The Growth of General Election as an Implementation of Democracy and Constitution in Indonesia since Parliamentary Democracy Era until Reformation Era

The objectives of this research are (first) to know General election growth as an implementation of democracy in Indonesia specially as an empirical description of General Election since Parliamentary Era until Reformation Era and as an assessment to know whether General election that was executed was democratic or not. This assessment used many indicators as General election order, General election organizer, General election contestant competition, freedom of elector, and controlling of General election. Second, to know the position of General election as Constitution implementation in Indonesia specially from the aspect of General election growth in Constitution and also General election law and causal factor of changing General election law in every General election that is implemented in Indonesia. Third, to give solution in order to make General election perfect in Indonesia governance system. This research use research method consist of normative law research that having descriptive character by using law approach, political approach, historical approach and comparability approach. Data in this research are secondary data with library research as an instrument. The technique to analyse data use qualitative method through categorize problems based on problems that is researched by taking conclusion based on logical idea. The result of this research indicate that General election is fluctuative. The General Election in the Parliamentary Democracy Era is democratic, The General election in Guided Democracy Era is not implementated, The General Election in New Order Era is undemocratic and The General election in Reformation Era is democratic. The growth of General election as Constitution implementation in Indonesia experiences a significant growth since Constitution of 1945, Constitution of 1949, Constitution of 1950 until amandement Constitution (reformation era). In General election law there are items that need to be defended, to be vanished and to be corrected. The basic reasons of changing General election law consist of law aspect, political aspect and sociological aspect. Small part of solution General election in governance system for Indonesian future (postscriptum) are necessity in improvement of General election democratization, necessity in repairing of General election in Constitution and General election law. Keyword: General election, constitution and democrac

LSE centre for economic performance: bankers’ bonuses

A new series of Election Analyses is now available from the LSE’s Centre for Economic Performance (CEP). The series will discuss the research evidence on some of the key policy battlegrounds of the 2010 General Election, including macroeconomic policy, immigration, health, education, crime, poverty and inequality, labour market policy, regional policy, energy and the environment, financial regulation and bankers’ bonuses, and foreign aid. The latest CEP Election Analysis, by Brian Bell, gives an overview of bankers’ bonuses and extreme wage inequality, one of the key battlegrounds of the 2010 General Election. The publication is summarised below and can be found in full on the CEP Election Analysis Site

Ramshackle Federalism: America’s Archaic and Dysfunctional Presidential Election System

Accordingly, this Article proposes five sensible and achievable reforms to modernize the presidential election system. Each requires Congress and the federal government to play a much more proactive role in the presidential election system. The Constitution may be founded on federalist principles, but excessive decentralization is not serving us well in presidential election administration. In an age of tumultuous and accelerating change, the presidential election system must be modernized to meet the needs of twenty-first century America

The Impact of European Elections on their Stock Markets

This paper seeks to provide insight on changes in the European political landscape and how these changes may affect the financial markets in Europe. By analyzing market trends in eight different European countries—Belgium, Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Great Britain, Switzerland and Greece—since 1990, this paper attempts to identify any significant relationships between the results of an election and the performances of the major stock indices of these countries. By comparing country index returns starting one hundred days before and ending one hundred days after each election date to a global index, this paper explores the amount of risk in each country’s stock index at times of a political change. It examines the difference in the volatility of stock markets before and after an election occurs both in the short term of five days around the event and over a longer term of one hundred days. It also investigates the impact of the implementation of the Euro on the country indices during a time of an election. The final aspect considered is the effect when there is a switch in political ideology from the controlling party before the election to the incumbent party post-election. By examining these effects around election dates through a regression model, insight is provided into the performances of markets and what investors can expect around upcoming elections

Legislative Alert: Election Support Consolidation and Efficiency Act (H.R. 672)

[Excerpt] I am writing on behalf of the AFL-CIO to urge you to oppose the Election Support Consolidation and Efficiency Act (HR 672), legislation to dismantle the Election Administration Commission (EAC) sixty days after enactment. The work of the EAC aims to ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of our nation\u27s complex and diversified election administration system, and this agency should not be abolished

Judging the Law of Politics

In this Review Essay I explore the rights-structure debate that has captivated the attention of election law scholars. The Essay juxtaposes the recent work of a leading individualist Professor Richard Hasen\u27s new book, The Supreme Court and Election Law, against the recent work of a leading structuralist, Professor Richard Pildes\u27 recent Foreword to the Harvard Law Review. I argue that even though the rights-structure debate produces much heat, it does not significantly advance the goal of understanding and evaluating the role of the Court in democratic politics. I aim to return election law to a dualistic understanding of the relationship between rights and structure, an understanding that prevailed in the early articulation of structuralism\u27s relevance to judicial review of democratic politics. I shall argue that election law cases cannot be divided into neat categories along the individual rights and structuralism divide. Election law cases raise both issues of individual and structural rights. Therefore, the label attached to election law claims is immaterial. The fundamental questions are what are the values that judicial review ought to vindicate and how best to vindicate those values. These are questions that transcend the rights-structure divide

Ayotte And Hassan In Dead Heat For 2016 NH Senate; Guinta Favorability Hurt By Scandal 5/27/15

New Hampshire Senator Kelly Ayotte continues to be popular in the state but is tied with Governor Maggie Hassan if Hassan decides to run for Senate in 2016. First District Congressman Frank Guinta’s favorability ratings have dropped in the wake of a Federal Election Commission fine concerning fundraising in his 2010 election. Election: 201

The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council

This is the author's accepted manuscript. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0096-4.The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks—election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. We also find evidence that richer countries from the developing world win election more often, while involvement in warfare lowers election probability. By contrast, development aid does not predict election