Biokonserwatyzm i preferencja status quo

Bioconservative view holds that we should prevent dissemination of biomedical inteventions enhancing human capacities. One of arguments against this view shows that it is based on status quo bias which gives unjustified preference for actual state of affairs. According to this argument reasons against human enhancement are not conclusive. The aim of this article is to show the possibility of the interpretation of the bioconservative view, under which it is possible avoiding the status quo bias objection

Interpretation und Weltbezug : [Rezension von Hans Krämer, Kritik der Hermeneutik, Interpretationsphilosophie und Realismus]

What does being moral mean? On one hand people may justify mercy killing as sparing someone’s suffering, but on the other hand they are still, in-fact, taking another’s life. According to Lind’s theory of moral competence (2008), it is based on consistent utilization of moral principles. Although common sense tells us that people’s affective states and levels of empathy may explain the differences, there is little direct evidence. The purpose of this study was to fill this gap by examining the relative contribution of empathy and affective state to moral competence. Results of the study revealed that although perspective taking and negative affective state were both significant predictors of moral competence, perspective taking was a stronger contributor. This suggests that the next time you deliberate over a moral dilemma (e.g., euthanasia), you should try understanding another person’s perspective rather than feeling empathy to make the best moral judgment

Minimalism and Expressivism

There has been a great deal of discussion in the recent philosophical literature of the relationship between the minimalist theory of truth and the expressivist metaethical theory. One group of philosophers contends that minimalism and expressivism are compatible, the other group contends that such theories are incompatible. Following Simon Blackburn (manuscript), I will call the former position ‘compatibilism’ and the latter position ‘incompatiblism.’ Even those compatibilist philosophers who hold that there is no conflict or tension between these two theories—minimalism and expressivism—typically think that some revision of minimalism is required to accommodate expressivism. The claim that there is such an incompatibility, I will argue, is based on a misunderstanding of the historical roots of expressivism, the motivations behind the expressivist theory, and the essential commitments of expressivism. I will present an account of the expressivist theory that is clearly consistent with minimalism

Limit and Creation. Towards an Ethic of Self-Limitation in the Digital Era

Aim of this article is to analyse the relationship between creativity, freedom and future in contemporary society. The main focus is on the notion of creativity in our digital era. Common sense understands creativity as a concept implying something new, something original that did not exist before. And yet in our society the constant overflow of news, products and contents doesn’t surprise anymore, is no longer connected to a truly creative act. The complete lack of limits seems to be our society’s own limit, since newness is not experienced anymore as something really new. The solution to this situation is a new ethic of self-limitation that reshapes our idea of creativity and bases it on different criteria. The first part of the article is an analysis of hypermodern society. Hypermodernity is defined through three features: quantity as a qualitative element, override of distance, sublation of perspective. Unlike postmodern society, hypermodernity defines itself positively on the basis of some technological and social results that are experienced as improvements. In the second part of the article the paradox of hypermodern society is discussed: despite its obsession for newness, despite the huge spread of creative jobs and the passion for future, newness seems to be something given an usual, being creative means conforming to given standards, and future is almost completely implemented into present. In the last part of the article I argue that a solution to this situation is an ethic of selflimitation, in which a rediscovery of limit leads to a new concept of creativity no longer based on quantitative increment, but rather on the ideas of qualitative selection, objective distance, personal perspective. According to this view, being creative is no longer a matter of content, but rather of form. I will also argue that the aesthetics of Oulipo, a French literary movement of the Sixties, already expressed this stance in a very similar situation

Panic and the Lack of Moral Competence. How We Can Help to Prevent Panic Pandemics

Often we have to decide on difficult problems and conflicts. For this, a certain level of moral competence is needed, in order to solve them as quickly and adequately as possible. Otherwise these problems and conflicts can overwhelm us, triggering a feeling of fear and panic, and making us react too slowly or inadequately, or both. Fear and panic can make us ignore problems and conflicts, attempt to “solve” them through brute force or deceit, or declare them to be beyond our responsibility and let an authority decide what to do. Often such makeshift solutions seem to work, but, more often, they have damaging effects. Therefore, society tries to curb criminal and anti-democratic activities through coercion, that is, through laws, law-enforcing institutions, and correction facilities – at high costs, and often with little efficacy. In this article I show that such coercion would not be needed if we gave all citizens an opportunity to develop their ability to solve conflicts and problems through thinking and discussion. Moral competence would immunize us against fear and panic, and thus also against immoral practices. Moral competence is not inborn in us, and it does not develop unless it is fostered through proper learning opportunities. Therefore, if we want to live together peacefully in a democratic society, we need to provide proper learning opportunities for everyone, not only of a few people. If the masses are infected by panic, a few rational people cannot stop this pandemic

