The Relationship of Money Ethics on Tax Evasion with Intrinsic Religiosity, Extrinsic Religiosity, and Materialism as Moderating Variables (Case on Private Taxpayers Listed in Kpp Pratama Ternate)

This study aims to find out the influence of money ethics on tax evasion with intrinsic religiosity, extrinsic religiosity, and materialism as moderating variables. The sample is selected by using convinience sampling method with sample size of a 100 respondents as primary data. This study uses simple regression and moderated regression analysis for hypothesis testing. The result of this study shows that money ethics has an effect on tax evasion, intrinsic religiosity moderarates the relationship between money ethics and tax evasion. Extrinsic religiosity does not moderate the relationship bertween money ethics and tax evasion. Materialism moderates the relationship between money ethics and tax evasion

Overall analysis of the tax evasion phenomenon and its dynamics in Romania after 1989

In this paper the tax dodger phenomenon is approached from the perspective of the tax evasion identified as a consequence of the fiscal inspection activity. Based on the data referring to the level and dynamics of the tax dodger phenomenon have been made appreciations regarding the fiscal discipline of the Romanian tax payer and to the attitude of the qualified organs in discovering and sanction of the fraudulent tax evasion, in the period 1995-2005. In this sense have been analyzed a series of indicators like: the number of verifications, the number of tax evasion cases, the frequency of tax evasion, the total value of the identified tax evasion, the real volume of the identified tax evasion, the medium measure of tax evasion, the penalty rate and the potential and effective multiplier of tax evasion. Also it has been realized an analysis on the capacity of the sums additionally drawn after the identification of tax evasion of financing the budget’s deficit. Thus, in 2005, the additionally drawn sums have exceeded the consolidated general budget’s deficit, but unfortunately, these have been received only in a proportion of 21, 4%, the receiving remaining difference, of 2,265,766 RON, representing 97,4% from the consolidated general budget’s deficit.tax evasion, Romanian economy, fiscal regulations, fiscal discipline

The Reform and Design of Commodity Taxes in the Presence of Tax Evasion with Illustrative Evidence from India

The literature on tax evasion and its implication for optimal tax theory has concentrated on income tax evasion. The issue of commodity tax evasion has received relatively little attention even though it is important in many cases, especially in developing countries. This paper proposes a theory of marginal reform of indirect taxes that recognises the presence of commodity tax evasion. Illustrative evidence from Indian data confirm the sensitivity of the Pareto improving direction of marginal tax changes to alternative a priori assumptions on commodity tax evasion. The theory of marginal reform of commodity taxes is, then, extended to propose a theory of marginal reform of audits and penalties, and several propositions are derived. The underlying theory of tax design is also extended to include income tax design and income tax evasion, and a framework is proposed to allow the simultaneous analyses of both forms of tax evasion, and study of their impact on the "optimal mix" of direct and indirect taxes.

Bureaucratic Corruption and Profit Tax Evasion

Firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on production activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affect corruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce less corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a non-systematic impact on tax evasion behaviour.corruption, firms, tax evasion

Nonlinear regression in tax evasion with uncertainty: a variational approach

One of the major problems in today's economy is the phenomenon of tax evasion. The linear regression method is a solution to find a formula to investigate the effect of each variable in the final tax evasion rate. Since the tax evasion data in this study has a great degree of uncertainty and the relationship between variables is nonlinear, Bayesian method is used to address the uncertainty along with 6 nonlinear basis functions to tackle the nonlinearity problem. Furthermore, variational method is applied on Bayesian linear regression in tax evasion data to approximate the model evidence in Bayesian method. The dataset is collected from tax evasion in Malaysia in period from 1963 to 2013 with 8 input variables. Results from variational method are compared with Maximum Likelihood Estimation technique on Bayeisan linear regression and variational method provides more accurate prediction. This study suggests that, in order to reduce the tax evasion, Malaysian government should decrease direct tax and taxpayer income and increase indirect tax and government regulation variables by 5% in the small amount of changes (10%-30%) and reduce direct tax and income on taxpayer and increment indirect tax and government regulation variables by 90% in the large amount of changes (70%-90%) with respect to the current situation to reduce the final tax evasion rate

