What is Power Sharing? Consociationalism, Centripetalism, and Hybrid Power Sharing

In this article, the author analyzes the term "power-sharing" in the context of power exercised within a state. He first examines the term in the very general sense, in which it can be applied to all types and dimensions of sharing of power between various groups and institutional entities. Second, the author examines the meaning of the term in the narrow sense, that is, the phenomenon of systemic sharing of power by groups (segments) whose membership is based on ascribed criteria such as common ancestors, relatives, or racial background, and/or cultural ones such as a common language, religion, or celebrations. The basic segmental units in this sense are nations (understood in the sociological sense), ethnic groups, or religious and denominational communities that form part of divided societies. Third, the article shows the differences between the principal models (types) of power-sharing in the narrow sense: consociationalism, centripetalism, and hybrid power-sharing

Stabilizing Power Sharing

Power sharing is modeled as a duel over some prize. Each of two players may either share the prize in some ratio or fire at the other player—either in sequence or simultaneously—and eliminate it with a specified probability. If one player eliminates the other without being eliminated itself, it captures the entire prize, but the prize is damaged over time when there is shooting. Simultaneous shooting, which is more damaging than sequential shooting, tends to induce the players to share the prize and expand their opportunities for sharing it. It was effectively implemented by the superpowers with the doctrine of “launch on warning” during the Cold War, and it was strengthened by the development of second-strike capability. Deterring terrorism has proved a different matter, because terrorists are difficult to detect and present few targets that can be damaged.power sharing, game, duel, deterrence, terrorism

Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia

The aim of this study is to demonstrate the validity of the thesis that in Indonesia one can find institutions that characterize two power-sharing models which are considered opposites of one another in political theory – centripetalism and consociationalism. In consequence, the Indonesian power-sharing system should be viewed as a hybrid, or mixed, system, and not a typically centripetal system as is usually the case in the literature. At the beginning of this article, a short analysis of Indonesia’s political situation is given for the purpose of defining the factors which determined the introduction of inter-segmental power-sharing arrangements in that country. This is followed by a description of the specificity of consociationalism and centripetalism. The article goes on to discuss specific institutions of both power-sharing models that exist in Indonesia and ends with some concluding remarks on the thesis advanced at the outset. The article has been published in "Polish Political Science Yearbook" 2017, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 168–185. For more on combining institutions of different models of power-sharing see: Krzysztof Trzcinski, Hybrid Power Sharing: On How to Stabilize the Political Situation in Multi-Segmental Societies, "Politeja" 2018, vol. 56, no. 5, pp. 86-10

Book Review: J. McEvoy and B. O'Leary (eds). Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places (U. Penn. Press, 2013)

Power-sharing is a key component of many peace settlements in divided societies. Scholarship on power-sharing is heavily influenced by Arend Lijphart’s pioneering work on consociational theory. Advocates of consociational power-sharing argue that it is a pragmatic means of dealing with competing ethnic identities which are durable, (as opposed to primordial), rather than malleable – a proposition not without its critic

The Instability of Power Sharing

Three models are presented in which two players agree to share power in a particular ratio, but either player may subsequently “fire” at the other, as in a duel, to try to eliminate it. The players have positive probabilities of eliminating each other by firing. If neither is successful, the agreement stays in place; if one is successful, that player obtains all the power; if each eliminates the other, both players get nothing. In Model I, the game is played once, and in Model II it is repeated, with discounting of future payoffs. Although there are conditions under which each player would prefer not to shoot, satisfying these conditions for one player precludes satisfying them for the other, so at least one player will always have an incentive to shoot. In anticipation, its rival would prefer to shoot, too, so there will be a race to preempt. In Model III, a damage factor caused by shooting, whether successful or not, is introduced into Model II. This mitigates the incentive to shoot but does not eliminate it entirely. The application of the models to conflicts, especially civil wars, is discussed.power sharing, repeated game, duel, civil wars

Boosting Fronthaul Capacity: Global Optimization of Power Sharing for Centralized Radio Access Network

The limited fronthaul capacity imposes a challenge on the uplink of centralized radio access network (C-RAN). We propose to boost the fronthaul capacity of massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) aided C-RAN by globally optimizing the power sharing between channel estimation and data transmission both for the user devices (UDs) and the remote radio units (RRUs). Intuitively, allocating more power to the channel estimation will result in more accurate channel estimates, which increases the achievable throughput. However, increasing the power allocated to the pilot training will reduce the power assigned to data transmission, which reduces the achievable throughput. In order to optimize the powers allocated to the pilot training and to the data transmission of both the UDs and the RRUs, we assign an individual power sharing factor to each of them and derive an asymptotic closed-form expression of the signal-to-interference-plus-noise for the massive MIMO aided C-RAN consisting of both the UD-to-RRU links and the RRU-to-baseband unit (BBU) links. We then exploit the C-RAN architecture's central computing and control capability for jointly optimizing the UDs' power sharing factors and the RRUs' power sharing factors aiming for maximizing the fronthaul capacity. Our simulation results show that the fronthaul capacity is significantly boosted by the proposed global optimization of the power allocation between channel estimation and data transmission both for the UDs and for their host RRUs. As a specific example of 32 receive antennas (RAs) deployed by RRU and 128 RAs deployed by BBU, the sum-rate of 10 UDs achieved with the optimal power sharing factors improves 33\% compared with the one attained without optimizing power sharing factors

