role of human and physical capital for the creation of scientific knowledge [pre-print]

This paper analyzes the effects of human capital (HC) and physical capital (PC) for the productivity of science departments. To address the endogeneity of input choices I use two extensive but temporary shocks to the HC and PC of science departments. As HC shock I use the dismissal of mostly Jewish scientists in Nazi Germany. As PC shock I use the destruction of facilities by Allied bombings during WWII. In the short run, a 10 percent to HC lowered departmental productivity by about 0.21sd. A 10 percent shock to PC lowered departmental productivity by about 0.05sd in the short run. While the HC shock persisted until the end of my sample period (1980), departments experiencing a PC shock recovered very quickly (by 1961). Additional results show that the dismissal 'star scientists' was particularly detrimental, and that a fall in the quality of hires was an important mechanism for the persistence of the HC shock

Trade in coinage, Gresham's Law, and the drive to monetary unification: the Holy Roman Empire, 1519-59

Research on premodern monetary unions has so far started out from the idea that such unions were designed to promote trade and economic integration. The present paper demonstrates that this in an anachronistic misconception. Premodern monetary unions were the answer to political and fiscal problems caused by Gresham’s Law in a monetary environment characterised permeable borders and by the increasing integration of currency markets. As integration advanced significantly in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the regional monetary unions that had been formed in the late medieval Holy Roman Empire were increasingly insufficient to address these problems. This is why the imperial estates were interested in creating and Empire-wide common currency – an aim they reached at the end of the 1550s