Assessing the extent of community spread caused by mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants

SARS-CoV-2 has recently been found to have spread from humans to minks and then to have transmitted back to humans. However, it is unknown to what extent the human-to-human transmission caused by the variant has reached. Here, we used publicly available SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequences from both humans and minks collected in Denmark and Netherlands, and combined phylogenetic analysis with Bayesian inference under an epidemiological model to trace the possibility of person-to-person transmission. The results showed that at least 12.5% of all people being infected with dominated mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 variants in Denmark and Netherlands were caused by human-to-human transmission, indicating this “back-to-human” SARS-CoV-2 variant has already caused human-to-human transmission. Our study also indicated the need for monitoring this mink-derived and other animal source “back-to-human” SARS-CoV-2 in future and that prevention and control measures should be tailored to avoid large-scale community transmission caused by the virus jumped between animals and humans

Inference of person-to-person transmission of COVID-19 reveals hidden super-spreading events during the early outbreak phase

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was first identified in late 2019 in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China and spread globally in months, sparking worldwide concern. However, it is unclear whether super-spreading events occurred during the early outbreak phase, as has been observed for other emerging viruses. Here, we analyse 208 publicly available SARS-CoV-2 genome sequences collected during the early outbreak phase. We combine phylogenetic analysis with Bayesian inference under an epidemiological model to trace person-to-person transmission. The dispersion parameter of the offspring distribution in the inferred transmission chain was estimated to be 0.23 (95% CI: 0.13–0.38), indicating there are individuals who directly infected a disproportionately large number of people. Our results showed that super-spreading events played an important role in the early stage of the COVID-19 outbreak

Live poultry trading drives China's H7N9 viral evolution and geographical network propagation

The on-going reassortment, human-adapted mutations, and spillover events of novel A(H7N9) avian influenza viruses pose a significant challenge to public health in China and globally. However, our understanding of the factors that disseminate the viruses and drive their geographic distributions is limited. We applied phylogenic analysis to examine the inter-subtype interactions between H7N9 viruses and the closest H9N2 lineages in China during 2010–2014. We reconstructed and compared the inter-provincial live poultry trading and viral propagation network via phylogeographic approach and network similarity technique. The substitution rates of the isolated viruses in live poultry markets and the characteristics of localized viral evolution were also evaluated. We discovered that viral propagation was geographically-structured and followed the live poultry trading network in China, with distinct north-to-east paths of spread and circular transmission between eastern and southern regions. The epicenter of H7N9 has moved from the Shanghai–Zhejiang region to Guangdong Province was also identified. Besides, higher substitution rate was observed among isolates sampled from live poultry markets, especially for those H7N9 viruses. Live poultry trading in China may have driven the network-structured expansion of the novel H7N9 viruses. From this perspective, long-distance geographic expansion of H7N9 were dominated by live poultry movements, while at local scales, diffusion was facilitated by live poultry markets with highly-evolved viruses

Novel genetic reassortants in H9N2 influenza A viruses and their diverse pathogenicity to mice

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>H9N2 influenza A viruses have undergone extensive reassortments in different host species, and could lead to the epidemics or pandemics with the potential emergence of novel viruses.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>To understand the genetic and pathogenic features of early and current circulating H9N2 viruses, 15 representative H9N2 viruses isolated from diseased chickens in northern China between 1998 and 2010 were characterized and compared with all Chinese H9N2 viruses available in the NCBI database. Then, the representative viruses of different genotypes were selected to study the pathogenicity in mice with the aim to investigate the adaptation and the potential pathogenicity of the novel H9N2 reassortants to mammals.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Our results demonstrated that most of the 15 isolates were reassortants and generated four novel genotypes (B62-B65), which incorporated the gene segments from Eurasian H9N2 lineage, North American H9N2 branch, and H5N1 viruses. It was noteworthy that the newly identified genotype B65 has been prevalent in China since 2007, and more importantly, different H9N2 influenza viruses displayed a diverse pathogenicity to mice. The isolates of the 2008-2010 epidemic (genotypes B55 and B65) were lowly infectious, while two representative viruses of genotypes B0 and G2 isolated from the late 1990s were highly pathogenic to mice. In addition, Ck/SD/LY-1/08 (genotype 63, containing H5N1-like NP and PA genes) was able to replicate well in mouse lungs with high virus titers but caused mild clinical signs.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Several lines of evidence indicated that the H9N2 influenza viruses constantly change their genetics and pathogenicity. Thus, the genetic evolution of H9N2 viruses and their pathogenicity to mammals should be closely monitored to prevent the emergence of novel pandemic viruses.</p

M gene reassortment in H9N2 influenza virus promotes early infection and replication: contribution to rising virus prevalence in chickens in China

