The Collective Bargaining Process

Nous définissons « le processus de la négociation collective » comme étant les mécanismes à travers lesquels les parties impliquées dans le système de négociation collective convertissent leurs buts (inputs) en accords et en clauses de conditions de travail (outputs). Le système de négociation collective inclut trois champs séparés de négociations : 1) la négociation parmi les groupes et les individus au sein du syndicat, 2) la négociation entre les membres de la direction-employeur, pour en arriver à un concensus sur ce qu'elle est prêtre à offrir, et 3) la négociation entre le syndicat et la direction en vue de concilier leur propositions respectives.LA NÉGOCIATION « INTERNE  ».Des groupes d'employés avec des objectifs différents doivent faire coïncider leurs opinions divergentes avant et pendant les négociations. La direction doit se soumettre au même effort de rapprochement, qui devient plus difficile lorsque l'unité de négociation comprend plusieurs secteurs d'employés.LA NÉGOCIATION ENTRE LES SALARIÉS ET LA DIRECTION.Différents mécanismes assurent la conversion des objectifs ou « inputs » des salariés et de l'employeur en « outputs ». Ceux-ci prennent la forme a) de relations interpersonnelles continuelles, b) de la structure des unités de négociations et des sources de la prise de décision, c) du processus des négociations, d) de la procédure en matière de griefs, des différents comités institués etc., et e) des différentes formes d'intervention de tiers, gouvernemental ou autre, qui s'expriment par les notions de conciliation, de médiation, d'arbitrage, etc. Nous discuterons brièvement ces différents points.Relations interpersonnelles.Nous trouvons décevant le fait que le Rapport de l'Équipe spécialisée en relations du travail ait omis de discuter du phénomène des relations interpersonnelles. En ne tenant pas compte de cet aspect des relations patrons-ouvriers, l'Equipe spécialisée a trop insisté sur l'aliénation et la subordination de l'individu dans le monde du travail.La structure des unités des négociations.Le rapport de l'Équipe spécialisée ne fait pas la distinction importante entre l'unité de négociation accréditée et l'unité négociant, puisqu'il semble s'être servi de l'expression « unité de négociation » pour englober ces deux réalités. Plusieurs commentaires sont de mise concernant les recommandations fait par l'Équipe spécialisée sur la structure de négociation.Les sources des prises de décisions.Le rapport de l'Équipe spécialisée s'est soucié des problèmes touchant la centralisation et la décentralisation des prises de décision, et effectua une mise en garde face à la situation où les participants à la négociation collective ne sont que de simples messagers des positions prises par des tiers. L'Équipe spécialisée recommande que les participants à la négociation d'un contrat aient le pouvoir de décision.Le deuxième point important ici est le conflit qui existe entre le désir des syndicats d'avoir une force de négociation importante et les exigences de chaque secteur local représenté d'avoir leurs intérêts propres respectés et négociés effectivement.Le processus des négociations.L'Équipe spécialisée a omis d'examiner ou de considérer l'interaction patrons-ouvriers qui se produit durant la négociation de contrats. Nous croyons que la partie analytique de son Rapport eut été beaucoup meilleure si elle avait examiné ce processus comme elle a analysé l'inflation.De la durée des négociations.Nous sommes d'accord avec la recommandation du Rapport que les parties soient libres de faire la grève ou un « lock-out » une fois que la convention collective est expirée et que les soixante jours après l'avis au conciliateur sont écoulés.La procédure en matière de griefs.Pour accélérer la solution des griefs, un pouvoir plus grand de décision attribué aux chefs syndicaux locaux et aux contremaîtres, et les décisions d'arbitrage prise sur le champ pourraient produire des résultats bénéfiques.Les procédures nouvelles de négociations collectives.L'Équipe spécialisée reconnaît les nouveaux développements des formes de négociation collective et stipule que « les parties seraient bien avisées... de négocier régulièrement pendant toute la durée de la convention ». Cette forme nouvelle d'approche requiert que les parties s'engagent fortement à identifier les problèmes après une recherche conjointe, à trouver des solutions à mesure que les problèmes sont soulevés, à maintenir de bonnes communications à tous les niveaux, et à prendre l'initiative de toucher des secteurs qui ne sont pas encore reconnus comme faisant partie du processus de négociation collective « traditionnelle ». Le point crucial est de s'engager à identifier et à résoudre les problèmes communs ou mutuels.This paper attempts to highlight the parts of the Woods 1 Report dealing with the collective bargaining process. The author discusses how the goals (inputs) of labour and management are converted to outputs via the mechanisms of collective bargaining, and gives his personal opinions on the positions advanced in the Task Force Report.1. Canadian Industrial Relations, The Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations, Ottawa, the Queen's Printer, 1969. This document will be referred to throughout this paper as the Task Force Report

Strategic Trade Policy in Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Competition

In this paper, we assess the influence of the generalized Nash bargaining model on strategic trade policies. In particular, how the trade policy and the bargaining process over managerial contract are strategically connected within the context of bargaining over the sales delegation model is analyzed. We explore the policy impacts in two different models: the export rivalry model and the import-competing model, and show that the introduction of managers' bargaining process leads to a decrease in the export subsidy and optimal tariff in different models.Bargaining Delegation