Tax Evasion Dynamics in Romania Reflected by Fiscal Inspection Activities

The paper aims to provide a panoramic view of the dynamics of tax evasion in Romania, reflected in terms of fiscal inspection activities. The author used the official data published by the institutions with attributions on the line of identification and fighting against tax evasion (National Agency of Fiscal Administration and Financial Guard) with the view to reflect the real situation concerning the number of inspections, quantify and sanction tax evasion for 2003-2008 periods. Although the number of fiscal inspections and the number of tax payers who have violated the rules of fiscal discipline decreased compared with 2003, the frequency of tax evasion remained. At the same time, based on the data referring to the level and dynamics of the tax dodger phenomenon appreciations have been made regarding the fiscal discipline of the Romanian tax payer and to the attitude of the qualified institutions in discovering and sanctioning the fraudulent tax evasion. In this respect, the author observed that the level of willingness of tax legislation in relation to the Romanian tax payer has not changed considerably.The level of identified tax evasion reported to real GDP increased slightly. This situation can be interpreted as a success of institutions in charge of identification and fighting of tax evasion, a result of the increase of fiscal inspection number and detection probability, but also a result of GDP growth at a rate lower than the identified tax evasion. The author has also tried to find a causality relation between the option for tax evasion and corruption. The author found that a corrupt environment facilitates the decision to evade depending on detection probability, penalty system and bribery level as discouraging factors for tax evasion. The level of identified tax evasion is smaller than the real level of entire tax evasion, an important part being impossible to determine because of corruption.tax evasion, fiscal fraud, fiscal inspections, fiscal discipline,voluntary fiscal compliance, underground economy, corruption

The excess burden of tax evasion - An experimental detection- concealment contest

We present an experimental study on the wasted resources associated with tax evasion. This waste arises from taxpayers and tax authorities investing costly effort in the concealment and detection of tax evasion. We show that these socially inefficient efforts - as well as the frequency of tax evasion - depend positively on the prevailing tax rate, but not on the fine which is imposed in the event of detected tax evasion. Tax evasion is less frequent, though, than a model with risk neutral taxpayers predicts. We find evidence that this is due to individual moral constraints rather than to risk aversion.tax evasion, contest, experiment, tax rates, fines

Timing Tax Evasion

Standard models of tax evasion implicitly assume that evasion is either fully detected, or not detected at all. Empirically, this is not the case, casting into doubt the traditional rationales for interior evasion choices. I propose two alternative, dynamic explanations for interior tax evasion rates: Fines depending on the duration of an evasion spell, and different vintages of income sources subject to aggregate risk and fixed costs when switched between evasion states. The dynamic approach yields a transparent representation of revenue losses and social costs due to tax evasion, novel findings on the effect of policy on tax evasion, and a tractable framework for the analysis of tax evasion dynamics.

The Excess Burden of Tax Evasion: An Experimental Detection-Concealment Contest

We present an experimental study on the wasted resources associated with tax evasion. This waste arises from taxpayers and tax authorities investing costly effort in the concealment and detection of tax evasion. We show that these socially inefficient efforts - as well as the frequency of tax evasion - depend positively on the prevailing tax rate, but not on the fine which is imposed in the event of detected tax evasion. Tax evasion is less frequent, though, than a model with risk neutral taxpayers predicts. We find evidence that this is due to individual moral constraints rather than to risk aversion.tax evasion, contest, experiment, tax rates, fines

Why Do People Pay Taxes? Prospect Theory Versus Expected Utility Theory

Tax evasion analysis is typically based on an expected utility theory (EUT) framework. However, this leads to several qualitative and quantitative puzzles. Given actual probabilities of audit and penalty rates the return on evasion ranges from 91-98 percent. So why don’t most of us evade? Furthermore, an EUT based analysis predicts that we should evade less as the tax rate increases (Yitzhaki puzzle). Intuition and the bulk of the evidence do not support this result. This paper analyzes tax evasion using, instead, Kahneman and Tversky’s cumulative prospect theory. Under prospect theory we show that (1) the calibration results predict empirically plausible magnitudes of tax evasion despite low audit probabilities and penalty rates, and (2) the Yitzhaki puzzle is easily explained. Thus, our paper argues that not only does prospect theory provide a satisfactory explanation of tax evasion, it also argues that the phenomenon of tax evasion provides independent confirmation of prospect theory.Reference Dependence; Loss Aversion; Decision Weights; Prospect Theory; Expected Utility Theory; Tax Evasion; Optimal taxation