Coordination mechanisms for inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these supply chains track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon base stock levels that minimize their own inventory costs. In general these levels do not coincide with the optimal base stock levels in the global optimum of the chain under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control. \ud To remove this cost inefficiency, two simple coordination mechanisms are presented: one for serial systems and one for distribution systems. Both mechanisms are initiated by the most downstream installation(s). The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for the increase of costs and provides it with a part of its gain from coordination. It is shown that both coordination mechanisms result in the global optimum of the chain being the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, all installations agree upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per installation. The practical implementation of these mechanisms is discussed

On multi-stage production/inventory systems under stochastic demand

This paper was presented at the 1992 Conference of the International Society of Inventory Research in Budapest, as a tribute to professor Andrew C. Clark for his inspiring work on multi-echelon inventory models both in theory and practice. It reviews and extends the work of the authors on periodic review serial and convergent multi-echelon systems under stochastic stationary demand. In particular, we highlight the structure of echelon cost functions which play a central role in the derivation of the decomposition results and the optimality of base stock policies. The resulting optimal base stock policy is then compared with an MRP system in terms of cost effectiveness, given a predefined target customer service level. Another extension concerns an at first glance rather different problem; it is shown that the problem of setting safety leadtimes in a multi-stage production-to-order system with stochastic lead times leads to similar decomposition structures as those derived for multi-stage inventory systems. Finally, a discussion on possible extensions to capacitated models, models with uncertainty in both demand and production lead time as well as models with an aborescent structure concludes the paper

Industrial Symbiotic Networks as Coordinated Games

We present an approach for implementing a specific form of collaborative industrial practices-called Industrial Symbiotic Networks (ISNs)-as MC-Net cooperative games and address the so called ISN implementation problem. This is, the characteristics of ISNs may lead to inapplicability of fair and stable benefit allocation methods even if the collaboration is a collectively desired one. Inspired by realistic ISN scenarios and the literature on normative multi-agent systems, we consider regulations and normative socioeconomic policies as two elements that in combination with ISN games resolve the situation and result in the concept of coordinated ISNs.Comment: 3 pages, Proc. of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2018

Cooperation in manure-based biogas production networks: An agent-based modeling approach

Biogas production from manure has been proposed as a partial solution to energy and environmental concerns. However, manure markets face distortions caused by considerable unbalance between supply and demand and environmental regulations imposed for soil and water protection. Such market distortions influence the cooperation between animal farmers, biogas producers and arable land owners causing fluctuations in manure prices paid (or incurred) by animal farmers. This paper adopts an agent-based modeling approach to investigate the interactions between manure suppliers, i.e., animal farmers, and biogas producers in an industrial symbiosis case example consisting of 19 municipalities in the Overijssel region (eastern Netherlands). To find the manure price for successful cooperation schemes, we measure the impact of manure discharge cost, dimension and dispersion of animal farms, incentives provided by the government for bioenergy production, and the investment costs of biogas plants for different scales on the economic returns for both actor types and favorable market conditions. Findings show that manure exchange prices may vary between −3.33 €/t manure (i.e., animal farmer pays to biogas producer) and 7.03 €/t manure (i.e., biogas producer pays to animal farmer) and thanks to cooperation, actors can create a total economic value added between 3.73 €/t manure and 39.37 €/t manure. Hence, there are cases in which animal farmers can profitably be paid, but the presence of a supply surplus not met by demand provides an advantage to arable land owners and biogas producers in the price contracting phase in the current situation in the Netherlands

Supply Chain Disruptors and their Impact on the Future of Manufacturing, Logistics, and Distribution

In this paper, we outline some of the changes occurring in the world and how businesses are adapting to these changes. We also list disruptors – factors or new ideas that disrupt the status quo – and their impact on manufacturing, supply chain, logistics, and distribution