The Collective Bargaining Process

A half century after the passage of the Wagner Act the right to bargain collectively remains a glowing but imperfectly realized promise for American workers. In recent years even the theoretical dimensions of the right have been markedly compressed. Yet collective bargaining was conceived in the widespread belief that both the cause of industrial peace and the welfare of the individual employee would be promoted if workers were given a genuine voice in determining their employment conditions. Why has the process apparently lost so much appeal? Does it still hold hope for the future? In this paper I shall review briefly the major policy choices confronting the early formulators of collective bargaining law, trace some of the more important doctrinal and practical developments over the intervening decades, and ruminate a bit about where we should go from here

Los Angeles Labor Negotiations Study

[Excerpt] Sjoberg Evashenk Consulting and Cornell University have completed a study of the City of Los Angeles’ labor negotiation policies, processes and practices, under contract with the City Controller’s Office. The objectives of the study are to: • Review negotiations executed within the last three years for lessons learned, as well as review negotiations currently underway. • Evaluate and map the City’s current collective bargaining process. • Conduct a nationwide search for promising practices the City could incorporate into the collective bargaining process. • Evaluate the fiscal impacts of labor negotiations. • Evaluate the role of and incentives for each party in the process. • Evaluate the labor-management relationships outside of the bargaining process. • Identify opportunities for improving labor-management relations. Cornell University addressed the City’s current labor relations process and identified areas for improvement or consideration (Sections I and III), while Sjoberg Evashenk Consulting focused on the financial implications of the City’s collective bargaining practices (Section II). Cornell ILR faculty who contributed their time to this study include: Associate Dean Suzanne Bruyere, Marcia Calicchia (Project Lead), Lou Jean Fleron, Professor Emeritus and former Associate Dean Lois S. Gray, Dean Harry Katz, Sally Klingel, Peter Lazes, Tom Quimby, Jane Savage, Rocco Scanza, Scott Sears, and Associate Dean and Vice Provost for Land Grant Affairs Ronald Seeber. Pam Strausser in Cornell’s Office of Human Resources and Mildred Warner in Cornell’s Department of City and Regional Planning also provided invaluable assistance

External Intervention and the Duration of Civil Wars

This paper examines the effect of external intervention on civil war duration from the years 1946-2002. Based on the logic that intervention causes a distortion of the bargaining process in civil wars, it is hypothesized that intervention leads to increased civil war duration. This hypothesis is tested using linear regression analysis, which finds a positive, significant relationship between intervention and civil war duration. Considered in the context of previous literature, it is concluded that in addition to the distorting effect intervention appears to have on the bargaining process, this result may have been informed by the presence of competitive intervention, rival intervention, and interventions by states with an independent agenda. This research provides further evidence of the conflict lengthening effect of intervention, while tracing a common explanation based in the bargaining model of war throughout the various perspectives in the literature

The Steward’s Role in Bargaining

[Excerpt] Bargaining a new contract is one of the biggest events in the life of a union, and one that offers stewards many opportunities to build a stronger organization. For many stewards, though, the bargaining process consists of responding the three big questions from the members

Life satisfaction and household production in a collective model: Evidence from Italy

The model takes into account the household production and self reported information is interpreted in relation with the sharing rule governing the bargaining process in the family. Considering that the theoretical framework implies a wide concept of full income, which includes the allocation of time between the spouses, we used the self reported information on whole satisfaction in life. We demonstrate that self reported data on satisfaction are useful in recovering the individual share of the household full income and the relevance of the wages in this bargaining process. We find also that non strictly economic individual variables and some household characteristics are important in explaining the Italian sharing rule.Collective model, Within-household income comparisons, Subjective data, Italy.

Optimal Contracts and Contractual Arrangements Within the Hospital: Bargaining vs. Take-it-or-leave-it Offers

We study the impact of different contractual arrangements within the hospital on the optimal contracts designed by third party payers when severity is hospital's private information. We develop a multi-issue bargaining process between doctors and managers within the hospital. Results are then compared with a scenario where doctors and managers decide independently by maximizing their own profit, with managers proposing to doctors a take-it-or leave-it offer. Results show that, when the cost of capital is sufficiently low, the informational rent arising on information asymmetry is higher in a set up where managers and doctors decide together through a strategic bargaining process than when they act as two decision-making units.Strategic Bargaining; Optimal Contracts; Hospitals; Asymmetric Information

Asymmetries in the Bargaining Process

Although both sides in academic collective bargaining state that they are interested in the best interests of the institution, there are, of course, differences as to what these interests are and how they are to be achieved. Some of the divergences are differences of degree (the union may look for much larger raises for the economic good of their members and the administration team may look to maintain economic viability for the institution), while others are differences of kind, asymmetries in the process. The present paper considers the latter kind of difference, considering the teams, their planning processes, and their behavior at the table. In the last section are suggestions for some ways to decrease these asymmetries

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games