Mali: another European intervention without the EU?

As French forces are engaged in combat operations in Mali, even belated EU involvement remains crucial, to ensure that the intervention fits in with the political end-state that the EU rightly pursues

Combat Veterans, Mental Health Issues, and the Death Penalty: Addressing the Impact of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury

More than 1.5 million Americans have participated in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past seven years. Some of these veterans have subsequently committed capital crimes and found themselves in our nation’s criminal justice system. This Essay argues that combat veterans suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury at the time of their offenses should not be subject to the death penalty. Offering mitigating evidence regarding military training, post-traumatic stress disorder, and traumatic brain injury presents one means that combat veterans may use to argue for their lives during the sentencing phase of their trials. Alternatively, Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons offer a framework for establishing a legislatively or judicially created categorical exclusion for these offenders, exempting them from the death penalty as a matter of law. By understanding how combat service and service-related injuries affect the personal culpability of these offenders, the legal system can avoid the consequences of sentencing to death America’s mentally wounded warriors, ensuring that only the worst offenders are subject to the ultimate punishment

Crossing the Canal: Combined Arms Operations at the Canal Du Nord, Sept–Oct 1918

The crossing of the Canal du Nord stands as one of the most impressive Canadian tactical operations of the First World War. Incorporating a risky battle plan, emphasizing combined arms operations and utilizing the recently re-organized Canadian Engineers, the battle stands as benchmark for the evolution of 20th century combat. Although sustaining high casualties, the Canadian Corps overcame one of the strongest German defensive positions along the Westner Front in an operation that foreshadowed the mobile, combined arms doctrine of the Second World War

Is sea-basing a viable method of providing logistic support to the UK amphibious force?

Maritime power has traditionally been a central part of the UK’s defence planning and is well suited to supporting a wide range of military operations. The littoral area has always created problems for naval planners as most landings historically have had to endure a tactical separation of the naval and land components, and hence an artificial seam between the Navy and the Marines. With the end of the Cold War, amphibious operations are going to be more difficult to conduct than in the past, and amphibious forces are going to have to adopt manoeuvre warfare capabilities in order to successfully complete their missions. It is very likely that amphibious forces will have to conduct operations against a numerically superior enemy, who is on his own terrain, and be surrounded by a neutral, if not hostile populace. As such, the concept of Operational Manoeuvre From The Sea (OMFTS) whereby the sea is used as a manoeuvre space, and command and control is fast enough to cope with large amounts of information, but at the same time allow subordinates maximum flexibility to use their initiative, is increasingly attractive. It will be important not only for the combat elements to be able to use this new concept, but the Combat Service Support (CSS) elements as well

Incursion at Howz-e Madad: An Afghanistan Vignette

On 20 June 2007, Canadian and Afghan National Army forces supported by Dutch and American air forces conducted one of a series of incursions into the Zharey District west of Kandahar City. This incursion, called Operation SEASONS, was representative of operations undertaken in the summer of 2007 by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in this area and is an evolution from how Canadian ground forces have been employed since they were re–introduced to the region in 2005. This account is based on the personal experiences of the author who observed these combat operations while they were in progress

Optimization of combat logistics force required to support major combat operations

Military requirements development involves operational commanders conducting analyses of a variety of combat scenarios to assess force structure and material requirements to meet their military objectives. The naval component of each command determines the number of Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships necessary to keep combatant vessels on station. Without sufficient CLF ships, naval forces are unable to sustain continued presence in theater, hampering their ability to support combat operations. Current practice uses spreadsheet-based average consumption models to estimate the CLF requirement. However, these models do not adequately account for surges in demand or coordination of shuttle ships between multiple battle groups. This thesis demonstrates an optimization model coupled with a spreadsheet interface to identify CLF requirements for campaign level analysis through the use of a fictional 60-day combat scenario. We determine that resupply port location is a key determinant of shuttle ship quantity and employment. We also demonstrate an all-shuttle-ship concept that eliminates the need for station ships and further reduces the number of CLF ships necessary to support the mission.http://archive.org/details/optimizationofco109453983US Navy (USN) author.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Women in Combat: Issues for Congress

[Excerpt] Over the past two decades of conflict, women have served with valor and continue to serve on combat aircraft, naval vessels, and in support of ground combat operations. The expansion of roles for women in the armed forces has evolved since the early days of the military when women were restricted by law and policy from serving in certain occupations and units. Women are not precluded by law from serving in any military unit or occupational specialty. However, a 1994 Department of Defense (DOD) policy prevented women from being assigned to units below brigade level where the unit’s primary mission was to engage directly in ground combat. This policy barred women from serving in infantry, artillery, armor, combat engineers, and special operations units of battalion size or smaller. On January 24, 2013, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta rescinded the rule that restricted women from serving in combat units and directed the military departments to review their occupational standards and assignment policies for implementation no later than January 1, 2016. This recent policy change followed extensive reviews by various commissions and others on issues regarding women in the military and policies for their assignment and career progression. For example, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-417) established the Military Leadership Diversity Commission whose mandate was to conduct a study and report on the “establishment and maintenance of fair promotion and command opportunities for ethnic- and gender-specific members of the Armed Forces.” Among its recommendations, the commission stated that DOD should take deliberate steps to open additional career fields and units involved in direct ground combat to women. The commission’s recommendations prompted Congress to direct DOD, in the Ike Skelton National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (P.L. 111-383), to conduct a review to “ensure that female members have equitable opportunities to compete and excel in the Armed Forces.” With the cancellation of the policy banning women from serving in combat units, some have questioned whether current occupational standards for entry into these units should be kept in place or modified. Proponents of change maintain that the existing standards are artificially high, and act as a de facto exclusionary barrier to the entry of women into combat occupations. Defenders of the current standards view any reductions to the existing standards as potentially damaging to military readiness. Congress has established requirements, definitions, and criteria for the development and application of “gender-neutral” occupational standards, and has oversight of all DOD decisions in this matter. Congress may also consider additional issues including equal opportunity, equal responsibility (such as selective service registration), readiness and cohesion, effectiveness, and the overall manpower needs of the military

PECULIARITIES OF HELICOPTER SUPPORTED OPERATIONS : (Presentment of a Combat Recovery operation’s helicopter assisted part)

The success of a contemporary military operation closely depends on the involved own force’s quick reaction ability, flexibility; on the benefits which can be recovered from the initiation and on the high level of mobility. It is unquestionable that the above listed capabilities can only be ensured by the use of helicopters. Helicopter forces are involved in many tasks of every defence forces. In joint operations, they take part in both combat support and combat service support operations. The objective of writing this article was to represent the capabilities of the helicopter forces and to clarify all of the restrains which can negatively effect the helicopter operations. As for that, considering my intent, the reader will get a clear understanding on the helicopter capabilities and helicopter supported operations. Using up the presentment of a Combat Recovery operation’s helicopter assisted part can even more highlight the importance of those joint force operations which are supported by helicopters

The Fog of War: Large-Scale Smoke Screening Operations of First Canadian Army in Northwest Europe

Smoke screens have been employed in sea and land warfare for many centuries for a variety of purposes. They have been used to conceal troop movements, to deceive the enemy as to combat strengths, point of attack, and preparations for offensive operations. During the Second World War all armies made use of smoke screns in their operations to a greater or lesser extent. Canada was no exception and was considered to be extremely innovative in the use of smoke equipment in ways for which it was not designed. The First Canadian Army first employed large-scale non-artillery-projected smoke screens during the campaign in Northwest Europe. For the first time, at least in the history of Canadian operations, units of trained specialists worked to lay down smoke screens in the field