Reid on Favors, Injuries, and the Natural Virtue of Justice

Reid argues that Hume’s claim that justice is an artificial virtue is inconsistent with the fact that gratitude is a natural sentiment. This chapter shows that Reid’s argument succeeds only given a philosophy of mind and action that Hume rejects. Among other things, Reid assumes that one can conceive of one of a pair of contradictories only if one can conceive of the other—a claim that Hume denies. So, in the case of justice, the disagreement between Hume and Reid is, at bottom, a disagreement over their respective conceptions of how the human mind works at its most fundamental level

Property in the Moral Life of Human Beings

AbstractLiberal egalitarian political philosophers have often argued that private property is a legal convention dependent on the state and that complaints about taxation from entitlement theorists are therefore based on a conceptual mistake. But our capacity to grasp and use property concepts seems too embedded in human nature for this to be correct. This essay argues that many standard arguments that property is constitutively a legal convention fail, but that the opposition between conventionalists and natural rights theorists is outmoded. In doing this, the essay draws on recent literature in evolutionary biology and psychology. Even though modern property in a complex society involves legal conventions, those conventions should be sensitive to our natural dispositions concerning ownership.</jats:p

The Separateness of Persons: A Moral Basis for a Public Justification Requirement

In morally grounding a public justification requirement, public reason liberals frequently invoke the idea that persons should be construed as “free and equal.” But this tells us little with regard to what it is about us that makes us free or how a claim about our status as persons can ultimately ground a requirement of public justification. In light of this worry, I argue that a public justification requirement can be grounded in a Nozick-inspired argument from the separateness of persons (one that is consistent with the idea that individuals are free and equal). As I claim, one particular feature of the fact of our separateness – the possession of a basic psychology consisting of beliefs, intentions, sentiments, and a variety of desire-like psychological states – does the most work in grounding both a principle of liberty (PL) and a requirement of public justification (RPJ). Together, PL and RPJ provide the basic framework for a theory of public reason liberalism

Ownership and Commodifiability of Synthetic and Natural Organs

The arrival of synthetic organs may mean we need to reconsider principles of ownership of such items. One possible ownership criterion is the boundary between the organ’s being outside or inside the body. What is outside of my body, even if it is a natural organ made of my cells, may belong to a company or research institution. Yet when it is placed in me, it belongs to me. In the future, we should also keep an eye on how the availability of synthetic organs may change our attitudes toward our own bodies

Judicial Conservatism v. A Principled Judicial Activism: Foreword to the Symposium on Law and Philosophy

In the wake of the Reagan administration\u27s numerous judicial appointments, it is the rare observer of the American legal scene who has not thought seriously about the proper role of the judge in enforcing the law. Editorialists, columnists, and academicians are all debating in one form or another the classic jurisprudential question: What is law? While such questions have never completely dropped from sight, we are now in a period of constructive intellectual turmoil much like those surrounding the Nuremburg trials and the civil rights movement. Such periods are usually characterized by, and perhaps caused by, a perception among an influential elite that there is a lot at stake. One of the most significant developments in the current debate has been a schism between conservative and classical liberal intellectuals on the issue of the proper role of the judiciary. Some of these intellectuals have hewed to a stance known as judicial conservatism. Others have urged a more activist judicial role, a view that I have previously called judicial pragmactivism and that has recently been referred to as a principled judicial activism. \u2

An alternative to intellectual property theories of Locke and utilitarian economics

In this paper, I examine two standard theories of intellectual property, voice criticisms of each theory from within their own perspectives, and offer an alternative approach to intellectual property. In the first chapter, I explicate Locke’s original property theory and provide a modern account of Lockean intellectual property as an extension of the original theory. I argue this extension is not compatible with Locke’s original thought on property rights. In the second chapter, I dissect the mainstream economic approach to intellectual property, an approach which employs utilitarianism to justify the intellectual property regime of first world, western nations. I argue that this mainstream utilitarian economic approach fails to satisfy the principle of utility. Lastly, I offer a sketch of an alternative theory or perspective on intellectual property based on the notion of human flourishing. I argue that our obligations to develop and use our minds are so extensive that exclusive claim-type intellectual property rights are not possible

Balancing the Inequities in Applying Natural Property Rights to Rights in Real or Intellectual Property

Eric Claeys’s book, Natural Property Rights, introduces a Lockean-based theory of interest-based natural property rights. Central to Claeys’s theory are the concepts of justified interests and productive use. A justified interest, Claeys writes, exists when an individual demonstrates a stronger interest in a resource than anyone else in the community and uses the resource productively in a manner that is “intelligent, purposeful, value-creating, . . . sociable,” and leads to survival or flourishing. Claeys’s theory demonstrates “how a standard justification for property gets implemented in practice” and how a community’s “goods” build on the individual’s goods. Claeys’s community “goods” focus, however, is antithetical to a Lockean private property ownership theory, which prioritizes an individual’s interest, except for the provisos—no waste and enough and as good. Although Claeys adequately addresses the differences between his and Locke’s theories, Claeys’s regard for both community and individual interests causes one to question whether his theory is truly Lockean-based. Claeys’s book consists of four parts: Natural Law and Natural Rights (Part I), Property’s Foundations (Part II), Property Law (Part III), and Property in Law and Policy Generally (Part IV). This Article addresses Parts I and II and explores the defenses and justification for Claeys’s interest-based natural property rights theory under a Lockean framework. This Article also addresses the defects in a Lockean natural rights theory, including Claeys’s application of that theory. Locke’s theory focuses on the natural rights of a specific community. Such a focus often disfavors people situated in out-of-power positions, for example, a land ownership dispute between indigenous people and recent immigrants that have organized themselves under laws that do not recognize the existing rights (natural or otherwise) of the indigenous people. Yet, both Claeys and Locke contend that natural rights emanate from a divine source (God) that intended humankind to use the things of nature for its survival and flourishing. But, when fundamentally different views exist concerning a resource’s ownership or productive use, rights conflicts arise. These conflicts often result in one community’s natural rights trampling another’s. This Article introduces a balancing interest test as a possible resolution to this conflict. The proposed balancing interest test seeks to maximize the common good in the most equitable way by finding an equitable mean between conflicting interests. Finally, this Article explores whether Claeys’s theory can justify natural property rights in intellectual property, specifically patents

Annual reports of the selectmen and treasurer, highway agent and all other officers of the town of Auburn for the year ending January 31, 1931.

This is an annual report containing vital statistics for a town/city in the state of New Hampshire

Intellectual Property and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Game Theory Justification of Copyrights, Patents, and Trade Secrets

In this article, I will offer an argument for the protection of intellectual property based on individual self-interest and prudence. In large part, this argument will parallel considerations that arise in a prisoner’s dilemma game. In brief, allowing content to be unprotected in terms of free access leads to a sub-optimal outcome where creation and innovation are suppressed. Adopting the institutions of copyright, patent, and trade secret is one way to avoid these sub-optimal results