Share Investors' Competence and Overconfidence in Investment Decision Making

Many factors may affect investors in making investment decision, some of them are overconfidence and competence. Those factors thought to have an influence on investment decision making. This research objectives to determine the effect of competence and overconfidence on investment decision. This research is a kind of quantitative research using survey method given to beginner investor. The sampling method used  judgment sampling with the number of samples in this research are 30 respondents of beginner investor. The analysis used is MRA (Multiple Regression Analysis). The results of this study showed that competence of investor does not affect in investment decision while investor's decision was influenced by overconfidence of investor. Keywords : competence, overconfidence. investment decisio

Auditor’s perceptions of CEOs overconfidence in Egypt : a quasi-experimental study

Purpose: This study aims to explore auditor’s perceptions of CEOs overconfidence in Egypt as one of the emerging countries. Design/methodology/approach: A quasi-experimental study is used on a sample comprises of 101 practicing auditors at public accounting firms in Egypt to assess (i) CEO overconfidence in a case scenario, (ii) the quality of earnings that would be provided by this overconfident CEO, and (iii) how overconfident CEO would be considered when they are assessing fraud risk, audit risk, audit effort and audit fees. Findings: The results suggest that not all the auditors in the sample were able to discover the same degree of overconfidence personal traits in a case scenario, and it was done by the sense, and they generally agree that overconfident CEO are more likely to provide lower earnings quality. Accordingly, they raise their assessment for audit fees as a result of an increase in fraud risk, audit risk, and audit effort. Practical implications: This study has significant implications for accounting and auditing professionals, market participants and regulators; where auditors should consider the overconfidence of the CEO during the audit process, market participants should consider managerial overconfidence when they are making investment decisions. Moreover, this study highlights the gap between auditing standards and the professional practice; which requires regulators to consider personal overconfidence traits as an indicator of financial reporting risk. Originality/value: This study helps in filling a gap in the literature; where auditor’s perceptions of CEOs overconfidence have not been fully investigated in emerging economies.peer-reviewe

Overconfidence?

Many studies have shown that people display an apparent overconfidence. In particular, it is common for a majority of people to describe themselves as better-than-average. The literature takes for granted that this better-than-average effect is problematic. We argue, however, that, even accepting these studies on their own terms, there is nothing at all wrong with a strict majority of people rating themselves above the median.Overconfidence, Better than Average, Experiments, Irrationality, Signalling Models

Farmers' Subjective Yield Distributions: Calibration and Implications for Crop Insurance Valuation

This paper examines the role of overconfidence in explaining farmer crop insurance purchasing decisions. The authors hypothesize that overconfidence could influence the participation decision and test this hypothesis. The preliminary results indicate that farmers are overconfident; however, the relationship between overconfidence and the insurance use remains uncertain.Risk and Uncertainty,

Overconfidence?

Many studies have shown that people display an apparent overconfidence. In particular, it is common for a majority of people to describe themselves as better than average. The literature takes for granted that this better-than-average effect is problematic. We argue, however, that, even accepting these studies completely on their own terms, there is nothing at all wrong with a strict majority of people rating themselves above the median.Overconfidence; Better than Average; Experimental Economics; Irrationality; Signalling Models

Overconfidence?

Many studies have shown that people display an apparent overconfidence. In particular, it is common for a majority of people to describe themselves as better-than-average. The literature takes for granted that this better-than-average is problematic. We argue, however, that, even accepting these studies on their own terms, there is nothing at all wrong with a strict majority of people rating themselves above the median.Overconfidence; Irrationality; Signalling Models; Better than average

Entrepreneurial success and failure: Confidence and fallible judgement

Excess entry – or the high failure rate of market-entry decisions – is often attributed to overconfidence exhibited by entreprene urs. We show analytically that whereas excess entry is an inevitable consequence of imperfect assessments of entrepreneurial skill, it does not imply overconfidence. Judgmental fallibility leads to excess entry even when everyone is underconfident. Self-selection implies greater confidence (but not necessarily overconfidence) among those who start new businesses than those who do not and among successful entrants than failures. Our results question claims that “entrepreneurs are overconfident” and emphasize the need to understand the role of judgmental fallibility in producing economic outcomes.Excess entry, fallible judgment, overconfidence, skill uncertainty, entrepreneurship, LeeX

Distinguishing Overconfidence from Rational Best-Response in Markets

This paper studies the causal effect of individuals' overconfidence and bounded rationality on asset markets. To do that, we combine a new market mechanism with an experimental design, where (1) players' interaction is centered on the inferences they make about each others' information, (2) overconfidence in private information is controlled by the experimenter (i.e., used as a treatment), and (3) natural analogs to prices, returns and volume exist. We find that in sessions where subjects are induced to be overconfident, volume and price error analogs are higher than predicted by the fully-rational model. However, qualitatively similar results are obtained in sessions where there is no aggregate overconfidence. To explain this, we suggest an alternative possibility: participants strategically respond to the errors contained in others' actions by rationally discounting the informativeness of these actions. Estimating a structural model of individuals' decisions that allows for both overconfidence and errors, we are able to separate these two channels. We find that a substantial fraction of excess volume and price error analogs is attributable to strategic response to errors, while the remaining is attributable to overconfidence. Further, we show that price analog exhibit serial autocorrelation only in the overconfidence-induced sessions.