The Impact of Simulation Sequencing on Perceived Clinical Decision Making

An emerging nursing education trend is to utilize simulated learning experiences as a means to optimize competency and decision making skills. The purpose of this study was to examine differences in students\u27 perception of clinical decision making and clinical decision making-related self-confidence and anxiety based on the sequence (order) in which they participated in a block of simulated versus hospital-based learning experiences. A quasi-experimental crossover design was used. Between and within group differences were found relative to self-confidence with the decision making process. When comparing groups, at baseline the simulation followed by hospital group had significantly higher self-confidence scores, however, at 14-weeks both groups were not significantly different. Significant within group differences were found in the simulation followed by hospital group only, demonstrating a significant decrease in clinical decision making related anxiety across the semester. Finally, there were no significant difference in; perceived clinical decision making within or between the groups at the two measurement points. Preliminary findings suggest that simulated learning experiences can be offered with alternating sequences without impacting the process, anxiety or confidence with clinical decision making. This study provides beginning evidence to guide curriculum development and allow flexibility based on student needs and available resources

What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation

How should judges interpret statutes? For some scholars and judges, interpreting statutes requires little more than a close examination of statutory language, with perhaps a dictionary and a few interpretive canons nearby. For others, statutory interpretation must be based upon an assessment of a statute\u27s underlying purpose, an evaluation of society\u27s current norms and values, or a normative objective, such as the law\u27s integrity. With such differences squarely framed in the literature, it is reasonable to ask whether anything of value can be added. We contend that there is

Dignity, Self-Respect, and Bloodless Invasions

In Chapter 7, “Dignity, Self-Respect, and Bloodless Invasions”, Saba Bazargan-Forward asks How much violence can we impose on those attempting to politically subjugate us? According to Bazargan-Forward, “reductive individualism” answers this question by determining how much violence one can impose on an individual wrongly attempting to prevent one from political participation. Some have argued that the amount of violence one can permissibly impose in such situations is decidedly sub-lethal. Accordingly, this counterintuitive response has cast doubt on the reductive individualist project. Bazargan-Forward argues, however, that political subjugation involves an institutionally embodied form of disrespect that has been altogether missed. A proper appreciation of this sort of disrespect, he contends, morally permits much greater defensive violence against those attempting to politically subjugate us or others

For (Some) Immigration Restrictions

According to many philosophers, the world should embrace open borders – that is, let people move around the globe and settle as they wish, with exceptions made only in very specific cases such as fugitives or terrorists. Defenders of open borders have adopted two major argumentative strategies. The first is to claim that immigration restrictions involve coercion, and then show that such coercion cannot be morally justified. The second is to argue that adopting worldwide open borders policies would make the world a much better place, particularly by improving average well-being. This essay contends that both of these argumentative strategies fail. Some immigration restrictions are not only morally justified, but morally required

The political economy of Hong Kong's "open skies" legal regime: an empirical and theoretical exploration

Copyright 2009 San Diego International Law Journal. Reprinted with the permission of the San Diego International Law Journal.The article presents an empirical and theoretical research which describes the functions of the international legal regime through powerful economic forces in Hong Kong, China. The government applied aviation policies with respect to open skies platform to provide a basis for a thorough understanding of government's legitimacy based on neoclassical logic and analysis. Conceptual perspectives of realists, liberals and cognitivists were acknowledged by the economically-inspired nationalists

Foreword: Is Reliance Still Dead?

One thing I found out when I was a prosecutor is that you should never tell a police officer he cannot do something, for that just serves as an open invitation for him to do it. In recent years, I have learned a similar lesson about legal scholarship which I should probably keep to myself but won\u27t. If you proclaim the existence of a scholarly consensus, this is an open invitation for academics to try to demolish such a claim

