Women's assets and intrahousehold allocation in rural Bangladesh

This paper examines how differences in the bargaining power of husband and wife affect the distribution of consumption expenditures in rural Bangladeshi households. Two alternative measures of assets are used: current assets and the value of assets brought to marriage. Results show that both assets at marriage and current assets are strongly determined by the human capital of husband and wife and the characteristics of their origin families. For both husband and wife, parents' landholdings are a consistent determinant of both assets at marriage and current assets. Contrary to the unitary model, husband's and wife's assets have different effects on the allocation of expenditures within the household. Wife's assets have a positive and significant effect on the share of expenditures on children's clothing and education. This result is robust to the choice of asset measure and estimation procedure. After endogeneity of assets is accounted for, husband's current assets have a positive and significant effect on the food expenditure share. Neglecting the endogeneity of asset measures to individual and parental characteristics may lead to biased estimates of the impact of men's and women's assets on expenditure shares.Family Economic aspects. ,Gender issues. ,Assets. ,Bangladesh Social conditions. ,Households Bangladesh. ,

Women's assets and intrahousehold allocation in rural Bangladesh

This paper examines how differences in the bargaining power of husband and wife affect the distribution of consumption expenditures in rural Bangladeshi households. Two alternative measures of assets are used: current assets and the value of assets brought to marriage. Results show that both assets at marriage and current assets are strongly determined by the human capital of husband and wife and the characteristics of their origin families. For both husband and wife, parents' landholdings are a consistent determinant of both assets at marriage and current assets. Contrary to the unitary model, husband's and wife's assets have different effects on the allocation of expenditures within the household. Wife's assets have a positive and significant effect on the share of expenditures on children's clothing and education. This result is robust to the choice of asset measure and estimation procedure. After endogeneity of assets is accounted for, husband's current assets have a positive and significant effect on the food expenditure share. Neglecting the endogeneity of asset measures to individual and parental characteristics may lead to biased estimates of the impact of men's and women's assets on expenditure shares.Family Economic aspects. ,Gender issues. ,Assets. ,Bangladesh Social conditions. ,Households Bangladesh. ,

Comparative Survey on the Records of Fixed Assets of Companies and Public Institutions

This paper deals by way of comparison with the theoretical and practical methods to record the output and input of tangible fixed assets (non-current assets) in and from the patrimony of companies, on the one side and of public institutions, on the other side, intending to point out the differences and similarities, in compliance with the national norms and international standards of accounting (IAS and IPSAS, as the case may be).fixed assets, long-term assets, non-current assets, tangible fixed assets, IAS, IPSAS

Analysis on the Influence of Current Ratio, Debt to Equity Ratio and Total Asset Turnover Toward Return on Assets on the Otomotive and Component Company That Has Been Registered in Indonesia Stock Exchange Within 2011-2017

A good company can be seen from the level of return on assets invested, and it affects the interest of an investor to invest in. But the high or low level of profit can be influenced by the financial performance of one of the financial performance is the Current Ratio, Debt to Equity Ratio, and Total Asset Turnover.  Therefore, a study was conducted to find out whether the Current Ratio, Debt to Equity Ratio, and Total Asset Turnover had an effect on Return On Assets in Automotive and Component companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2011-2017. The study population consisted of 12 companies selected by purposive sampling. Financial report data is obtained from the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX).  The data analysis technique used is multiple linear regression analysis with SPSS 19.0 and SMART PLS 2019 application tools. The results obtained from this study are the Current Ratio which has a significant effect on Return On Assets, Debt to Equity Ratio has a not significant negative effect on Return On Assets, and Total Asset has a significant positive effect on Return On Assets

Bad Bank(s) and Recapitalization of the Banking Sector

With banking sectors worldwide still suffering from the effects of the financial crisis, public discussion of plans to place toxic assets in one or more bad banks has gained steam in recent weeks. The following paper presents a plan how governments can efficiently relieve ailing banks from toxic assets by transferring these assets into a publicly sponsored work-out unit, a so-called bad bank. The key element of the plan is the valuation of troubled assets at their current market value - assets with no market would thus be valued at zero. The current shareholders will cover the losses arising from the depreciation reserve in the amount of the difference of the toxic assets' current book value and their market value. Under the plan, the government would bear responsibility for the management and future resale of toxic assets at its own cost and recapitalize the good bank by taking an equity stake in it. In extreme cases, this would mean a takeover of the bank by the government. The risk to taxpayers from this investment would be acceptable, however, once the banks are freed from toxic assets. A clear emphasis that the government stake is temporary would also be necessary. The government would cover the bad bank's losses, while profits would be distributed to the distressed bank's current shareholders. The plan is viable independent of whether the government decides to have one centralized bad bank or to establish a separate bad bank for each systemically relevant banking institute. Under the terms of the plan, bad banks and nationalization are not alternatives but rather two sides of the same coin. This plan effectively addresses three key challenges. It provides for the transparent removal of toxic assets and gives the banks a fresh start. At the same time, it offers the chance to keep the cost to taxpayers low. In addition, the risk of moral hazard is curtailed. The comparison of the proposed design with the bad bank plan of the German government reveals some shortcomings of the latter plan that may threaten the achievement of these key issues.Financial crisis, financial regulation, toxic assets, Bad Bank

Bad Bank(s) and Recapitalization of the Banking Sector

With banking sectors worldwide still suffering from the effects of the financial crisis, public discussion of plans to place toxic assets in one or more bad banks has gained steam in recent weeks. The following paper presents a plan how governments can efficiently relieve ailing banks from toxic assets by transferring these assets into a publicly sponsored work-out unit, a so-called bad bank. The key element of the plan is the valuation of troubled assets at their current market value – assets with no market would thus be valued at zero. The current shareholders will cover the losses arising from the depreciation reserve in the amount of the difference of the toxic assets’ current book value and their market value. Under the plan, the government would bear responsibility for the management and future resale of toxic assets at its own cost and recapitalize the good bank by taking an equity stake in it. In extreme cases, this would mean a takeover of the bank by the government. The risk to taxpayers from this investment would be acceptable, however, once the banks are freed from toxic assets. A clear emphasis that the government stake is temporary would also be necessary. The government would cover the bad bank’s losses, while profits would be distributed to the distressed bank’s current shareholders. The plan is viable independent of whether the government decides to have one centralized bad bank or to establish a separate bad bank for each systemically relevant banking institute. Under the terms of the plan, bad banks and nationalization are not alternatives but rather two sides of the same coin. This plan effectively addresses three key challenges. It provides for the transparent removal of toxic assets and gives the banks a fresh start. At the same time, it offers the chance to keep the cost to taxpayers low. In addition, the risk of moral hazard is curtailed. The comparison of the proposed design with the bad bank plan of the German government reveals some shortcomings of the latter plan that may threaten the achievement of these key issues.financial crisis, financial regulation, toxic assets, bad bank