Applications of Distributed Optimal Control in Economics-The Case of Forest Management

This paper presents a theoretical model to find the optimal selective-logging regime of a size-distributed forest. The law of motion of the economic model is governed by a partial differential equation that describes the evolution of the forest stock over time. To find the solution of the resulting distributed optimal control problem, we propose a numerical solution technique known as "Escalator Boxcar Train" used in Biology, for the study of dynamics of physiologically structured populations. The empirical part of the paper determines the optimal selective-logging regime of a size-distributed forest, that is, the selective logging that maximizes the discounted net benefits from timber production of a stand of pinus sylvestris, over an infinite time horizon, and compares the selective logging with the clear-cutting regime.Distributed optimal control, diameter-distributed forest, Escalator Boxcar Train.

Investment Policy for New Environmental Monitoring Technologies to Manage Stock Externalities

With the development of modern information technologies, relying on nanotechnologies and remote sensing, a number of systems can be envisaged that allow for monitoring of the negative externalities generated by producers, consumers or travelers - road pricing schemes or individual emission meters for automobiles are two examples. In the paper, we analyze a dynamic model of stock pollution when the regulator has incomplete information on emissions generated by heterogeneous agent. The paper's contribution is to explicitly study a decentralized policy for adoption of monitoring equipment over time. Each agent has to choose between paying a fixed fee or installing monitoring technology and paying a tax on actual emissions. We determine the second-best tax rates, the pattern of monitoring technology adoption, and identify conditions for the voluntary diffusion of monitoring technologies over time.Externalities ; environmental taxation ; monitoring technology adoption ; diffusion ; nanotechnologies

Technology Adoption by Heterogeneous Producers to Regulate a Stock Externality

This paper presents a framework to determine optimal resource allocation over time for the production of a good by heterogeneous producers who generate a stock externality. We analyze the optimal intertemporal and quality-specific combination of abatement strategies at the source given by a change in the intensity of production and in the chosen technology, and/or removal of existing pollution stock. The results show how the specifications of the production and the emission functions affect technology adoption and the design of the optimal intertemporal combination of source and stock abatement strategies. Moreover, the paper shows that regulation at the intensive margin cannot be considered as a substitute for a regulation at the extensive margin. The paper employs the so-called two-stage solution approach for solving the resulting quality distributed-intertemporal optimal control problem.Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,

Contaminants of emerging concern: a review of biological and economic principles to guide water management policies

Awareness regarding water contamination has increased recently due to the emergence of a multitude of pollutants that pose a high risk to ecosystems and human health. The huge number and heterogeneity of contaminants of emerging concerns (CECs), in terms of their occurrence, bio-chemical behavior, and environmental impacts complicate their monitoring and control. This paper reviews empirical literature on the current situation of CECs to analyze how the identification and control of these emissions have been addressed. The results highlight the need for the risks and impacts of these emerging contaminants to be assessed from an integrated perspective, and for accurate estimates of the cost-efficiency of abatement technologies, taking into account potential side effects, to be provided. Thus, there is an urgent need for economic research that provides guidance for regulating these substances. Furthermore, issues such as developing protocols for measuring their presence and eco-toxicity, the way in which they are introduced into the environment, and their potential impact on aquatic ecosystems have yet to be covered

Reseña de libro Los instrumentos económicos en la gestión del agua en la agricultura

[EN] José Albiac Murillo, Editor científico Ediciones Mundi-Prensa, 2003.Xabadia Palmada, A. (2003). Reseña de libro Los instrumentos económicos en la gestión del agua en la agricultura. Economía Agraria y Recursos Naturales - Agricultural and Resource Economics. 3(6):159-162. doi:10.7201/earn.2003.06.09SWORD1591623

Policy for the adoption of new environmental monitoring technologies to manage stock externalities

International audienceWith the development of modern information technologies, relying on nanotechnologies and remote sensing, a number of systems can be envisaged that allow for monitoring of the negative externalities generated by producers, consumers or travelers - road pricing schemes or individual emission meters for automobiles are two examples. We analyze a dynamic model of stock pollution when the regulator has incomplete information on emissions generated by heterogeneous agents. Our contribution is to explicitly study a decentralized policy for adoption of monitoring equipment over time. We determine second-best tax rates, the pattern of monitoring technology adoption, and identify conditions for the voluntary diffusion of monitoring technologies over time. Simulations show the welfare gains compared to alternative policies

Investment Policy for New Environmental Monitoring Technologies to Manage Stock Externalities

URL des Documents de travail : http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/cesdp2009.htmlDocuments de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2009.10 - ISSN : 1955-611XWith the development of modern information technologies, relying on nanotechnologies and remote sensing, a number of systems can be envisaged that allow for monitoring of the negative externalities generated by producers, consumers or travelers - road pricing schemes or individual emission meters for automobiles are two examples. In the paper, we analyze a dynamic model of stock pollution when the regulator has incomplete information on emissions generated by heterogeneous agent. The paper's contribution is to explicitly study a decentralized policy for adoption of monitoring equipment over time. Each agent has to choose between paying a fixed fee or installing monitoring technology and paying a tax on actual emissions. We determine the second-best tax rates, the pattern of monitoring technology adoption, and identify conditions for the voluntary diffusion of monitoring technologies over time.Depuis longtemps, la régulation des externalités se heurte à des problèmes d'information. Avec le progrès technique, il existe maintenant de nouvelles technologies qui se révèlent prometteuses pour la régulation des externalités : codes-barres digitaux (pouvant servir à tracer les lieux et méthodes de production), nanotechnologies permettant de tracer les molécules de produits chimiques dispersés dans l'eau ou de suivre des molécules transportés dans l'air, ou encore détecteurs de longue portée permettant de détecter les mouvements de voiture et de les faire payer selon leurs usages des routes en fonction de l'horaire et du flux de la circulation. Ce genre de technologies nécessite souvent un grand investissement dans l'infrastructure ainsi que des coûts variables afin de gérer chaque agent lié au système, comme c'est le cas pour les systèmes d'information géographique, par exemple. Le régulateur se trouve donc face au problème suivant : sous quelles conditions doit-il investir dans ces nouvelles technologies permettant une meilleure traçabilité des externalités, et, étant donné le progrès technique qui diminue les coûts d'investissements avec le temps, quand investir ? Comment la régulation doit-elle s'adapter pour prendre en compte ces nouvelles possibilités techniques ? Nous tentons de répondre à ces questions, en analysant un modèle d'optimisation dynamique d'un planificateur social face à un problème d'externalité de stock où le coût social augmente avec l'accumulation d'émissions. Nous utilisons des méthodes d'optimisation en deux étapes afin de résoudre le problème du planificateur : d'abord déterminer les émissions optimales selon les caractéristiques des agents, et ensuite déterminer la trajectoire optimale d'émissions dans le temps. Etant donné que le régulateur manque d'information sur les émissions des agents individuels, nous proposons ensuite une politique volontaire de locations de ce genre d'équipement une fois que l'investissement dans l'infrastructure aurait été effectué

The optimal selective logging regime and the Faustmann formula

Distributed optimal control Density effects Forest management Faustmann rule Selective logging

Optimal Forest Management in the Presence of Intraspecific Competition

The Escalator Boxcar Train method is used to solve the distributed optimal control problems of forest management numerically. It takes into account intraspecific competition for scarce resources such as light, space, and nutrients during reproduction, growth, and mortality. It provides an alternative to gradient projection methods and Markov processes. It is implemented with standard software. The application is on the optimal forest management regime in the presence of intraspecific competition.distributed optimal control, Escalator Boxcar Train, forest management, intraspecific competition, numerical methods,