Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games

We prove the existence of subsidy free and sustainable pricing schedule in multiproduct contestable markets. We allow firms to discriminate the local markets that are composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Results are obtained under an assumption of fair sharing cost and under boundary condition of demand functions. The pricing problem is modelled in terms of equilibrium-core allocations of parameterized cost games.Cooperative games, contestable markets, sustainability, subsidy free, parameterized cost games.

Capital Movements, Banking Insolvency, and Silent Runs in the Asian Financial Crisis

This paper supplies an agency-cost and contestable-markets perspective on the financial policies that triggered the Asian financial crisis. The agency-cost analysis hypothesizes that individual-country regulators knew that politically directed loans had made their banks insolvent, but purposefully gambled that deregulation could allow the insolvent banks to grow their way out of trouble. The contestable-markets paradigm sets this gamble in the context of offshore innovations in financial technology and regulatory systems that made it progressively easier for worried Asian citizens to move funds to foreign institutions. These perspectives portray the simultaneous breakdown of repressive financial systems as a technology-led victory of market forces over longstanding government efforts to wall out foreign financial competition.

Contestability: The debate and industry policy

The paper examines the legacy of the debate over perfectly contestable markets, the usefulness of several variations on the theory of imperfectly contestable markets including consideration of the problems associated with identifying contestable markets, and the contribution of conte'stability theory to the understanding of industry structure and appropriate industry policy. TTie debate surrounding contestability theory prompted economists to critically reassess the neoclassical theory of the firm, particularly with respect to: impediments to potential competition; the complementary role of potential and actual competition in affecting the conduct of incumbent firms; and the role and direction of appropriate industry regulation. The major problems identified by the debate are the difficulty in determining the extent to which markets may be imperfectly contestable and the framing of policy approaches appropriate to specific industry contexts

COOPERATIVE ANTITRUST MONOPOLIZATION AND THE THEORY OF CONTESTABLE MARKETS

The judiciary has relied on a firm's market share to evaluate the presence of monopoly power for a Sherman Act monopolization violation. However, an allegation that a firm's market share constitutes monopoly power may be refuted by evidence that there exists a contestable market. Contestable market theory shows that there is no monopoly power where there exists a threat of entry of other firms. This theory thereby offers agricultural cooperatives, which may have a large market share by reasons of the antitrust immunity provided by the Capper-Volstead Act, an argument to overcome allegations of a Sherman Act monopolization violation.Industrial Organization,

Stable pricing in multiproduct natural monopoly (in French)

We provide some existence results of stable pricings for natural monopoly as defined in the theory of contestable markets. The main addings are based on the assumption of separated markets and the possibilities of entries. We borrow tools from cooperative game theory. Following the work of Bendali et al. (Revista de Matematicas Aplicadas, 2000), we make full use of parameterized cores of games with side payments to characterize subsidy free and sustainable pricings.natural monopoly, contestable markets, multiproduct firms, sustainability, subsidy free prices.

Productive Efficiency and Contestable Markets

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"Exclusive Dealing Contract and Inefficient Entry Threat"

This paper examines the effects of exclusive dealing contracts in a simple model with manufacturers-distributors relations. We consider entrants in both manufacturing and distribution sectors. It is well-known that a potential entry threat is welfare increasing under homogenous price competition, even though the potential entrant is less productive. This paper reexamines this intuition by employing the above model. We show that the entry threat of a less-productive manufacturer is welfare decreasing when there is an exclusive dealing contract between the incumbent manufacturer and distributor. This result is in contrast to the view of the contestable markets literature.