U.S. Energy Policy and the Presumption of Market Failure

The article presents an analysis of U.S. energy policy, focusing on the question of whether it is able to correct market failures in terms of alternative energy sources. The question of whether any such market failures exist is said to be a separate question, and an argument is presented that governments generally are not competent to fix such problems even when they do exist. A discussion of U.S. energy policy from the early 1970s to the 21st century is presented. Programs designed to encourage technological innovations such as biofeuls, nuclear fusion, and electric vehicles are analyzed

The Apollo Fallacy and its Effect on U.S. Energy Policy

US Policy makers have made continual references to the Apollo Program as a model for development of alternative energy technologies. This model, however, is inappropriate for energy policy, and its use is termed the Apollo fallacy. The goal of the Apollo Program was the demonstration of engineering prowess while any alternative energy technology must succeed in the marketplace. Several Apollo-like energy programs have been tried and all have failed at high cost. It is argued that the use of Apollo has political benefits but that it is detrimental to the adoption of potentially effective energy policies

Determinants of share price movements in emerging equity markets: some evidence from America\u27s past

Emerging equity markets are plagued by poor information, which is a barrier to outside shareholder participation. This paper examines the determinants of share prices of two United States companies over a 14-year period during the late 19th century, when America had an emerging equity market. These two companies withheld all information on profits and assets until the end of the period, yet traded regularly. Overall, the evidence suggests that outside investors received sufficient compensation for their ignorance, and that these outsiders set the market price. An event study shows that when information about company assets was revealed, market returns were significantly changed

The Dynamics of the Hungarian Hyperinflation, 1945-6: A New Perspective

From late 1945 through the middle of 1946, Hungary experienced the most gigantic inflation of modern history. But in August 1946, the astronomical price increases stopped, and lasting price stability followed. Indeed, the contrast is so dramatic that it is viewed by some as an economic miracle surpassing even the post-war German Wirschaftswunder. On the surface, the Hungarian hyperinflation, which witnessed a depreciation of the currency unit, the pengo of about 10-27, seems a kind of madness that raises two interlinked questions: First, how could such a fantastic destruction in the value of a currency take place, and second, what possible motive could anyone have for creating this inflation or at least for allowing it to happen

When is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection

The nominal efficiency of a regulatory regime is determined by comparing its social costs and benefits; the regime is nominally efficient if it produces benefits in excess of its costs. Thus, a regulatory regime can be at once nominally efficient and relatively inefficient. A regulatory regime that is nominally efficient in the early days of pollution-control efforts, when increments of environmental quality are relatively cheap, may (but will not necessarily) grow less efficient over time - producing less return on each dollar invested - as increments of environmental quality grow increasingly expensive. A regulatory regime that is more efficient in one institutional and technological setting may be less efficient (or inefficient) in another. In reality, however, this outcome will occur only under certain conditions; specifically, when the regulatory regime as a whole is more efficient. The discussion begins, for the sake of comparison, with a brief review of the conventional story of the Clean Air Act\u27s regulatory regime. In addition, in 1987 the EPA wrapped up a small-scale and temporary but highly successful experiment in tradable rights to lead-content in gasoline. Like other institutions in society, those of environmental protection (including the regulatory regime itself) tend to evolve slowly, incrementally, and inconsistently. In large measure, the choice of regulatory regime depends on the goals and concerns of policy-makers

Lessons from CLEO and FOCUS Measurements of D0-anti-D0 Mixing Parameters

If the true values of the D0-anti-D0 mixing parameters lie within the one sigma ranges of recent measurements, then there is strong evidence for a large width difference, y > 0.01, and large SU(3) breaking effects in strong phases, \delta > pi/4. These constraints are model independent, and would become stronger if M_{12}/Gamma_{12} << 1 in the D0-anti-D0 system. The interesting fact that the FOCUS result cannot be explained by a large mass difference is not trivial and depends on the small D0-anti-D0 production asymmetry in FOCUS and the bounds on CP violating effects from CLEO. The large value of \delta might help explain why y ~ sin^2(theta_c).Comment: 15 pages, harvma

Protecting Private Property with Constitutional Judicial Review: A Social Welfare Approach

This article uses a social welfare approach to determine if and when the institution of constitutional judicial review of property regulation and expropriation is efficient. A model is proposed in which property rights protection is a component of social costs. Constitutional judicial review is assumed to either add to or subtract on net from those costs, affecting social welfare generally. It will be shown that under realistic conditions, reflected in real instances, that constitutional judicial review might not enhance economic efficiency or overall social welfare. We show that the efficiency of constitutional judicial review is likely to vary within the larger institutional context

The JEC Revisited: Did Debt Undermine Stability?

The Joint Executive Committee (JEC), one of the most studied cartels in all of economics, was at best partially successful at maintaining collusion. The railroad cartel faced frequent breakdowns and re-contracting efforts. This paper considers the effects that large capital debt may have had on the members of the JEC. The JEC is compared to the express cartel of the period in which all firms were creditors. The latter had no breakdowns during the same period. It is shown through a small modification in an oligopolistic supergame that debt-burdened firms are Jess likely to maintain a stable cartel agreement than a cartel of creditors, a result that is consistent with the experience of these two cartels