Theory of Mind and Non-Human Intelligence

Comparative cognition researchers have long been interested in the nature of nonhuman animal social capacities. One capacity has received prolonged attention: mindreading, or “theory of mind” as it’s also called, is often seen to be the ability to attribute mental states to others in the service of predicting and explaining behavior. This attention is garnered in no small measure from interest into what accounts for the distinctive features of human social cognition and what are the evolutionary origins of those features. This entry surveys: (1) main hypotheses concerning the adaptive value of mindreading, (2) theoretical problems complicating our ability to determine whether nonhuman animals mindread, and finally (3) proposals that mindreading is a plural rather than unitary cognitive system

Targeted cortical reorganization using optogenetics in non-human primates.

Brain stimulation modulates the excitability of neural circuits and drives neuroplasticity. While the local effects of stimulation have been an active area of investigation, the effects on large-scale networks remain largely unexplored. We studied stimulation-induced changes in network dynamics in two macaques. A large-scale optogenetic interface enabled simultaneous stimulation of excitatory neurons and electrocorticographic recording across primary somatosensory (S1) and motor (M1) cortex (Yazdan-Shahmorad et al., 2016). We tracked two measures of network connectivity, the network response to focal stimulation and the baseline coherence between pairs of electrodes; these were strongly correlated before stimulation. Within minutes, stimulation in S1 or M1 significantly strengthened the gross functional connectivity between these areas. At a finer scale, stimulation led to heterogeneous connectivity changes across the network. These changes reflected the correlations introduced by stimulation-evoked activity, consistent with Hebbian plasticity models. This work extends Hebbian plasticity models to large-scale circuits, with significant implications for stimulation-based neurorehabilitation

The non-human interest story: De-personalising the migrant

We argue that newspapers deliberately employ techniques to dehumanise and depersonalise news stories in order to cultivate distance between the reader and human subject in newspaper accounts. We posit this as a dominant technique in discourses of immigration in newspaper discourses. In the process the migrant is narrated as the sub-human entrapped through socio-legal terminologies and deviance discourses that both silence and trivialise human suffering. We highlight the case study of the refugee settlement in Calais dubbed the ‘jungle’ to illuminate this phenomenon. We argue that the depersonalisation of immigration stories is a sustained technique in media to submerge the ethical and humanitarian paradigms presented by immigration

Cytokine expression in malaria-infected non-human primate placentas

Malaria parasites are known to mediate the induction of inflammatory immune responses at the maternal-foetal interface during placental malaria (PM) leading to adverse consequences like pre-term deliveries and abortions. Immunological events that take place within the malaria-infected placental micro-environment leading to retarded foetal growth and disruption of pregnancies are among the critical parameters that are still in need of further elucidation. The establishment of more animal models for studying placental malaria can provide novel ways of circumventing problems experienced during placental malaria research in humans such as inaccurate estimation of gestational ages. Using the newly established olive baboon (Papio anubis)-Plasmodium knowlesi (P. knowlesi) H strain model of placental malaria, experiments were carried out to determine placental cytokine profiles underlying the immunopathogenesis of placental malaria. Four pregnant olive baboons were infected with blood stage P. knowlesi H strain parasites on the one fiftieth day of gestation while four other uninfected pregnant olive baboons were maintained as uninfected controls. After nine days of infection, placentas were extracted from all the eight baboons through cesarean surgery and used for the processing of placental plasma and sera samples for cytokine sandwich enzyme linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA). Results indicated that the occurrence of placental malaria was associated with elevated concentrations of tumour necrosis factor alpha (TNF-{\alpha}) and interleukin 12 (IL-12). Increased levels of IL-4, IL-6 and IL-10 and interferon gamma (IFN-{\gamma}) levels were detected in uninfected placentas. These findings match previous reports regarding immunity during PM thereby demonstrating the reliability of the olive baboon-P. knowlesi model for use in further studies.Comment: Open Veterinary Journal 1st June 2012. Seven pages, Three Figures. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1201.323

Non-human Intention and Meaning-Making: An Ecological Theory

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019. The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97550-4_12Social robots have the potential to problematize many attributes that have previously been considered, in philosophical discourse, to be unique to human beings. Thus, if one construes the explicit programming of robots as constituting specific objectives and the overall design and structure of AI as having aims, in the sense of embedded directives, one might conclude that social robots are motivated to fulfil these objectives, and therefore act intentionally towards fulfilling those goals. The purpose of this paper is to consider the impact of this description of social robotics on traditional notions of intention and meaningmaking, and, in particular, to link meaning-making to a social ecology that is being impacted by the presence of social robots. To the extent that intelligent non-human agents are occupying our world alongside us, this paper suggests that there is no benefit in differentiating them from human agents because they are actively changing the context that we share with them, and therefore influencing our meaningmaking like any other agent. This is not suggested as some kind of Turing Test, in which we can no longer differentiate between humans and robots, but rather to observe that the argument in which human agency is defined in terms of free will, motivation, and intention can equally be used as a description of the agency of social robots. Furthermore, all of this occurs within a shared context in which the actions of the human impinge upon the non-human, and vice versa, thereby problematising Anscombe's classic account of intention.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