Take-ings

The word property had many meanings in 1789, as it does today, and a critical aspect of the ongoing debate about the meaning of the Fifth Amendment\u27s Takings Clause has centered on how the word should be read in the context of the Clause. Property has been read by Professor Thomas Merrill to refer to ownership interests, by Richard Epstein in terms of a broad Blackstonian conception of the individual control of the possession, use, and disposition of resources, by Benjamin Barros as reflective of constructions through individual expectations and state law, and by the author as physical control of material possessions As a textual matter, however, the Takings Clause is not simply concerned with governmental actions that affect property. The Clause provides that private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation. It is thus concerned with property taken for public use and the word taken is the key, at least for a textualist, to understanding both which types of governmental actions fall within the ambit of the Clause and what types of property the Clause protects. The centrality of the concept of takings to the Clause\u27s meaning is reflected by the name by which the Clause is known. It is the Takings Clause, not the Property Clause. Although it has, ironically, not figured prominently in takings scholarship, the word taken is of fundamental importance to the Clause\u27s meaning. In this essay, the author explores the importance from a textualist perspective and argues that a textualist will reject the doctrine of regulatory takings

Accountability and Intervening Agency: An Asymmetry between Upstream and Downstream Actors

Suppose someone (P1) does something that is wrongful only in virtue of the risk that it will enable another person (P2) to commit a wrongdoing. Suppose further that P1’s conduct does indeed turn out to enable P2’s wrongdoing. The resulting wrong is agentially mediated: P1 is an enabling agent and P2 is an intervening agent. Whereas the literature on intervening agency focuses on whether P2’s status as an intervening agent makes P1’s conduct less bad, I turn this issue on its head by investigating whether P1’s status as an enabling agent makes P2’s conduct more bad. I argue that it does: P2 wrongs not just the victims of ϕ but P1 as well, by acting in a way that wrongfully makes P1 accountable for ϕ. This has serious implications for compensatory and defensive liability in cases of agentially mediated wrongs

Intentionalism\u27s Revival

This essay responds to an article by Professors Boudreau, Lupia, McCubbins, and Rodriguez (hereinafter BLMRod ) that was posted in Legislation and Statutory Interpretation Abstracts on July 26, 2007, (http://ssrn.com/abstract=997924) and that will appear in the San Diego Law Review, vol.44, no.2, 2007. The essay situates BLMRod\u27s article in the context of recent efforts by a number of scholars to reclaim foundational legitimacy for intentionalism as an approach to construing statutes. The essay first applauds BLMRod\u27s use of insights from communication theory to conceptualize statutes as compressed substantive or procedural commands that cannot be adequately understood without an appreciation for the compression process that generated them. The essay explores certain implications of this thematic focus. It discusses how the authors\u27 approach may help clarify the status of legislative history as evidence of ascribed or imputed intent. It also suggests how that approach may enhance the value of legislative history when contrasted with key interpretive resources generated by the two other branches of government - i.e., the canons of construction and agency rules or adjudications. The essay then adopts a more critical perspective toward BLMRod\u27s treatment of the compression (lawmaking) and expansion (law-interpreting) processes. It suggests that by viewing the compression process as essentially a majority party domain, the authors undervalue important congressional conversations involving minority party members, especially although not exclusively in the Senate. Further, the essay discusses how the architecture of congressional conversations may differ across subject matter areas more than the authors\u27 basic model seems to contemplate. Finally, the essay addresses the process of expansion, particularly BLMRod\u27s approach to conversations among a bill\u27s coalition of supporting members. It suggests ways in which the authors\u27 analysis of what motivates ardent and pivotal supporters, and how courts should treat these two key groups when elaborating the meaning of text, may be in need of some refinement

Defensive Liability Without Culpability

A minimally responsible threatener is someone who bears some responsibility for imposing an objectively wrongful threat, but whose responsibility does not rise to the level of culpability. Minimally responsible threateners include those who knowingly commit a wrongful harm under duress, those who are epistemically justified but mistaken in their belief that a morally risky activity will not cause a wrongful harm, and those who commit a harm while suffering from a cognitive impairment which makes it prohibitively difficult to recognize and act on what is morally required of them. The chapter argues that minimally responsible threateners can indeed be morally liable for the harms they impose. Put differently, culpability is not a necessary basis for liability