Liberalism, Perfectionism, and Civic Virtue

This paper explores the question whether perfectionism amounts to a political doctrine that is more attractive than liberalism. I try to show that an egalitarian liberalism that is open to questions of value and that holds a conception of limited neutrality can meet the perfectionist challenge. My thesis is that liberalism can be reconciled easily with perfectionism read as a moral doctrine. Perfectionism as a political doctrine equall stays within the value framework of liberalism. Finally, I try to show that liberalism can give an account of civic virtue that is a sufficient basis for developing the normative guidelines of a rich and meaningful social life

Is Liberalism Disingenuous? Truth and Lies in Political Liberalism

Rawlsian political liberalism famously requires a prohibition on truth. This has led to the charge that liberalism embraces non-cognitivism, according to which political claims have the moral status of emotions or expressions of preference. This result would render liberalism a non-starter for liberatory politics, a conclusion that political liberals themselves disavow. This conflict between what liberalism claims and what liberalism does has led critics to charge that the theory is disingenuous and functions as political ideology. In this paper, I explore one way that this charge unfolds: critics charge that liberalism utilizes an individualistic and identity-insensitive social ontology, which in turn yields epistemic deficiencies that render it incapable of detecting oppression. The theory’s claim to freestandingness then shields it from necessary critique. I argue that this objection relies on constructing a conflict between liberalism’s professed non-cognitivism and its actual cognitivist commitments. By demonstrating that Rawlsian political liberalism explicitly endorses substantive moral truths, and that the method of avoidance applies only to public justification for coercive state action, I show that the theory is openly and foundationally cognitivist, and thus that the charge of disingenuousness does not stick

Governing information infrastructures and services in telecommunications

Purpose – Telecommunications comprises a vital component of information infrastructures and services, with a historically strong public interest dimension. For the best part of 30 years, the telecommunications sector in Europe has been the subject of a radical reorganisation in structural and operational terms along the lines of neo-liberalism. This paper aims to analyse the significance of the neo-liberal project in telecommunications in respect of the related dimensions of ideology and practice. Design/methodology/approach – The paper presents a public policy critique of the manifestation of neo-liberalism in the telecommunications sector in the European Union, employing desk-based research on relevant primary and secondary source documentation. Findings – The paper finds that proponents of neo-liberalism have been able to secure the broad acceptance of neo-liberalism as a “view of the world” for telecommunications. It shows that in practice, however, the neo-liberal model in telecommunications provides evidence of a less than efficacious adoption process in three respects: neo-liberalism requires an elaborately managed system the regulatory burden of which has been under-emphasised; the normative success of neo-liberalism has masked how difficult it has actually proven to be to create competition; the preoccupation with markets and competition has resulted in de-emphasis of public interest issues in telecommunications. Originality/value – This paper contributes up-to-date knowledge of the nature and effects of neo-liberalism in the European telecommunication sector. It provides a challenge and counterweight to the “received wisdom” that neo-liberalism has been an overwhelmingly successful approach to the re-ordering of European telecommunications

Liberalism and the Moral Significance of Individualism: A Deweyan View

A liberalism which scorns all individualism is fundamentally misguided. This is the chief thesis of this paper. To argue for it, I look closely at some key concepts. The concepts of morislity and individualism are crucial. I emphasize Dewey on the "individuality of the mind" and a Deweyan discussion of language, communication, and community. The thesis links individualism and liberalism, and since appeals to liberalism have broader appeal in the present context of discussions, I start with consideration of liberalism. The aim is to dispute overly restrictive conceptions and explore a broader perspective. To bring the argument to a close, attention turns first to Dewey on value inquiry, to Dewey's "democratic individualism" (cf. Dewey 1939, 179), and to the concept of moral community. Disputing the acquisitiveness of utilitarian influences in classical liberalism, a Deweyan argument from the nature of moral community supports re-emphasis on individualism in contemporary liberal thought

Michel Foucault's the Birth of Biopolitics and contemporary neo-liberalism debates

Neo-liberalism has become one of the boom concepts of our time. From its original reference point as a descriptor of the economics of the ‘Chicago School’ or authors such as Friedrich von Hayek, neo-liberalism has become an all-purpose concept, explanatory device and basis for social critique. This presentation evaluates Michel Foucault’s 1978–79 lectures, published as The Birth of Biopolitics, to consider how he used the term neo-liberalism, and how this equates with its current uses in critical social and cultural theory. It will be argued that Foucault did not understand neo-liberalism as a dominant ideology in these lectures, but rather as marking a point of inflection in the historical evolution of liberal political philosophies of government. It will also be argued that his interpretation of neo-liberalism was more nuanced and more comparative than more recent contributions. The article points towards an attempt to theorize comparative historical models of liberal capitalism

Classical Liberalism

Classical Liberalism is a political philosophy that has stood the test of time. Developed by the English philosopher John Locke, classical liberalism is rooted in the ideals of individual rights and social contract. It is ultimately a Christian philosophy, as it admits the inherent sinfulness of man and the sovereignty of God. The United States of America is the greatest application of this philosophy as it prioritizes the protection of individual liberties and derives its power from the consent of the governed

Can Modus Vivendi Save Liberalism from Moralism? A Critical Assessment of John Gray’s Political Realism

This chapter assesses John Gray’s modus vivendi-based justification for liberalism. I argue that his approach is preferable to the more orthodox deontological or teleological justificatory strategies, at least because of the way it can deal with the problem of diversity. But then I show how that is not good news for liberalism, for grounding liberal political authority in a modus vivendi undermines liberalism’s aspiration to occupy a privileged normative position vis-à-vis other kinds of regimes. So modus vivendi can save liberalism from moralism, but at cost many liberals will not be prepared to pay

9. Economic Liberalism

Some of the classical economists thought that their function was to describe the general principles of economic life and not to prescribe the means of improving society. Wealth, not happiness, remarked Senior, is the economist\u27s concern. Others, who took more seriously the titles they chose for the books they were publishing, thought differently. [excerpt

Forbidden ways of life

I examine an objection against autonomy-minded liberalism sometimes made by philosophers such as John Rawls and William Galston, that it rules out ways of life which do not themselves value freedom or autonomy. This objection is incorrect, because one need not value autonomy in order to live an autonomous life. Hence autonomy-minded liberalism need not rule out such ways of life. I suggest a modified objection which does work, namely that autonomy-minded liberalism must rule out ways of life that could not develop under an autonomy-promoting education. I conclude by suggesting some reasons why autonomy-minded liberals should bite the bullet and accept this