Relationship between Social Support and Life Satisfaction of College Students: Resilience As a Mediator and Moderator

A total of 843 college students in Guangdong University of Foreign Studies were investigated using a social support evaluation scale, a resilience scale, and a life satisfaction evaluation scale. Results were analyzed using IBM® SPSS 21.0® and Amos 17.0. It was shown that there existed a positive correlation respectively among resilience, social support and life satisfaction. Social support predicted resilience positively and resilience partially mediated the association between social support and life satisfaction. Finally, resilience moderated the association between social support and life satisfaction; the higher the resilience level, the more significant the positive predictive effect of social support on life satisfaction. College students' life satisfaction is closely related to social support and resilience; resilience partially plays a mediating and moderating role between social support and life satisfaction.

The Outline of Communal ‘Ars Moriendi’ in Egalitarian Transhumanism

This paper outlines the proposal for an egalitarian, transhumanist, and communal version of ars moriendi that should be coherent and meet the consequentialist criteria of the principle of minimizing anti-values and maximizing values, especially the ethical values of freedom and happiness. Transhuman-ist augmented dying (AD) refers to the extended body-mind, free from harmful religious and political ideologies. At present, a feasible art of dying can be systematically supported by anesthetics and psy-chedelics (entheogens), computer games, virtual reality, and good death machines. Its egalitarian form requires a deeply democratic society, and its progress may need a transition to a type 1 society on the Kardashev scale

Typhus in Buchenwald: Can the Story Be Told?

Ludwik Fleck is known today primarily as pioneer in the social study of scientific knowledge. However, during World War II he was a prisoner in Buchenwald, where he and other prisoners produced a typhus vaccine for the Nazis, and where he witnessed murderous experiments on human beings. After WW2, Fleck was accused by one of the prisoners who had participated in the vaccine production at Buchenwald of collaborating, either deliberately or due to lack of imagination, with the Nazi experiments. This article critically examines this accusation and its well-documented rebuttal by Fleck. It argues that while sometimes, especially when dealing with emotionally fraught issues, it may be difficult to establish what precisely took place at a given time and site, it is important to restore the original complexity and messiness of past events – in order to open spaces for understanding, reflexivity and compassion.Ludwik Fleck is known today primarily as pioneer in the social study of scientific knowledge. However, during World War II he was a prisoner in Buchenwald, where he and other prisoners produced a typhus vaccine for the Nazis, and where he witnessed murderous experiments on human beings. After WW2, Fleck was accused by one of the prisoners who had participated in the vaccine production at Buchenwald of collaborating, either deliberately or due to lack of imagination, with the Nazi experiments. This article critically examines this accusation and its well-documented rebuttal by Fleck. It argues that while sometimes, especially when dealing with emotionally fraught issues, it may be difficult to establish what precisely took place at a given time and site, it is important to restore the original complexity and messiness of past events – in order to open spaces for understanding, reflexivity and compassion

Self-determination and “the Right to Specificity”. Concerning Hegel’s Theory of Modern Freedom

In this paper, it will be shown that Hegel’s philosophical thematisation of subjective freedom has given a fundamental contribution to the historical innovation of modernity, which regards not only human rights, but also norms and values. Besides, it played an important role concerning the cultural transformation, i.e., the process of the realization of the historical innovation oriented towards the ideals of modern freedom. To show this, the author will focus on some passages from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right of 1820, in which Hegel regarded subjective freedom as universally-normative and, at the same time, as socially and historically contextualized (situated, respectively). Hegel, namely, explicates modern freedom in its ideality and moral normativity, addressing its realization in particular forms of life. Marriage, for instance, as it will be shown towards the end of this contribution, exemplified as the right to particularity, is the normative basis of modern subjective freedom. Tensions and collisions will permanently challenge this type of freedom and also require permanent (and self-defeating) efforts invested in striving for a (too contextualized and situated) „reconciliation“ (in Hegel´s terms Versöhnung)

Mind and Machine. The New Spaces of Robots and Digitization

Machines have always been a tool or technical instrument for human beings to facilitate and to accelerate processes through mechanical power. The same applies to robots nowadays – the next step in the evolution of machines. Over the course of the last few years, robot usage in society has expanded enormously, and they now carry out a remarkable number of tasks for us. It seems we are on the eve of a historic revolution that will change everything we know right now. But not only robots have an impact on our life. It is digitization in its entirety, including smart applications and games, that confronts us with new spaces. This special volume of Ethics in Progress tries to broaden our understanding of a philosophical field – robots and digitization – that is still in its infancy in terms of it research and literature