Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in the United States: Actors and Outcomes

The authors examine disposition statistics from employment arbitration cases administered over an 11-year period by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) to investigate the process of dispute resolution in this new institution of employment relations. They investigate the predictors of settlement before the arbitration hearing and then estimate models for the likelihood of employee wins and damage amounts for the 2,802 cases that resulted in an award. Their findings show that larger-scale employers who are involved in more arbitration cases tend to have higher win rates and have lower damage awards made against them. This study also provides evidence of a significant repeat employer-arbitrator pair effect; employers that use the same arbitrator on multiple occasions win more often and have lower damages awarded against them than do employers appearing before an arbitrator for the first time. The authors find that self-represented employees tend to settle cases less often, win cases that proceed to a hearing less often, and receive lower damage awards. Female arbitrators and experienced professional labor arbitrators render awards in favor of employees less often than do male arbitrators and other arbitrators

An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes

Using data from reports filed by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) pursuant to California Code requirements, this article examines outcomes of employment arbitration. The study analyzes 3,945 arbitration cases, of which 1,213 were decided by an award after a hearing, filed and reaching disposition between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2007. This includes all the employment arbitration cases administered nationally by the AAA during this time period that derived from employer-promulgated arbitration procedures. Key findings include: (1) the employee win rate amongst the cases was 21.4%, which is lower than employee win rates reported in employment litigation trials; (2) in cases won by employees, the median award amount was $36,500 and the mean was$109,858, both of which are substantially lower than award amounts reported in employment litigation; (3) mean time to disposition in arbitration was 284.4 days for cases that settled and 361.5 days for cases decided after a hearing, which is substantially shorter than times to disposition in litigation; (4) mean arbitration fees were $6,340 per case overall,$11,070 for cases disposed of by an award following a hearing, and in 97 percent of these cases the employer paid 100 percent of the arbitration fees beyond a small filing fee, pursuant to AAA procedures; (5) in 82.4 percent of the cases, the employees involved made less than $100,000 per year; and (6) the mean amount claimed was$844,814 and 75 percent of all claims were greater than $36,000. The study also analyzes whether there is a repeat player effect in employer arbitration. The results provide strong evidence of a repeat employer effect in which employee win rates and award amounts are significantly lower where the employer is involved in multiple arbitration cases, which could be explained by various advantages accruing to larger organizations with greater resources and expertise in dispute resolution procedures. The results also indicate the existence of a significant repeat employer-arbitrator pairing effect in which employees on average have lower win rates and receive smaller damage awards where the same arbitrator is involved in more than one case with the same employer, a finding supporting some of the fairness criticisms directed at mandatory employment arbitration

Employment Arbitration in the Securities Industry: Lessons from Recent Empirical Research

In this Article, we use evidence gathered from employment arbitration cases arising in the securities industry to address several research questions that emanate from the debate over the arbitration of employment disputes. We empirically answer the following questions: (1) Are critics correct in asserting that employment arbitration favors repeat players? (2) Do employees fare better under voluntary arbitration than they do under mandatory arbitration? (3) Are employees who allege violations of their civil rights, through the filing of discrimination charges, treated differently from those filing other types of claims? (4) Does the gender of the parties involved in the arbitration process affect outcomes in any way? (5) Is there evidence that companies learn from, or are affected by, the results of prior arbitration awards when dealing with a current claim? Although the literature has offered some answers to these questions, this Article provides a holistic review and overview of the arbitration experience within the securities industry and a summation of quantitative evidence on the subject

Arbitration Outcomes and Employer Size in the Context of the American Arbitration Association 2010-2020

This study examines the ``repeat player effect in employment arbitration for counsel appearing repeatedly in the same arbitration forum, and the impact of employer size on arbitration outcomes, and finds that the repeat player effect has a notable impact only on arbitrations involving the largest employers

Moving the Ball Forward in Consumer and Employment Dispute Resolution: What Can Planning, Talking, Listening and Breaking Bread Together Accomplish?

Article Extract: Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration has been a divisive issue for many years, particularly since the Supreme Court began enforcing the arbitration clauses that businesses and employers impose on consumers and employees, respectively, in contracts of adhesion. In 2009, the Dispute Resolution Section’s Council proposed to weigh in on this issue through the vehicle of an ABA House of Delegates resolution. The compromise position developed by the Section, expressing support for pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses provided they offer a meaningful opt-out, generated such a firestorm of opposition from both pro-arbitration and anti-arbitration advocates that the Council ultimately chose to abstain from expressing any position at all

Secondary Liability, ISP Immunity, and Incumbent Entrenchment

More than fifteen years have passed since the two major U.S. statutes concerning the secondary liability of Internet service providers were adopted--the Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The statutes have been criticized; however, very little of the criticism has come from Internet service providers, who have enjoyed the benefits of generous safe harbors and immunity from suit guaranteed by these statutes. This Article raises the question of whether these statutes contribute to incumbent entrenchment--solidifying the position of the existing Internet service providers to the detriment of potential new entrants. The current laws and industry self-regulation may hamper the entry of new service providers into the market and thereby retard the technological progress that best serves society

Resolving Discrimination Complaints in Employment Arbitration: An Analysis of the Experience in the Securities Industry

This article empirically examines whether employment discrimination claims differ from other types of disputes resolved through arbitration. Whether arbitration is appropriate for resolving violations of anti-discrimination statutes at work is a focus of ongoing policy debates. Yet empirical scholarship has rarely considered whether different types of complaints might have distinct characteristics and receive varied outcomes in arbitration. The authors analyze all of the employment arbitration awards for cases filed between 1991 and 2006 in the financial services industry to determine whether differences in the type of allegation affect award outcomes. They also examine the effects of the financial industry’s decision in 1999 to introduce voluntary arbitration for discrimination claims. Results indicate that discrimination claims largely fared worse in arbitration than did other statutory or nonstatutory claims but that arbitration systems are capable of meaningful self-reform