Segment reassortment and base mutagenesis of influenza A viruses are the primary routes to the rapid evolution of high fitness virus genotypes. We recently described a predominant G57 genotype of avian H9N2 viruses that caused country-wide outbreaks in chickens in China during 2010-2013 which led to the zoonotic emergence of H7N9 viruses. One of the key features of the G57 genotype is the substitution of the earlier BJ/94-like M gene with the G1-like M gene of quail origin. We report here on the functional significance of the G1-like M gene in H9N2 viruses in conferring increased infection severity and infectivity in primary chicken embryonic fibroblasts and chickens. H9N2 virus housing the G1-like M gene, in place of BJ/94-like M gene, showed early surge in viral mRNA and vRNA transcription that were associated with enhanced viral protein production, and with early elevated release of progeny virus comprising largely spherical rather than filamentous virions. Importantly, H9N2 virus with G1-like M gene conferred extrapulmonary virus spread in chickens. Five highly represented signature amino acid residues (37A, 95K, 224N and 242N in M1 protein, and 21G in M2 protein) encoded by the prevalent G1-like M gene were demonstrated as prime contributors to enhanced infectivity. Therefore, the genetic evolution of M gene in H9N2 virus increases reproductive virus fitness, indicating its contribution to rising virus prevalence in chickens in China. Importance We recently described the circulation of a dominant genotype (G57) of H9N2 viruses in country-wide outbreaks in chickens in China, which was responsible through reassortment for the emergence of H7N9 viruses that cause severe human infections. A key feature of the G57 genotype H9N2 virus is the presence of quail origin G1-like M gene which had replaced the earlier BJ/94-like M gene. We found that H9N2 virus with G1-like M gene, but not BJ/94-like M gene, showed early surge in progeny virus production, more severe pathology and extrapulmonary virus spread in chickens. Five highly represented amino acid residues in M1 and M2 proteins derived from G1-like M gene were shown to mediate enhanced virus infectivity. These observations enhance what we currently know about the roles of reassortment and mutations on virus fitness and have implications for assessing the potential of variant influenza viruses that can cause rising prevalence in chickens

Re-emergence of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in wild birds, China

Re-emergence of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in wild birds, Chin

Novel Swine Influenza Virus Reassortants in Pigs, China

During swine influenza virus surveillance in pigs in China during 2006–2009, we isolated subtypes H1N1, H1N2, and H3N2 and found novel reassortment between contemporary swine and avian panzootic viruses. These reassortment events raise concern about generation of novel viruses in pigs, which could have pandemic potential

Neurovirulence of avian influenza virus is dependent on the interaction of viral NP protein with host factor FMRP in the murine brain

Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are zoonotic viruses that exhibit a range infectivity and severity in the human host. Severe human cases of AIVs infection are often accompanied by neurological symptoms, however, the factors involved in the infection of the central nervous system (CNS) are not well known. In this study, we discovered that avian-like sialic acid (SA)-α2, 3 Gal receptor is highly presented in mammalian (human and mouse) brains. In the generation of a mouse-adapted neurotropic H9N2 AIV (SD16-MA virus) in BALB/c mice, we identified key adaptive mutations in its hemagglutinin (HA) and polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2) genes that conferred viral replication ability in mice brain. The SD16-MA virus showed binding affinity for avian-like SA-α2, 3 Gal receptor, enhanced viral RNP polymerase activity, increased viral protein production and transport that culminated in elevated progeny virus production and severe pathogenicity. We further established that host Fragile X Mental Retardation Protein (FMRP), a highly expressed protein in the brain that physically associated with viral nucleocapsid protein (NP) to facilitate RNP assembly and export, was an essential host factor for the neuronal replication of neurotropic AIVs (H9N2, H5N1 and H10N7 viruses). Our study identified a mechanistic process for AIVs to acquire neurovirulence in mice

Guinea Pig Model for Evaluating the Potential Public Health Risk of Swine and Avian Influenza Viruses

BACKGROUND: The influenza viruses circulating in animals sporadically transmit to humans and pose pandemic threats. Animal models to evaluate the potential public health risk potential of these viruses are needed. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We investigated the guinea pig as a mammalian model for the study of the replication and transmission characteristics of selected swine H1N1, H1N2, H3N2 and avian H9N2 influenza viruses, compared to those of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and seasonal human H1N1, H3N2 influenza viruses. The swine and avian influenza viruses investigated were restricted to the respiratory system of guinea pigs and shed at high titers in nasal tracts without prior adaptation, similar to human strains. None of the swine and avian influenza viruses showed transmissibility among guinea pigs; in contrast, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus transmitted from infected guinea pigs to all animals and seasonal human influenza viruses could also horizontally transmit in guinea pigs. The analysis of the receptor distribution in the guinea pig respiratory tissues by lectin histochemistry indicated that both SAα2,3-Gal and SAα2,6-Gal receptors widely presented in the nasal tract and the trachea, while SAα2,3-Gal receptor was the main receptor in the lung. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: We propose that the guinea pig could serve as a useful mammalian model to evaluate the potential public health threat of swine and avian influenza viruses

Mink is a highly susceptible host species to circulating human and avian influenza viruses

Pandemic influenza, typically caused by reassortment of human and avian influenza viruses, can result in severe or fatal infections in humans. Timely identification of potential pandemic viruses must be a priority in influenza virus surveillance. However, the range of host species responsible for the generation of novel pandemic influenza viruses remain unclear. In this study, we conducted serological surveys for avian and human influenza virus infections in farmed mink and determined the susceptibility of mink to prevailing avian and human virus subtypes. The results showed that farmed mink were commonly infected with human (H3N2 and H1N1/pdm) and avian (H7N9, H5N6, and H9N2) influenza A viruses. Correlational analysis indicated that transmission of human influenza viruses occurred from humans to mink, and that feed source was a probable route of avian influenza virus transmission to farmed mink. Animal experiments showed that mink were susceptible and permissive to circulating avian and human influenza viruses, and that human influenza viruses (H3N2 and H1N1/pdm), but not avian viruses, were capable of aerosol transmission among mink. These results indicate that farmed mink could be highly permissive “mixing vessels” for the reassortment of circulating human and avian influenza viruses. Therefore, to reduce the risk of emergence of novel pandemic viruses, feeding mink with raw poultry by-products should not be permitted, and epidemiological surveillance of influenza viruses in mink farms should be urgently implemented