6,423 research outputs found
Multi-Layer Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience for Smart Grid
The smart grid is a large-scale complex system that integrates communication
technologies with the physical layer operation of the energy systems. Security
and resilience mechanisms by design are important to provide guarantee
operations for the system. This chapter provides a layered perspective of the
smart grid security and discusses game and decision theory as a tool to model
the interactions among system components and the interaction between attackers
and the system. We discuss game-theoretic applications and challenges in the
design of cross-layer robust and resilient controller, secure network routing
protocol at the data communication and networking layers, and the challenges of
the information security at the management layer of the grid. The chapter will
discuss the future directions of using game-theoretic tools in addressing
multi-layer security issues in the smart grid.Comment: 16 page
Adversarial behaviours knowledge area
The technological advancements witnessed by our society in recent decades have brought
improvements in our quality of life, but they have also created a number of opportunities for
attackers to cause harm. Before the Internet revolution, most crime and malicious activity
generally required a victim and a perpetrator to come into physical contact, and this limited
the reach that malicious parties had. Technology has removed the need for physical contact
to perform many types of crime, and now attackers can reach victims anywhere in the world, as long as they are connected to the Internet. This has revolutionised the characteristics of crime and warfare, allowing operations that would not have been possible before. In this document, we provide an overview of the malicious operations that are happening on the Internet today. We first provide a taxonomy of malicious activities based on the attacker’s motivations and capabilities, and then move on to the technological and human elements that adversaries require to run a successful operation. We then discuss a number of frameworks that have been proposed to model malicious operations. Since adversarial behaviours are not a purely technical topic, we draw from research in a number of fields (computer science, criminology, war studies). While doing this, we discuss how these frameworks can be used by researchers and practitioners to develop effective mitigations against malicious online operations.Published versio
A critical review of cyber-physical security for building automation systems
Modern Building Automation Systems (BASs), as the brain that enables the
smartness of a smart building, often require increased connectivity both among
system components as well as with outside entities, such as optimized
automation via outsourced cloud analytics and increased building-grid
integrations. However, increased connectivity and accessibility come with
increased cyber security threats. BASs were historically developed as closed
environments with limited cyber-security considerations. As a result, BASs in
many buildings are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that may cause adverse
consequences, such as occupant discomfort, excessive energy usage, and
unexpected equipment downtime. Therefore, there is a strong need to advance the
state-of-the-art in cyber-physical security for BASs and provide practical
solutions for attack mitigation in buildings. However, an inclusive and
systematic review of BAS vulnerabilities, potential cyber-attacks with impact
assessment, detection & defense approaches, and cyber-secure resilient control
strategies is currently lacking in the literature. This review paper fills the
gap by providing a comprehensive up-to-date review of cyber-physical security
for BASs at three levels in commercial buildings: management level, automation
level, and field level. The general BASs vulnerabilities and protocol-specific
vulnerabilities for the four dominant BAS protocols are reviewed, followed by a
discussion on four attack targets and seven potential attack scenarios. The
impact of cyber-attacks on BASs is summarized as signal corruption, signal
delaying, and signal blocking. The typical cyber-attack detection and defense
approaches are identified at the three levels. Cyber-secure resilient control
strategies for BASs under attack are categorized into passive and active
resilient control schemes. Open challenges and future opportunities are finally
discussed.Comment: 38 pages, 7 figures, 6 tables, submitted to Annual Reviews in Contro
Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: a survey of techniques
SCADA systems monitor and control critical infrastructures of national importance such as power generation and distribution, water supply, transportation networks, and manufacturing facilities. The pervasiveness, miniaturisations and declining costs of internet connectivity have transformed these systems from strictly isolated to highly interconnected networks. The connectivity provides immense benefits such as reliability, scalability and remote connectivity, but at the same time exposes an otherwise isolated and secure system, to global cyber security threats. This inevitable transformation to highly connected systems thus necessitates effective security safeguards to be in place as any compromise or downtime of SCADA systems can have severe economic, safety and security ramifications. One way to ensure vital asset protection is to adopt a viewpoint similar to an attacker to determine weaknesses and loopholes in defences. Such mind sets help to identify and fix potential breaches before their exploitation. This paper surveys tools and techniques to uncover SCADA system vulnerabilities. A comprehensive review of the selected approaches is provided along with their applicability
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