Bee Work | Departure

How do we get closer to the nature of the bee’s, or any non-human\u27s, experience, mystery that it is? This essay is a lyrical meditation on the power (and challenges) of poetry and language to access non-human worlds

Primate malarias: Diversity, distribution and insights for zoonotic Plasmodium

Protozoans within the genus Plasmodium are well-known as the causative agents of malaria in humans. Numerous Plasmodium species parasites also infect a wide range of non-human primate hosts in tropical and sub-tropical regions worldwide. Studying this diversity can provide critical insight into our understanding of human malarias, as several human malaria species are a result of host switches from non-human primates. Current spillover of a monkey malaria, Plasmodium knowlesi, in Southeast Asia highlights the permeability of species barriers in Plasmodium. Also recently, surveys of apes in Africa uncovered a previously undescribed diversity of Plasmodium in chimpanzees and gorillas. Therefore, we carried out a meta-analysis to quantify the global distribution, host range, and diversity of known non-human primate malaria species. We used published records of Plasmodium parasites found in non-human primates to estimate the total diversity of non-human primate malarias globally. We estimate that at least three undescribed primate malaria species exist in sampled primates, and many more likely exist in unstudied species. The diversity of malaria parasites is especially uncertain in regions of low sampling such as Madagascar, and taxonomic groups such as African Old World Monkeys and gibbons. Presence–absence data of malaria across primates enables us to highlight the close association of forested regions and non-human primate malarias. This distribution potentially reflects a long coevolution of primates, forest-adapted mosquitoes, and malaria parasites. The diversity and distribution of primate malaria are an essential prerequisite to understanding the mechanisms and circumstances that allow Plasmodium to jump species barriers, both in the evolution of malaria parasites and current cases of spillover into humans

Extrapolating from Laboratory Behavioral Research on Nonhuman Primates Is Unjustified

Conducting research on animals is supposed to be valuable because it provides information on how human mechanisms work. But for the use of animal models to be ethically justified, it must be epistemically justified. The inference from an observation about an animal model to a conclusion about humans must be warranted for the use of animals to be moral. When researchers infer from animals to humans, it’s an extrapolation. Often non-human primates are used as animal models in laboratory behavioral research. The target populations are humans and other non-human primates. I argue that the epistemology of extrapolation renders the use of non-human primates in laboratory behavioral research unreliable. If the model is relevantly similar to the target, then the experimental conditions introduce confounding variables. If the model is not relevantly similar to the target, then the observations of the model cannot be extrapolated to the target. Since using non-human primates in as animal models in laboratory behavioral research is not epistemically justified, using them as animal models in laboratory behavioral research is not ethically justified

Issues on combining human and non-human intelligence

The purpose here is to call attention to some of the issues confronting the designer of a system that combines human and non-human intelligence. We do not know how to design a non-human intelligence in such a way that it will fit naturally into a human organization. The author's concern is that, without adequate understanding and consideration of the behavioral and psychological limitations and requirements of the human member(s) of the system, the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) subsystems can exacerbate operational problems. We have seen that, when these technologies are not properly applied, an overall degradation of performance at the system level can occur. Only by understanding how human and automated systems work together can we be sure that the problems introduced by automation are not more serious than the problems solved

The social, cosmopolitanism and beyond

First, this article will outline the metaphysics of ‘the social’ that implicitly and explicitly connects the work of lassical and contemporary cosmopolitan sociologists as different as Durkheim, Weber, Beck and Luhmann. In a second step, I will show that the cosmopolitan outlook of classical sociology is driven by exclusive differences. In understanding human affairs, both classical sociology and contemporary cosmopolitan sociology reflect a very modernist outlook of epistemological, conceptual, methodological and disciplinary rigour that separates the cultural sphere from the natural objects of concern. I will suggest that classical sociology – in order to be cosmopolitan – is forced (1) to exclude non-social and non-human objects as part of its conceptual and methodological rigour, and (2) consequently and methodologically to rule out the non-social and the non-human. Cosmopolitan sociology imagines ‘the social’ as a global, universal explanatory device to conceive and describe the non-social and non-human. In a third and final step the article draws upon the work of the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde and offers a possible alternative to the modernist social and cultural other-logics of social sciences. It argues for a inclusive conception of ‘the social’ that gives the non-social and non-human a cosmopolitan voice as well