A New Societal Self-Defense Theory of Punishment—The Rights-Protection Theory

In this paper, I propose a new self-defense theory of punishment, the rights-protection theory. By appealing to the interest theory of right, I show that what we call “the right of self-defense” is actually composed of the right to protect our basic rights. The right of self-defense is not a single, self-standing right but a group of derivative rights justified by their contribution to the protection of the core, basic rights. Thus, these rights of self-defense are both justified and constrained by the basic rights they are supposed to protect. I then explain how this theory responds to a common objection. Opponents argue that, to exercise the right of self-defense, some threat must be present. However, in the context of punishment, the threat has already taken effect or is already gone. Thus, the right of self-defense becomes irrelevant when we punish an offender. I show that this objection is based on an implausibly narrow conception of self-defense. A reasonable conception would allow us to exercise our right of self-defense when there is a present definite threat, a future definite threat, or a potential threat. Thus, we may still exercise our right of self-defense in the context of punishment

Fortifying the Self-Defense Justification of Punishment

David Boonin has recently advanced several challenges to the self-defense justification of punishment. Boonin argues that the self-defense justification of punishment justifies punishing the innocent, justifies disproportionate punishment, cannot account for mitigating excuses, and does not justify intentionally harming offenders as we do when we punish them. In this paper, I argue that the self-defense justification, suitably understood, can avoid all of these problems. To help demonstrate the self-defense theory’s attraction, I also develop some contrasts between the self-defense justification, Warren Quinn’s better known ‘auto-retaliator’ argument, and desert-based justifications of punishment. In sum, I show that the self-defense justification of punishment is more resilient than commonly supposed and deserves to be taken seriously as a justification of punishment

Self-Defense and Rights

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1976, given by Judith Jarvis Thomson, an American philosopher

Simulasi Self Defense sebagai Sarana Pembelajaran Menghadapi Pembajakan Pesawat Komersial Menggunakan Metode Frame By Frame

Self defenseis a system for defending selfwhich is used to defeat the opponent quickly and without spending a lot of energy. Self defense training is also very needed for pilots and flight attendants, for example to confront the hijacking of commercial flight.Self defense can be trained through the medium of interactive multimedia with 3D animation content. This interactive multimedia was built by using adobe flash professional software, and 3D content using Lightwave 3D software. The result gets from trials to 30 respondents is this learning simulation is used because it is worth more than 50% of users give good response to simulation as a whole

Pricing and Investments in Internet Security: A Cyber-Insurance Perspective

Internet users such as individuals and organizations are subject to different types of epidemic risks such as worms, viruses, spams, and botnets. To reduce the probability of risk, an Internet user generally invests in traditional security mechanisms like anti-virus and anti-spam software, sometimes also known as self-defense mechanisms. However, such software does not completely eliminate risk. Recent works have considered the problem of residual risk elimination by proposing the idea of cyber-insurance. In this regard, an important research problem is the analysis of optimal user self-defense investments and cyber-insurance contracts under the Internet environment. In this paper, we investigate two problems and their relationship: 1) analyzing optimal self-defense investments in the Internet, under optimal cyber-insurance coverage, where optimality is an insurer objective and 2) designing optimal cyber-insurance contracts for Internet users, where a contract is a (premium, coverage) pair