Theoretical, Measured and Subjective Responsibility in Aided Decision Making

When humans interact with intelligent systems, their causal responsibility for outcomes becomes equivocal. We analyze the descriptive abilities of a newly developed responsibility quantification model (ResQu) to predict actual human responsibility and perceptions of responsibility in the interaction with intelligent systems. In two laboratory experiments, participants performed a classification task. They were aided by classification systems with different capabilities. We compared the predicted theoretical responsibility values to the actual measured responsibility participants took on and to their subjective rankings of responsibility. The model predictions were strongly correlated with both measured and subjective responsibility. A bias existed only when participants with poor classification capabilities relied less-than-optimally on a system that had superior classification capabilities and assumed higher-than-optimal responsibility. The study implies that when humans interact with advanced intelligent systems, with capabilities that greatly exceed their own, their comparative causal responsibility will be small, even if formally the human is assigned major roles. Simply putting a human into the loop does not assure that the human will meaningfully contribute to the outcomes. The results demonstrate the descriptive value of the ResQu model to predict behavior and perceptions of responsibility by considering the characteristics of the human, the intelligent system, the environment and some systematic behavioral biases. The ResQu model is a new quantitative method that can be used in system design and can guide policy and legal decisions regarding human responsibility in events involving intelligent systems

Nudges and other moral technologies in the context of power: Assigning and accepting responsibility

Strawson argues that we should understand moral responsibility in terms of our practices of holding responsible and taking responsibility. The former covers what is commonly referred to as backward-looking responsibility , while the latter covers what is commonly referred to as forward-looking responsibility . We consider new technologies and interventions that facilitate assignment of responsibility. Assigning responsibility is best understood as the second- or third-personal analogue of taking responsibility. It establishes forward-looking responsibility. But unlike taking responsibility, it establishes forward-looking responsibility in someone else. When such assignments are accepted, they function in such a way that those to whom responsibility has been assigned face the same obligations and are susceptible to the same reactive attitudes as someone who takes responsibility. One family of interventions interests us in particular: nudges. We contend that many instances of nudging tacitly assign responsibility to nudgees for actions, values, and relationships that they might not otherwise have taken responsibility for. To the extent that nudgees tacitly accept such assignments, they become responsible for upholding norms that would otherwise have fallen under the purview of other actors. While this may be empowering in some cases, it can also function in such a way that it burdens people with more responsibility that they can (reasonably be expected to) manage

The Contribution of Levinas’ Conception of Responsibility to Ethical Encounter Counselor-Counselee

In fact, humans have always been closely related to others. This relationship can be meant to encounter ethical counselor-counselee which is based on an attitude of responsibility. The concept of Levinas’s responsibility can be laid at the foundation for the ethical relationship of counselor-counselee to contribute and strengthen the concept of responsibility in the literature of guidance and counseling, as well as in counseling practices. Based on the literature review and critical analysis, we found the following results: 1) The helping profession is to be interpreted in the framework of thinking responsibility, and the responsibility of counselor-counselee should be able to be realized in concrete actions and patterned being-for so that it becomes I-for-You (asymmetrical), should not be reversed into a being-with so that it becomes You-to-I (reciprocity/mutuality); 2) Responsibility in the context of multicultural counseling is seen in phenomenological by pointing at reality in awareness counselor (intentionality); 3) Empathy as a major component of the counselor in the basic attitude of its existence takes responsibility for substitution (one-in-the-place-of-another). The responsibility of substitution is the unique and the total responsibility of the counselor-counselee; and 4) Reconciliation as the main goal of responsibility

From Moral Responsibility to Legal Responsibility in the Conduct of War

Different societies came to consider certain behaviors as morally wrong, and, in time, due to a more or less general practice, those behaviors have also become legally prohibited. While, nowadays, the existence of legal responsibility of states and individuals for certain reprehensible acts committed during an armed conflict, international or non-international, is hard to be disputed, an inquiry into the manner in which the behavior of the belligerents has come to be considered reveals long discussions in the field of morals and theory of morality, and, especially, regarding the different manner of establishing the elements to whom obedience is rather owed (the divinity, the sovereign, the law) and the relations between these. Hence, the present paper aims at analyzing the connections between moral responsibility and legal responsibility for wrongful behaviur during war in a diachronic approach, along with the major shifts in paradigm (codification and individual liability). Understanding morality as practice, convention, custom, we are arguing that the nowadays requirement of liability for war crimes appeared due to an assumed intention and practice of the decision-making entities (the sovereign, the state) and, ultimately, to a decision-making process of the most influential states

God and moral responsibility

I will argue in this article that Scheler’s last writings are not necessarily less valuable than his earlier works. First, I will try to prove that Scheler’s Späte Schriften are in concordance with his earlier writings, at least from the perspective of his ethical views, and do not represent such a dramatic rupture as is often claimed. The main part of this article will therefore consist of an analysis of the moral implications that are inherent in Scheler’s renewing concept of God, as it is obvious that Scheler’s concept of Gottwerdung, central in his late metaphysics, does not leave morality untouched. I will stress the fact that these moral implications remarkably coincide with the core of Scheler’s earlier ethical system, as developed in his magnificent Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik (Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values). Furthermore, Scheler's Späte Schriften are not only compatible with the essence of his earlier ethics, but there is also a great consistency in them, even though they are often characterized as merely a collection of distinct essays. Scheler’s so-called metanthropology accords with his political, epistemological and ethical views