Coherence as a Test for Truth

This paper sets out to demonstrate that a contrast can be drawn between coherentism as an account of the structure of justification, and coherentism as a method of inquiry. Whereas the former position aims to offer an answer to the ‘regress of justification’ problem, the latter position claims that coherence plays a vital and indispensable role as a criterion of truth, given the fallibility of cognitive methods such as perception and memory. It is argued that ‘early’ coherentists like Bradley and Blanshard were coherentists of the latter kind, and that this sort of coherentism is not open to certain sorts of standard objection that can be raised against justificatory coherentism

Wittgenstein on the Structure of Justification: Breaking New Epistemological Ground

I shall investigate Wittgenstein's view of the structure of justification comparing it to Foundationalism, Holistic Coherentism, and Contextualism. Remarks in On Certainty (1969) appear to commit Wittgenstein to each of these theories, and scholars have attributed each theory to him. I argue that Wittgenstein's remarks fit neither these theories, nor a sort of combination theory. Wittgenstein breaks new epistemological ground. The issue of the structure of justification arises from the regress problem. An inferential belief gets its justification from other beliefs, producing a belief chain. This chain, or regress, either continues indefinitely or ends. If it continues indefinitely, then it either goes on forever (Infinitism) or circles back upon itself (Linear Coherentism)--two problematic positions I will not discuss. If the regress ends, it ends in beliefs that are directly or non-inferentially justified. The regress problem thus delineates three possible structures, and four possible theories, of justification: an infinite chain of beliefs (Infinitism), a circular chain of beliefs (Linear Coherentism), and a finite chain of beliefs (Foundationalism and Contextualism)

Must Understanding Be Coherent?

Several authors suggest that understanding and epistemic coherence are tightly connected. Using an account of understanding that makes no appeal to coherence, I explain away the intuitions that motivate this position. I then show that the leading coherentist epistemologies only place plausible constraints on understanding insofar as they replicate my own account’s requirements. I conclude that understanding is only superficially coherent

A Critical Examination of BonJour’s, Haack’s, and Dancy’s Theory of Empirical Justification

In this paper, we shall describe and critically evaluate four contemporary theories which attempt to solve the problem of the infinite regress of reasons: BonJour's ‘impure’ coherentism, BonJour's foundationalism, Haack's ‘foundherentism’ and Dancy's pure coherentism. These theories are initially put forward as theories about the justification of our empirical beliefs; however, in fact they also attempt to provide a successful response to the question of their own ‘metajustification.’ Yet, it will be argued that 1) none of the examined theories is successful as a theory of justification of our empirical beliefs, and that 2) they also fall short of being adequate theories of metajustification. It will be further suggested that the failure of these views on justification is not coincidental, but is actually a consequence of deeper and tacitly held problematic epistemological assumptions (namely, the requirements of justificatory generality and epistemic priority), whose acceptance paves the way towards a generalized scepticism about empirical justification

Coherentism and Belief Fixation

Plantinga argues that cases involving ‘fixed’ beliefs refute the coherentist thesis that a belief’s belonging to a coherent set of beliefs suffices for its having justification (warrant). According to Plantinga, a belief cannot be justified if there is a ‘lack of fit’ between it and its subject’s experiences. I defend coherentism by showing that if Plantinga means to claim that any ‘lack of fit’ destroys justification, his argument is obviously false. If he means to claim that significant ‘lack of fit’ destroys justification, his argument suffers a critical lack of support. Either way, Plantinga’s argument fails and coherentism emerges unscathed

Foundationalism and Coherentism From a Contextualist Point of View

Here is the picture classical foundationalism draws of empirical justification: Our system of beliefs is structured like a pyramid, it consists of a broad foundation of perceptual beliefs, i.e. beliefs reporting the contents of our perceptual states, and a superstructure of worldly beliefs, i.e. beliefs reporting what is going on in the world around us. The beliefs building the foundation, the perceptual beliefs, are to be justified noninferentially, by direct appeal to our perceptual experiences, while the beliefs in the superstructure, beliefs about what is going on in the world around us, are to be justified inferentially, i.e. by appeal to other beliefs. Ultimately, our worldly beliefs thus rest on our perceptual beliefs, which in turn draw upon our perceptual experiences

Well-Being Coherentism

Philosophers of well-being have tended to adopt a foundationalist approach to the question of theory and measurement, according to which theories are conceptually prior to measures. By contrast, social scientists have tended to adopt operationalist commitments, according to which they develop and refine well-being measures independently of any philosophical foundation. Unfortunately, neither approach helps us overcome the problem of coordinating between how we characterize wellbeing and how we measure it. Instead, we should adopt a coherentist approach to well-being science

The Epistemology of Alvin Plantinga

In this article we intend to present Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology by showing the way in which its central concepts: the Reidian foundationalism, the partial critique of evidentialism, warrant, proper function, reliability and externalism - are logically interrelated. A section of this article is reserved to the critiques of his account of warrant brought by Peter Klein and Richard Feldman and to the way in which Plantinga answered them, by developing the concepts of cognitive maxi- and mini-environment. In the end we will see the way in which Plantinga’s epistemology relates to both modernism and postmodernism