Power Sharing and the Rule of Law in the Aftermath of Civil War

What effect do power-sharing institutions agreed to as part of civil war settlements have on the development of the rule of law in post–civil war states? We contend that power-sharing measures facilitate the emergence of the rule of law in two ways. First, they establish a form of institutional constraint that promotes judicial autonomy and independence. Second, they foster a sense of security among judges and other political actors that bolsters commitment to the law. We demonstrate the plausibility of a positive relationship between power sharing and the rule of law through an analysis of post–civil war states between the years 1948 and 2006. Our findings suggest that civil war settlements can help to establish the rule of law when they include mechanisms aimed at allaying the insecurities of political actors in the postconflict environment

Automatic power sharing modification of P/V droop controllers in low-voltage resistive microgrids

Microgrids are receiving an increasing interest to integrate the growing share of distributed generation (DG) units in the electrical network. For the islanded operation of the microgrid, several control strategies for the primary control have been developed to ensure a stable microgrid operation. In lowvoltage microgrids, active power/voltage (P/V ) droop controllers are gaining attention as they take into account the resistive nature of the network lines and the lack of directly-coupled rotating inertia. However, a problem often cited with these droop controllers is that the grid voltage is not a global parameter. This can influence the power sharing between different units. In this paper, it is investigated whether this is actually a disadvantage of the control strategy. It is shown that with P/V droop control, the DG units that are located electrically far from the load centres automatically deliver a lower share of the power. This automatic power sharing modification can lead to decreased line losses, thus, an overall better efficiency compared to the methods that focus on perfect power sharing. In this paper, the P/V and P/f droop control strategies are compared with respect to this power sharing modification and the line losses

Power Sharing: Developing Inter-Provincial Electricity Trade

Canada needs a “Made-in-Canada” approach to electricity transmission that better exploits the benefits of east-west power trading. In this study, the author explains how to overcome the impediments to electricity trading that currently exist at provincial borders. To ensure continued access to US markets, most Canadian provinces have complied with US electricity trading rules. But when transplanted in Canada these rules limit provinces with competitive electricity markets, where electricity customers may choose among suppliers (Alberta and Ontario), in sharing the benefits of trade with their neighbouring monopoly utilities (such as in British Columbia, Manitoba, or Quebec). Some provinces rely mostly on hydroelectric generation, while others rely more on fossil or nuclear-fuelled generation. Carr says Canada would benefit from more electricity trading on an east-west axis because the sharing of different forms of electricity generation – and time-zone diversity – would allow better use of each province’s generation capacity. Carr makes several specific recommendations for provincial action. He also recommends the federal government support provincial initiatives in the event of NAFTA challenges.Economic Growth and Innovation, Canada, electricity, inter-provincial trade, NAFTA

The African Union, constitutionalism and power-sharing

Over the past decade, the African Union (AU) had put in place an important normative framework to promote constitutional rule and, in particular, orderly constitutional transfers of power in its member states. Through its Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU has actively opposed, including through the use of sanctions, unconstitutional changes of government. As a key element of its policy, the PSC systematically advocates a return to constitutional order as a remedy for unconstitutional changes of government. Free and fair elections are an important element in the PSC policy of legitimating a new constitutional and political order. However, while opposing unconstitutional means of obtaining or transferring power, the AU has been generally supportive of the use of power-sharing agreements as an instrument of negotiated conflict settlement. Most power-sharing agreements are not in accordance with the prevailing constitutional order and, as part of a larger peace agreement, often contain new constitutional blueprints. This dual policy of, on the one hand, opposing certain types of unconstitutional changes of government, in particular military coups, and, on the other, advocating power-sharing agreements in the absence of a regulatory framework or normative guidance on such agreements poses an obvious challenge for the consistency of AU policy. Insofar as the AU wishes to nurture a culture of constitutionalism in its member states, it might benefit from developing policy guidelines about how to enhance the legitimacy of a new constitutional order - and of the political regime exercising political authority – be it in the aftermath of a coup or as a result of power-sharing.